| Literature DB >> 23437262 |
Claudia A F Wascher1, Thomas Bugnyar.
Abstract
Sensitivity to inequity is considered to be a crucial cognitive tool in the evolution of human cooperation. The ability has recently been shown also in primates and dogs, raising the question of an evolutionary basis of inequity aversion. We present first evidence that two bird species are sensitive to other individuals' efforts and payoffs. In a token exchange task we tested both behavioral responses to inequity in the quality of reward (preferred versus non-preferred food) and to the absence of reward in the presence of a rewarded partner, in 5 pairs of corvids (6 crows, 4 ravens). Birds decreased their exchange performance when the experimental partner received the reward as a gift, which indicates that they are sensitive to other individuals' working effort. They also decreased their exchange performance in the inequity compared with the equity condition. Notably, corvids refused to take the reward after a successful exchange more often in the inequity compared with the other conditions. Our findings indicate that awareness to other individuals' efforts and payoffs may evolve independently of phylogeny in systems with a given degree of social complexity.Entities:
Mesh:
Year: 2013 PMID: 23437262 PMCID: PMC3577644 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0056885
Source DB: PubMed Journal: PLoS One ISSN: 1932-6203 Impact factor: 3.240
Figure 1Photo of the experimental setup.
Corvids stayed in adjacent experimental compartments, separated from each other by a wire mesh. The experimenter kneeled in front of the compartments, having both reward typed visible for the birds in front of her.
Behavioral responses of crows and ravens during the exchange experiment
| success | exchange | individual took the initial item with the beak and upon request gave it back into the hand of the experimenter |
| refuses reward | individual successfully exchanged but refuses to take the reward | |
| failure | refuses initial item | individual refuses to take the initial item |
| drop | individual drops initial item but not into the hand of the experimenter | |
| does not give back | individual does not give back the initial item upon request |
Experimental conditions conducted in the present study.
| condition | task | action focal | action model | reward focal | reward model | |
| equity | task A | exchange | exchange | cheese and grape | cheese and grape | |
| equity low quality | task B | exchange | exchange | grape | grape | |
| effort control | task A | exchange | cheese and grape | cheese and grape | ||
| task B | grape | grape | ||||
| quality control | task A | exchange | not present | grape | ||
| no reward no partner | task B | exchange | not present | not rewarded | ||
| both no reward | task B | exchange | exchange | not rewarded | not rewarded | |
| inequity | task A | exchange | exchange | grape | cheese | |
| task B | exchange | exchange | not rewarded | grape | ||
Factors and interactions remaining in the final model investigating exchange performance of corvids in response to inequity.
| task A: inequity in reward quality | |||||
| fixed factors | numerator df | denominator df | F | p | |
| condition | 3 | 1.787 | 3.278 | 0.02 | |
| type of reward | 1 | 1.787 | 11.769 | 0.001 | |
| reward in previous trial | 1 | 1.787 | 7.206 | 0.007 | |
| session | 1 | 1.787 | 2.557 | 0.11 | |
| interactions | |||||
| condition * individual | 27 | 1.787 | 2.568 | <0.001 | |
| session * individual | 9 | 1.787 | 4.042 | <0.001 | |
Factors and interactions (in bold) significantly influence exchange performance.
Number of successful exchanges and number of reward refusals (in brackets) in each condition.
| equity | effort control | quality control | inequity | ||
| grape | cheese | ||||
| task A: inequity in reward quality | |||||
| Crows | |||||
| 3109301m | 23 (1) | 23 (0) | 48 (0) | 34 (0) | 38 (2) |
| HF54707m | 19 (1) | 23 (0) | 39 (0) | 34 (0) | 35 (4) |
| HF54710f | 19 (0) | 22 (1) | 34 (2) | 44 (8) | 28 (13) |
| HF54709m | 16 (2) | 19 (0) | 30 (0) | 19 (0) | 19 (4) |
| HF54706f | 20 (0) | 22 (0) | 48 (0) | 25 (2) | 43 (4) |
| HF54708f | 15 (5) | 21 (0) | 19 (0) | 22 (10) | 38 (28) |
| Ravens | |||||
| JC46070f | 23 (0) | 24 (0) | 41 (6) | 34 (0) | 37 (15) |
| JC38974m | 24 (0) | 24 (0) | 44 (1) | 46 (0) | 46 (4) |
| JC38981m | 24 (0) | 24 (0) | 35 (0) | 32 (0) | 27 (0) |
| JC46083m | 24 (0) | 24 (0) | 48 (0) | 48 (0) | 46 (0) |
Please note that in task B (inequity in the presence/absence of reward), reward refusals where not possible in the no reward, no partner, both no reward and inequity conditions, as focal individuals did not receive any reward for exchanging. In each condition each individual received a total of 48 trials (2 sessions á 24 trials). f female individuals, m male individuals.
Figure 2Corvids behavioral responses to task A, inequity in the quality of the food reward.
Graph shows mean percentage of successful exchanges ± SE. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; Alpha after Bonferroni correction 0.0125.
Post-hoc comparisons between different test conditions.
| T | p-value | |
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| equity high-equity low | 0.171 | 0.87 |
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| equity low-effort control high | 1.72 | 0.14 |
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| equity low quality reward-quality control | ||
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| effort control high-effort control low | 2.38 | 0.06 |
| effort control low-quality control | 0.32 | 0.76 |
| effort control low-inequity | 1.03 | 0.35 |
| effort control high-inequity | 1.6 | 0.17 |
| inequity-quality control | 1.826 | 0.12 |
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| effort control-no reward no partner | 2.37 | 0.055 |
| effort control-both no reward | 1.56 | 0.169 |
| effort control-inequity | 1.65 | 0.15 |
| no reward no partner-both no reward no partner | 0.93 | 0.388 |
| no reward no partner-inequity | 0.83 | 0.438 |
| both no reward- inequity | 0.87 | 0.417 |
Differences between the parameter estimates have been divided by the standard error (SE) differences between pairs and interpreted the output as a t-test.
Figure 3Mean percentage ± SE of successful exchanges with the experimenter but refusals to take the offered reward in task A.
Equity- effort control (T = 0, p = 1); equity- quality control (T = 7, p = 0.001); equity-inequity (T = 10.5, p = 0.001); effort control- quality control (T = 7.5, p = 0.001); effort control- inequity (T = 10.6, p = 0.001); quality control-inequity (T = 12.25, p = 0.01).
Figure 4Corvids behavioral responses in experiment B exchange in the absence of a reward.
Graph shows mean percentage of successful exchanges ± SE. Alpha after Bonferroni correction 0.01.