| Literature DB >> 28747481 |
Siobhán O'Brien1, Adela M Luján2, Steve Paterson3, Michael A Cant4, Angus Buckling5.
Abstract
Cooperation in nature is ubiquitous, but is susceptible to social cheats who pay little or no cost of cooperation yet reap the benefits. The effect such cheats have on reducing population productivity suggests that there is selection for cooperators to mitigate the adverse effects of cheats. While mechanisms have been elucidated for scenarios involving a direct association between producer and cooperative product, it is less clear how cooperators may suppress cheating in an anonymous public goods scenario, where cheats cannot be directly identified. Here, we investigate the real-time evolutionary response of cooperators to cheats when cooperation is mediated by a diffusible public good: the production of iron-scavenging siderophores by Pseudomonas aeruginosa We find that siderophore producers evolved in the presence of a high frequency of non-producing cheats were fitter in the presence of cheats, at no obvious cost to population productivity. A novel morphotype independently evolved and reached higher frequencies in cheat-adapted versus control populations, exhibiting reduced siderophore production but increased production of pyocyanin-an extracellular toxin that can also increase the availability of soluble iron. This suggests that cooperators may have mitigated the negative effects of cheats by downregulating siderophore production and upregulating an alternative iron-acquisition public good. More generally, the study emphasizes that cooperating organisms can rapidly adapt to the presence of anonymous cheats without necessarily incurring fitness costs in the environment they evolve in.Entities:
Keywords: Pseudomonas; cooperation; experimental evolution; public goods; pyoverdine; siderophore
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Year: 2017 PMID: 28747481 PMCID: PMC5543229 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2017.1089
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Proc Biol Sci ISSN: 0962-8452 Impact factor: 5.349
Figure 1.Relative fitness of evolved populations in a 1 : 1 co-culture with ancestral wild-type PAO1, in both the presence and absence of cheats, in iron-limited KB media. Evolved populations were generally less fit than their ancestor, with the exception of treatment populations when competed under the same conditions as which they had evolved in (in the presence of 90% cheats). (LMER treatment × cheat interaction: p < 0.0001). Data are means of six replicates per each of 12 evolved populations ± s.e.m.
Figure 2.Total siderophore (a) and pyoverdine (b) production by evolved control populations (Ctrl), treatment populations (Trt; evolved in the presence of 90% cheats) and the ancestral clonal PAO1 (Anc). After approximately 190 generations, treatment populations exhibited reduced per capita total siderophore production (one-sample t-test (alt = 0.70672), t5 = 3.4056, p < 0.05) and pyoverdine production (one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test, alternative = 7876.512, V = 4, p < 0.0001), relative to the ancestor. For (a), data are means of six evolved populations for each treatment ± s.e.m, and the single population of ancestral PAO1. For (b), data are means of pyoverdine production for 30 colonies for each evolved population (six evolved populations each for control and treatment condition), and the single ancestral PAO1.
Figure 3.Effect of the addition of exogenous pyocyanin to PAO1 (cooperator; circles and dashed line) and PAO1ΔpvdDΔpchEF (cheat; triangles and solid line) populations. Selection coefficient is calculated relative to a control cooperator or cheat population to which no pyocyanin was added. The effect increasing pyocyanin has on relative fitness (r) is greatest in cheat populations (GLM, strain identity × pyocyanin concentration, F1,44 = 12.018, p = 0.001). Fitness (r) relative to control population (no pyocyanin added) was calculated as m(strain x) − mean(m(strain y)). Lines are plotted based on predictions from minimal GLM model. Data are means of six replicates per treatment ± s.e.m.