| Literature DB >> 25222742 |
Christian E H Beaudrie1, Terre Satterfield2, Milind Kandlikar3, Barbara H Harthorn4.
Abstract
Engineered nanoscale materials (ENMs) present a difficult challenge for risk assessors and regulators. Continuing uncertainty about the potential risks of ENMs means that expert opinion will play an important role in the design of policies to minimize harmful implications while supporting innovation. This research aims to shed light on the views of 'nano experts' to understand which nanomaterials or applications are regarded as more risky than others, to characterize the differences in risk perceptions between expert groups, and to evaluate the factors that drive these perceptions. Our analysis draws from a web-survey (N = 404) of three groups of US and Canadian experts: nano-scientists and engineers, nano-environmental health and safety scientists, and regulatory scientists and decision-makers. Significant differences in risk perceptions were found across expert groups; differences found to be driven by underlying attitudes and perceptions characteristic of each group. Nano-scientists and engineers at the upstream end of the nanomaterial life cycle perceived the lowest levels of risk, while those who are responsible for assessing and regulating risks at the downstream end perceived the greatest risk. Perceived novelty of nanomaterial risks, differing preferences for regulation (i.e. the use of precaution versus voluntary or market-based approaches), and perceptions of the risk of technologies in general predicted variation in experts' judgments of nanotechnology risks. Our findings underscore the importance of involving a diverse selection of experts, particularly those with expertise at different stages along the nanomaterial lifecycle, during policy development.Entities:
Mesh:
Year: 2014 PMID: 25222742 PMCID: PMC4164444 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0106365
Source DB: PubMed Journal: PLoS One ISSN: 1932-6203 Impact factor: 3.240
Demographic and Domain of Expertise variables by expert group.
| Variables | Category | NSE (N = 171) | NEHS (N = 143) | NREG (N = 110) |
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| Year of highest degree ( | 1990.1 (11.3) | 1994.0 (10.4) | 1992.3 (10.2) | |
| Gender (% Male) | 89.1% | 60.2% | 64.9% | |
| Education |
| 99.3% | 98.9% | 48.7% |
|
| 0.7% | 0.0% | 35.9% | |
|
| 0.0% | 1.1% | 15.4% | |
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| Proportion of time working on nano (mean (SD)) | 0.64 (0.28) | 0.57 (0.30) | 0.34 (0.34) | |
| Involvement in Research | 99.3% | 94.7% | 43.6% | |
| Affiliation |
| 81.9% | 89.4% | 0.0% |
|
| 8.0% | 1.1% | 97.4% | |
|
| 10.1% | 9.6% | 2.6% | |
| Disciplinary Field |
| 85.0% | 13.7% | 6.4% |
|
| 6.4% | 60.0% | 50.0% | |
|
| 0.7% | 7.4% | 17.9% | |
|
| 7.9% | 15.8% | 7.7% | |
|
| 0.0% | 3.2% | 16.7% |
Notes: All values (except for ‘year of highest degree’ and ‘proportion of time working on nano’) indicate the distribution of respondents by group for each variable (out of a total of 100%). Figures for the ‘year of highest degree’ and ‘proportion of time working on nano’ scales indicate mean scores and standard deviations.
Figure 1“Risk versus Benefit” ratings for nanotechnologies in general.
Color-coded bars indicate the proportion of respondents in each expert group (NSE, NEHS, and NREG) choosing the indicated response.
Figure 2'Risk Perception' ratings for NSE, NEHS, and NREG expert groups.
Mean scores for each group are indicated with points on respective color-coded lines capturing 14 different nanotechnology scenarios rated between ‘almost no risk’ and ‘high risk’. Significant differences in means were determined using a one-way ANOVA with post hoc analysis, and are indicated with a, b, and c markings as outlined in the legend.
Loadings from a principal components analysis over seven rating scales averaged across individuals (VARIMAX rotated solution).
| Rating Scale |
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| New Benefits | .10 |
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| Novel Properties | .08 |
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| Properties Cannot be Anticipated |
| .17 |
| New Risks |
| .24 |
| Risks are Not Well Known |
| −.16 |
| Risks Cannot be Determined |
| −.02 |
| More Uncertainty |
| .16 |
* Items are reverse coded to facilitate comparison.
Notes: Loadings exceeding 0.4 are in boldface.
For each novelty question, the following Likert scale was used: 1 – Strongly Disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 – Agree, 4 – Strongly Agree.
Nano-scale materials promise benefits for society that are not possible with bulk (non nano-scale) materials.
Nano-scale materials possess novel properties that are not expressed in their corresponding bulk forms.
The novel properties of nano-scale materials cannot be anticipated by knowing the properties of the same material in its bulk form.
Nano-scale materials pose risks for society that are not present with bulk (non nano-scale) materials.
The health and environmental risks from nano-scale materials are not well known to scientists.
The existing methods for assessing health and environmental risks from bulk materials are not suitable for determining risks from nano-scale materials.
There is more uncertainty about the risks from nano-scale materials than the risks from bulk forms.
Loadings from a principal components analysis over fourteen rating scales related to 'Regulation of Risks' and 'Regulation of Nanotechnologies', averaged across individuals (VARIMAX rotated solution).
| Rating Scale | Factor 1: Confidence in Markets and Voluntary Regulation | Factor 2: Preference for Precaution |
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| The government should err on the side of precaution to protect the public from the risks from technology | −.21 |
|
| Regulations unduly prevent society from reaping the benefits of technology |
| −.33 |
| Chemical risks are sufficiently regulated in this country |
| −.29 |
| Voluntary approaches for risk management are effective for protecting human health and the environment. |
| −.16 |
| Market-based approaches are an effective means of managing health and environmental risks from technology |
| −.08 |
| Consumers should be provided with more product information to allow them to better understand a product's risks and benefits | .01 |
|
| Traditional government regulation too frequently determines that a product is dangerous when it is really safe. | .29 |
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| Because current regulations do not take into account novel (size-dependent) properties of nano-scale materials, they are inadequate for protecting society from risks | −.29 |
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| Government should restrict commercial development of nanotechnology until studies have been done on how to control risks | −.12 |
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| Companies utilizing nano-materials in their products should be required to perform more stringent toxicity testing for the products they create | −.07 |
|
| Consumers, through their purchasing decisions, are able to avoid products containing nano-scale materials if they deem them to be too risky |
| .07 |
| Government regulations, as they currently exist, will do a good job of managing risks across the entire life-cycle of nanomaterials (from initial production to end-of-life) |
| −.37 |
| Government should focus on developing voluntary programs rather than mandatory programs to manage risks from nanotechnology |
| −.20 |
Note: Loadings exceeding 0.4 are in boldface.
Hierarchical regression with Nano Risk Index as dependent variable.
| I | II | III | IV | V | VI | |
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| DNEHS | 0.14 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.02 |
| DNREG | 0.22 | 0.18 | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.04 |
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| Gender | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.02 | |
| Education | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.04 | |
| Year of Degree | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.09 | |
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| Disciplinary Field | 0.16 | 0.13 | 0.06 | 0.07 | ||
| Affiliation | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | ||
| Affiliation | −0.06 | −0.02 | 0.03 | 0.00 | ||
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| Novelty: New and Uncertain Risksg | 0.33 | 0.2 | 0.21 | |||
| Novelty: Novel Benefits and Propertiesh | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.04 | |||
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| Regulation: Market-Based, Voluntaryi | −0.10 | −0.10 | ||||
| Regulation: Precautionj | 0.33 | 0.19 | ||||
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| Tech Risk Indexk | 0.41 | |||||
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| 3.5% | 0.5% | 9.0% | 7.7% | 14.7% | |
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*p<.05.
**p<.01.
***p<.001.
Notes: N = 404. Independent variables were entered in six steps, where I through VI indicate model steps, and cell entries are standardized (β) regression coefficients.
Paired dummy variables, where ‘NSE’ is coded as DNEHS = 0, DNREG = 0, ‘NEHS’ is coded as DNEHS = 1, DNREG = 0, and ‘NREG’ is coded as DNEHS = 0, DNREG = 1.
1 = female, 0 = male.
1 = PhD, 0 = Bachelors/Masters.
Standardized continuous variable.
1 = physical sciences, 0 = other, where ‘physical sciences’ includes chemistry, physics, materials science, chemical engineering, electrical engineering, and mechanical engineering.
Paired dummy variables, where ‘academic vs government’ is coded as academic = 0, government = 1, and ‘academic vs other’ is coded as academic = 0, other = 1.
Continuous index variables, described above.
Figure 3Mean scores for the 'Novelty' and 'Attitudes toward Regulation' indices for NSE, NEHS, and NREG groups.
The continuum from ‘high’ to ‘low’ represents a factor score range of +/− 0.5, representing one half standard deviation in either direction from the index. a, b, and c markings indicate significant differences between groups, where a: NSE and NEHS, b: NSE and NREG, c: NEHS and NREG. Tukey HSD post hoc analysis confirms that differences in index scores are significant across all three groups for ‘Novelty’ (p<.05; NSE: N = 180, M = −0.29, SD = 0.86, NREG: N = 103, M = 0.39, SD = 0.88, NEHS: N = 121, M = 0.11, SD = 0.85), and for ‘Regulation: Preference for Precaution’ (p<.001; NSE: N = 180, M = −0.29, SD = 0.82; NEHS: N = 121, M = 0.06, SD = 0.93; NREG: N = 103, M = 0.43, SD = 0.81). Post hoc analysis confirmed a significant difference between NSE and NREG groups only for ‘Regulation: Market-Based, Voluntary’ (p<.022; NSE: N = 180, M = −0.08, SD = 0.80; NREG: N = 103, M = −0.21, SD = 0.91).
Figure 4Comparison of perceptions of ‘novelty’ and ‘attitudes towards regulation’ across expert groups: a) Perceptions of the novelty of benefits versus novelty of risks. b) ‘Confidence in Markets and Voluntary Regulation’ versus ‘Preference for Precaution’.
* indicates significant difference in means between ‘novel risks’ and ‘novel benefits’ by paired t-test, where Novel Benefits M = 3.50, SD = 0.58, Novel Risks M = 2.89, SD = 0.65 for NSE group; Novel Benefits M = 3.3, SD = 0.62, Novel Risks M = 3.16, SD = 0.67, for NEHS group; and difference in means for NREG group is not significant.
Figure 5Comparison of Tech Risk Index and Nano Risk Index scores by expert group.
Paired t-test scores confirmed a significant difference in means between Tech Risk Index and Nano Risk Index for the both the NREG group (Tech Risk Index M = −0.08, SD = 0.99; Nano Risk Index M = 0.26, SD = 0.90), and for the NSE group (Tech Risk Index M = −0.04, SD = 0.82; Nano Risk Index M = −0.20, SD = 0.84). * indicates significant difference in means between Tech Risk Index and Nano Risk Index scores.