Evolution of personality differences in leadership.

When members of a group differ in their preferred course of action, coordination poses a challenge. Leadership offers one way to resolve this difficulty, but the evolution of leaders and followers is itself poorly understood. Existing discussions have frequently attributed leadership to differences in information or need among individuals. Here, however, we show that in an n-player, repeated coordination game, selection leads to evolutionary branching and diversification in intrinsic leadership among the members of a population even in the absence of any variation in state. When individuals interact in pairs, repeated branching is possible; when individuals interact in larger groups, the typical outcome is a single branching event leading to a dimorphism featuring extreme intrinsic leaders and followers. These personality types emerge and are maintained by frequency-dependent selection, because leaders gain by imposing their preferences on followers, but fail to coordinate effectively when interacting with other leaders. The fraction of intrinsic leaders in the population increases with the degree of conflict among group members, with both types common only at intermediate levels of conflict; when conflict is weak, most individuals are intrinsic followers, and groups achieve high levels of coordination by randomly converging on one individual's preferred option, whereas when conflict is strong, most individuals are intrinsic leaders, and coordination breaks down because members of a group are rarely willing to follow another.