| Literature DB >> 35745994 |
Spyridon Damilos1, Stratos Saliakas1, Ioannis Kokkinopoulos1, Panagiotis Karayannis1, Melpo Karamitrou2, Aikaterini-Flora Trompeta2, Costas Charitidis2, Elias P Koumoulos1.
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic instigated massive production of critical medical supplies and personal protective equipment. Injection moulding (IM) is considered the most prominent thermoplastic part manufacturing technique, offering the use of a large variety of feedstocks and rapid production capacity. Within the context of the European Commission-funded imPURE project, the benefits of IM have been exploited in repurposed IM lines to accommodate the use of nanocomposites and introduce the unique properties of nanomaterials. However, these amendments in the manufacturing lines highlighted the need for targeted and thorough occupational risk analysis due to the potential exposure of workers to airborne nanomaterials and fumes, as well as the introduction of additional occupational hazards. In this work, a safety-oriented failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) was implemented to evaluate the main hazards in repurposed IM lines using acrylonitrile butadiene styrene (ABS) matrix and silver nanoparticles (AgNPs) as additives. Twenty-eight failure modes were identified, with the upper quartile including the seven failure modes presenting the highest risk priority numbers (RPN), signifying a need for immediate control action. Additionally, a nanosafety control-banding tool allowed hazard classification and the identification of control actions required for mitigation of occupation risks due to the released airborne silver nanoparticles.Entities:
Keywords: failure mode and effect analysis; injection moulding; nanocomposites; nanomaterials; nanosafety; repurposing; risk analysis
Year: 2022 PMID: 35745994 PMCID: PMC9228191 DOI: 10.3390/polym14122418
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Polymers (Basel) ISSN: 2073-4360 Impact factor: 4.967
Figure 1Process flow diagram of the manufacturing pilot line.
Figure 2Top-down illustration of the manufacturing pilot line.
Evaluation of the three failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) factors.
| Level | Severity ( | Occurrence ( | Detection ( |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Negligible | Almost impossible | Almost certain |
| 2 | Minor | Low | High |
| 3 | Serious | Moderate | Moderate |
| 4 | Major | High | Low |
| 5 | Fatal | Almost certain | Almost impossible |
Failure modes per piece of equipment of the repurposed injection moulding line.
| Failure Modes | Node | Threat | Source | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FM1 | Injection Moulding | Cuts, bruises, injuries | Moving mechanical parts | Injuries caused by moulds dismantling tooling |
| FM2 | Burns | Hot surfaces | Exposed hot surfaces | |
| FM3 | Burns | Heated material | Hot specimens from the mould | |
| FM4 | Inhalation of hazardous fumes | Melted or heated polymer | ||
| FM5 | Eye irritation/damage | Dust | Dust during the final step of the injection process (relaxation) | |
| FM6 | Respiratory irritation/damage | |||
| FM7 | Explosion | High pressure | Operation at max 16 bar through a pneumatic system | |
| FM8 | Electric shock | Electrical hazards | Equipment was connected to the power grid | |
| FM9 | Hearing damage | Noise | Mainly due to the compressor (>100 dB). Disturbing periodic noise from the vent | |
| FM10 | Strain injury, injury from falling object | Lifting of heavy parts | Moulds for IM | |
| FM11 | Eruption | Compressor operation and emptying | High-pressure 90 L vessel on compressor and tubing below the flooring at approx. 15 bars | |
| FM12 | Inhalation of/dermal contact with ENMs | Handling of ENMs | Nanocomposite masterbatch production | |
| FM13 | Pelletizer | Cuts, bruises, injuries | Moving mechanical parts | Cuts during pelletizer operation (blades at high rotation speeds) |
| FM14 | Eye irritation/damage | Dust | Mainly from the pelletizer | |
| FM15 | Respiratory irritation/damage | Mainly from the pelletizer | ||
| FM16 | Electric shock | Electrical hazards | Equipment connected to the power grid | |
| FM17 | Compounder | Burns | Hot surfaces | Exposed hot surfaces |
| FM18 | Burns | Heated material | Melted polymer from the compounder | |
| FM19 | Inhalation of hazardous fumes | Due to melted or heated polymer | ||
| FM20 | Explosion | High pressure | Compounder can reach up to 80 bars | |
| FM21 | Electrical shock | Electrical hazards | Equipment connected to the power grid | |
| FM22 | Strain injury, injury from falling object | Lifting of heavy parts | Feeders for compounder | |
| FM23 | Electric shock | Water spillage | Cooling water bath for the extruded material (close to cables, sockets, etc.) | |
| FM24 | Inhalation of/dermal contact with ENMs | Handling of ENMs | Nanoparticles inserted in the compounder through a gravimetric feeder in dry form | |
| FM25 | Oven | Burns | Hot surfaces | Exposed hot surfaces |
| FM26 | Burns | Heated material | Hot pellets dried in the oven | |
| FM27 | Inhalation of hazardous fumes | Due to the heated polymer | ||
| FM28 | Electric shock | Electrical hazards | Equipment connected to the power grid |
Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) of the repurposed injection moulding line.
| Failure Modes | Affected Groups | Existing Controls |
|
|
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FM1 | O | Standard operating procedure (SOP), heavy-duty gloves, pelletizer interlock | 2 | 4 | 3 | 24 |
| FM2 | O | SOP, heavy-duty gloves, safety cover | 3 | 4 | 1 | 12 |
| FM3 | O | SOP, lab coat, heavy-duty gloves, closed shoes | 3 | 4 | 1 | 12 |
| FM4 | O, B | Arm hood, central ventilation system, respirators | 3 | 4 | 2 | 24 |
| FM5 | O, B | Arm hood, central ventilation system, safety glasses | 2 | 2 | 3 | 12 |
| FM6 | O, B | Arm hood, central ventilation system, respirators | 2 | 2 | 3 | 12 |
| FM7 | O, B | Fire extinguisher, fire plan, safety glasses, pressure indicators on the compressor and IM machine, pressure sensors on the compounder with emergency shutdown | 5 | 1 | 2 | 10 |
| FM8 | O | Lightning arrester in the switchboard, current relay, extra grounding, power safety for the operation bench | 4 | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| FM9 | O, B | Isolation of compressor to a separate room | 3 | 5 | 1 | 15 |
| FM10 | O, B | SOP, closed shoes | 3 | 4 | 1 | 12 |
| FM11 | O, B | SOP, pressure valve and indicator | 5 | 3 | 2 | 30 |
| FM12 | O, B | Isolated inlet system: material is filled in the feeder under a fume hood and then placed on the extruder feeder. Arm hood above the feeder. PPEs (face mask, gloves, lab coat, shoe covering, hair covering) | 2 | 4 | 4 | 32 |
| FM13 | O | SOP, heavy-duty gloves, pelletizer interlock | 2 | 3 | 2 | 12 |
| FM14 | O, B | Arm hood, central ventilation system, safety glasses | 2 | 2 | 3 | 12 |
| FM15 | O, B | Arm hood, central ventilation system, respirators | 2 | 2 | 3 | 12 |
| FM16 | O | Lightning arrester in the switchboard, current relay, extra grounding, power safety for the operation bench | 4 | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| FM17 | O | SOP, safety cover, heavy-duty gloves | 3 | 4 | 1 | 12 |
| FM18 | O | SOP, lab coat, heavy-duty gloves, closed shoes | 3 | 4 | 1 | 12 |
| FM19 | O, B | Arm hood, central ventilation system, respirators | 3 | 4 | 2 | 24 |
| FM20 | O, B | Fire extinguisher, fire plan, safety glasses, pressure indicators on the compressor and the IM machine, pressure sensors on the compounder with emergency shutdown | 5 | 1 | 2 | 10 |
| FM21 | O | Lightning arrester in the switchboard, current relay, extra grounding, power safety for the operation bench | 4 | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| FM22 | O, B | SOP, closed shoes | 3 | 4 | 1 | 12 |
| FM23 | O | SOP, release valve on the bottom of the bath | 5 | 3 | 2 | 30 |
| FM24 | O, B | Isolated inlet system: material is filled in the feeder under a fume hood and then placed on the extruder feeder. Arm hood above the feeder. PPEs (face mask, gloves, lab coat, shoes covering, hair covering). Use of liquid pump to insert the particles in suspension form | 3 | 4 | 4 | 48 |
| FM25 | O | SOP, heavy-duty gloves, safety cover | 3 | 4 | 1 | 12 |
| FM26 | O | SOP, lab coat, heavy-duty gloves, closed shoes | 3 | 4 | 1 | 12 |
| FM27 | O, B | Arm hood, central ventilation system, respirators | 3 | 2 | 2 | 12 |
| FM28 | O | Lightning arrester in the switchboard, current relay, extra grounding, power safety for the operation bench | 4 | 1 | 2 | 8 |
O: operators; B: background personnel.
Input parameters in the Stoffenmanager Nano for silver nanoparticle hazard assessment.
| Stoffenmanager Nano Input Fields | Parameters Input within Tool | |
|---|---|---|
| Process Type | Handling of Bulk Aggregated/Agglomerated Powders | |
| Product Characteristics | Dustiness | Unknown |
| Moisture content | Dry product | |
| Concentration of nano component | 100% | |
| Does it contain one of the following OECD components? | Ag (nanosilver) | |
| Is the primary particle diameter larger than 50 nm? | No | |
| Handling/Process | Task characterization | Handling of products in small amounts (up to 100 g) |
| Task duration | 30–120 min a day | |
| Task frequency | 2–3 days a week | |
| Task performed within breathing zone of employee | Yes | |
| Working Area | Working room being cleaned daily; | Yes |
| inspections and maintenance of machines/ancillary equipment being done at least monthly | Yes | |
| Working room volume | 100–1000 m3 | |
| Ventilation in working room | Mechanical or natural ventilation | |
| Local Control Measures and Personal Protective Equipment | Local control measures | Scenario A—No controls |
| Personal protective equipment | Scenario A—No controls | |
Figure 3Control-banding classification of silver nanoparticles handling through Stoffenmanager Nano.
Ratings for highest threat failure modes.
| Priority Number | Failure Modes | Affected Groups |
|
|
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | FM24 | O, B | 3 | 4 | 4 | 48 |
| 2 | FM12 | O, B | 2 | 4 | 4 | 32 |
| 3 | FM11 | O, B | 5 | 3 | 2 | 30 |
| 4 | FM23 | O | 5 | 3 | 2 | 30 |
| 5 | FM1 | O | 2 | 4 | 3 | 24 |
| 6 | FM4 | O, B | 3 | 4 | 2 | 24 |
| 7 | FM19 | O, B | 3 | 4 | 2 | 24 |
O: operators; B: background personnel.