Literature DB >> 25349390

Direct and indirect punishment among strangers in the field.

Loukas Balafoutas1, Nikos Nikiforakis2, Bettina Rockenbach3.   

Abstract

Many interactions in modern human societies are among strangers. Explaining cooperation in such interactions is challenging. The two most prominent explanations critically depend on individuals' willingness to punish defectors: In models of direct punishment, individuals punish antisocial behavior at a personal cost, whereas in models of indirect reciprocity, they punish indirectly by withholding rewards. We investigate these competing explanations in a field experiment with real-life interactions among strangers. We find clear evidence of both direct and indirect punishment. Direct punishment is not rewarded by strangers and, in line with models of indirect reciprocity, is crowded out by indirect punishment opportunities. The existence of direct and indirect punishment in daily life indicates the importance of both means for understanding the evolution of cooperation.

Entities:  

Keywords:  cooperation; field experiment; indirect reciprocity; punishment; social norms

Mesh:

Year:  2014        PMID: 25349390      PMCID: PMC4234623          DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1413170111

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A        ISSN: 0027-8424            Impact factor:   11.205


  27 in total

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Review 2.  Evolution of indirect reciprocity.

Authors:  Martin A Nowak; Karl Sigmund
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Review 3.  Five rules for the evolution of cooperation.

Authors:  Martin A Nowak
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4.  The long-run benefits of punishment.

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5.  Cooperation in social dilemmas: free riding may be thwarted by second-order reward rather than by punishment.

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Journal:  J Pers Soc Psychol       Date:  2008-10

6.  Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare.

Authors:  Robert Boyd; Herbert Gintis; Samuel Bowles
Journal:  Science       Date:  2010-04-30       Impact factor: 47.728

7.  To qualify as a social partner, humans hide severe punishment, although their observed cooperativeness is decisive.

Authors:  Bettina Rockenbach; Manfred Milinski
Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  2011-10-10       Impact factor: 11.205

8.  Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation.

Authors:  David G Rand; Joseph J Armao; Mayuko Nakamaru; Hisashi Ohtsuki
Journal:  J Theor Biol       Date:  2010-06-09       Impact factor: 2.691

9.  Antisocial punishment across societies.

Authors:  Benedikt Herrmann; Christian Thöni; Simon Gächter
Journal:  Science       Date:  2008-03-07       Impact factor: 47.728

10.  Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment.

Authors:  Hisashi Ohtsuki; Yoh Iwasa; Martin A Nowak
Journal:  Nature       Date:  2009-01-01       Impact factor: 49.962

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  17 in total

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Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  2019-07-29       Impact factor: 11.205

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Journal:  Proc Biol Sci       Date:  2017-12-13       Impact factor: 5.349

3.  Toddlers and infants expect individuals to refrain from helping an ingroup victim's aggressor.

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Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  2016-04-25       Impact factor: 11.205

6.  Direct punishment and indirect reputation-based tactics to intervene against offences.

Authors:  Catherine Molho; Junhui Wu
Journal:  Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci       Date:  2021-10-04       Impact factor: 6.237

7.  Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game.

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8.  The effect of power asymmetries on cooperation and punishment in a prisoner's dilemma game.

Authors:  Jonathan E Bone; Brian Wallace; Redouan Bshary; Nichola J Raihani
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2015-01-28       Impact factor: 3.240

9.  Social image concerns promote cooperation more than altruistic punishment.

Authors:  Gianluca Grimalda; Andreas Pondorfer; David P Tracer
Journal:  Nat Commun       Date:  2016-08-09       Impact factor: 14.919

10.  Indirect Reciprocity, Resource Sharing, and Environmental Risk: Evidence from Field Experiments in Siberia.

Authors:  E Lance Howe; James J Murphy; Drew Gerkey; Colin Thor West
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2016-07-21       Impact factor: 3.240

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