Literature DB >> 21572939

Beyond Testing: Empirical Models of Insurance Markets.

Liran Einav1, Amy Finkelstein, Jonathan Levin.   

Abstract

We describe recent advances in the empirical analysis of insurance markets. This new research proposes ways to estimate individual demand for insurance and the relationship between prices and insurer costs in the presence of adverse and advantageous selection. We discuss how these models permit the measurement of welfare distortions arising from asymmetric information and the welfare consequences of potential government policy responses. We also discuss some challenges in modeling imperfect competition between insurers and outline a series of open research questions.

Entities:  

Year:  2010        PMID: 21572939      PMCID: PMC3092551          DOI: 10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.143254

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Annu Rev Econom        ISSN: 1941-1383


  7 in total

1.  Asymmetric information in health insurance: evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey.

Authors:  J H Cardon; I Hendel
Journal:  Rand J Econ       Date:  2001

2.  Choice Inconsistencies among the Elderly: Evidence from Plan Choice in the Medicare Part D Program: Reply.

Authors:  Jason Abaluck; Jonathan Gruber
Journal:  Am Econ Rev       Date:  2017-12

3.  Optimal Mandates and The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from The U.K. Annuity Market.

Authors:  Liran Einav; Amy Finkelstein; Paul Schrimpf
Journal:  Econometrica       Date:  2010-05-01       Impact factor: 5.844

4.  Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market.

Authors:  Amy Finkelstein; Kathleen McGarry
Journal:  Am Econ Rev       Date:  2006-09-01

5.  Preference Heterogeneity and Insurance Markets: Explaining a Puzzle of Insurance.

Authors:  David M Cutler; Amy Finkelstein; Kathleen McGarry
Journal:  Am Econ Rev       Date:  2008-05

6.  ESTIMATING WELFARE IN INSURANCE MARKETS USING VARIATION IN PRICES.

Authors:  Liran Einav; Amy Finkelstein; Mark R Cullen
Journal:  Q J Econ       Date:  2010-08-01
  7 in total
  12 in total

1.  Paying Medicare Advantage plans: To level or tilt the playing field.

Authors:  Jacob Glazer; Thomas G McGuire
Journal:  J Health Econ       Date:  2016-12-29       Impact factor: 3.883

2.  Deriving risk adjustment payment weights to maximize efficiency of health insurance markets.

Authors:  Timothy J Layton; Thomas G McGuire; Richard C van Kleef
Journal:  J Health Econ       Date:  2018-07-23       Impact factor: 3.883

3.  The Value of Medicaid: Interpreting Results from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment.

Authors:  Amy Finkelstein; Nathaniel Hendren; Erzo F P Luttmer
Journal:  J Polit Econ       Date:  2019-12

4.  Selection in insurance markets: theory and empirics in pictures.

Authors:  Liran Einav; Amy Finkelstein
Journal:  J Econ Perspect       Date:  2011

5.  Adverse Selection and an Individual Mandate: When Theory Meets Practice.

Authors:  Martin B Hackmann; Jonathan T Kolstad; Amanda E Kowalski
Journal:  Am Econ Rev       Date:  2015-03

6.  Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance.

Authors:  Liran Einav; Amy Finkelstein; Stephen Ryan; Paul Schrimpf; Mark R Cullen
Journal:  Am Econ Rev       Date:  2013-02

7.  Measuring efficiency of health plan payment systems in managed competition health insurance markets.

Authors:  Timothy J Layton; Randall P Ellis; Thomas G McGuire; Richard van Kleef
Journal:  J Health Econ       Date:  2017-12       Impact factor: 3.883

8.  Estimating the Tradeoff Between Risk Protection and Moral Hazard with a Nonlinear Budget Set Model of Health Insurance.

Authors:  Amanda E Kowalski
Journal:  Int J Ind Organ       Date:  2015-11-01

9.  Private Information and Insurance Rejections.

Authors:  Nathaniel Hendren
Journal:  Econometrica       Date:  2013-09-01       Impact factor: 5.844

10.  When Should There Be Vertical Choice in Health Insurance Markets?

Authors:  Victoria R Marone; Adrienne Sabety
Journal:  Am Econ Rev       Date:  2022-01
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