| Literature DB >> 18053138 |
Peter Andras1, John Lazarus, Gilbert Roberts.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: A major cornerstone of evolutionary biology theory is the explanation of the emergence of cooperation in communities of selfish individuals. There is an unexplained tendency in the plant and animal world - with examples from alpine plants, worms, fish, mole-rats, monkeys and humans - for cooperation to flourish where the environment is more adverse (harsher) or more unpredictable.Entities:
Mesh:
Year: 2007 PMID: 18053138 PMCID: PMC2217547 DOI: 10.1186/1471-2148-7-240
Source DB: PubMed Journal: BMC Evol Biol ISSN: 1471-2148 Impact factor: 3.260
Figure 1The minimal acceptable level of resources. The incremental fitness cost (assumed to be straight lines for simplicity) and benefit (curved line) are shown as a function of the resource amount gained, in a less adverse (continuous straight line) and a more adverse (segmented straight line) environment (the slope of the two lines is the same). Cost increases with resource amount since, optimally, more investment (cost) is made when the return (benefit) is greater. The resource amounts Rand Rare assumed to be the minimal acceptable levels of resources in the two environments.
Figure 2The distribution of resources in two environments having the same objective resource distribution. The resource amounts Rand Rare the minimal acceptable amounts of resources in the two environments. The shaded areas are the parts of the distributions ignored by animals living in the two environments. The larger the ignored area the higher is the subjective variance of the distribution, with the condition that the ignored area is smaller than half of the area below the curve of the distribution.
The pay-off matrix for the cooperation/competition game
| Cooperate | Compete | |
| Cooperate | ||
| Compete |
Entries indicate the mean of the payoff distribution to the row player followed by the column player. R1 and R2 are the amount of resources owned by the row and column player respectively, and Δ = [f(R1 + R2) - f(R1) - f(R2)]+ (i.e., it takes only the positive values of the expression in brackets and it is zero if the value of the expression is negative). The function f is a diminishing return function, and R1 and R2 are typically in the range where 2f(x) ≤ f(2x), and 0 <α < 1.
Figure 3The evolution of the proportion of cooperating agents. The graphs show the mean (± SD) values of c2 (the proportion of agents participating in cooperation-cooperation interactions, where c is the proportion of cooperating agents in the population) in environments with various levels of uncertainty (see the numbers in the box).