| Literature DB >> 7466396 |
Abstract
Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.Mesh:
Year: 1981 PMID: 7466396 DOI: 10.1126/science.7466396
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Science ISSN: 0036-8075 Impact factor: 47.728