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Literature DB >> 16979665

Stochastic payoff evaluation increases the temperature of selection.

Arne Traulsen¹, Martin A Nowak, Jorge M Pacheco.

Abstract

We study stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in populations of finite size. Moreover, each individual has a randomly distributed number of interactions with other individuals. Therefore, the payoff of two individuals using the same strategy can be different. The resulting "payoff stochasticity" reduces the intensity of selection and therefore increases the temperature of selection. A simple mean-field approximation is derived that captures the average effect of the payoff stochasticity. Correction terms to the mean-field theory are computed and discussed.

Mesh：

Year: 2006 PMID： 16979665 PMCID： PMC1866307 DOI： 10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.08.008

Source DB: PubMed Journal: J Theor Biol ISSN： 0022-5193 Impact factor: 2.691

29 in total

Stochastic payoff evaluation increases the temperature of selection.

1. Social games in a social network.

2. Replicator dynamics for optional public good games.

3. Scale-free networks provide a unifying framework for the emergence of cooperation.

4. Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation.

5. Active linking in evolutionary games.

6. A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks.

7. Stochasticity and evolutionary stability.

8. Evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations.

9. Evolutionarily stable strategies for a finite population and a variable contest size.

10. Collective phenomena in spatially extended evolutionary games.

1. Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games coevolving on adaptive networks.

2. Stochastic payoff evaluation increases the temperature of selection.

3. Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamics.

4. The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics.

5. Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?

6. Repeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking.

7. Biological auctions with multiple rewards.

8. Evolution of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas on Complex Networks.

9. Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in N-person stag hunt dilemmas.

10. Heterogeneous aspirations promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game.