| Literature DB >> 35574191 |
Annika Hillebrandt1, Laurie J Barclay2.
Abstract
While scholars have debated whether environmental factors (e.g., air pollution) can prompt unethical behavior (e.g., crime), we argue that the COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique opportunity to inform this theoretical debate by elaborating on why these effects may occur, identifying how they can be overcome, and addressing methodological issues. Drawing on appraisal theories of emotion, we argue that appraising COVID-19 (i.e., an environmental factor) as a threat can elicit anxiety. This can focus employees on their own self-interest and prompt cheating behavior (i.e., unethical workplace behavior). However, we propose that these detrimental effects can be attenuated by prosocial messages (i.e., highlighting the meaningful and positive impact that employees' work can have on others). Our predictions were supported using a two-wave survey (N = 396) and an experiment (N = 163) with samples of full-time employees during the COVID-19 pandemic. Theoretically, our studies inform this ongoing debate by highlighting the importance of state anxiety and self-interest as key mechanisms and that drawing peoples' attention towards others can serve as a boundary condition. Practically, we provide insight into the ethical costs of COVID-19 in the workplace and identify a simple yet effective strategy that organizations can use to curtail workplace cheating behavior.Entities:
Keywords: COVID‐19; anxiety; appraisal theory; cheating; unethical behavior
Year: 2022 PMID: 35574191 PMCID: PMC9088701 DOI: 10.1002/job.2612
Source DB: PubMed Journal: J Organ Behav ISSN: 0894-3796
FIGURE 1Theoretical model
Study 1: Means, standard deviations, zero‐order correlations, and reliabilities
| Variable |
|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Workplace cheating behavior (T1) | 1.51 | 0.61 | (.85) | ||||||||||||
| 2. Threat appraisals of COVID‐19 | 3.63 | 0.94 | −.01 | (.81) | |||||||||||
| 3. State anxiety | 3.27 | 1.18 | .13 | .53 | (.88) | ||||||||||
| 4. Prosocial messages | 3.29 | 1.21 | −.10 | .09 | .05 | (.94) | |||||||||
| 5. Workplace cheating behavior (T2) | 1.52 | 0.59 | .76 | .04 | .20 | −.10 | (.85) | ||||||||
| 6. Perceived inequity | 2.96 | 1.13 | .11 | .22 | .25 | −.16 | .17 | (.93) | |||||||
| 7. Job demands | 3.19 | 1.17 | −.03 | .25 | .25 | .13 | .00 | .39 | (.91) | ||||||
| 8. Perceived organizational support | 3.19 | 1.05 | −.20 | −.18 | −.17 | .28 | −.25 | −.74 | −.21 | (.94) | |||||
| 9. State anger | 2.29 | 1.24 | .11 | .17 | .44 | −.01 | .15 | .20 | .16 | −.18 | (‐) | ||||
| 10. Neuroticism | 2.49 | 0.90 | .16 | .22 | .45 | −.16 | .20 | .26 | .08 | −.30 | .31 | (.91) | |||
| 11. Moral disengagement | 2.43 | 0.69 | .22 | −.07 | .02 | −.12 | .31 | .11 | −.03 | −.16 | .07 | .11 | (.75) | ||
| 12. Moral identity internalization | 4.44 | 0.57 | −.13 | .14 | .10 | .13 | −.15 | −.02 | .11 | .07 | −.04 | −.11 | −.16 | (.72) | |
| 13. Belief in a dangerous world | 2.97 | 0.95 | .10 | .15 | .28 | −.01 | .15 | .24 | .13 | −.22 | .33 | .34 | .07 | −.05 | (.85) |
Note: Reliabilities are shown on the diagonal.
p < .05.
p < .01.
Study 1: Hierarchical linear regression results
| Variables | State anxiety | Workplace cheating behavior (T2) | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | |||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| Intercept | −1.30 (0.66) | .05 | minus;2.20 (0.60) | <.001 | 0.38 (0.26) | .15 | 0.03 (0.31) | .93 |
| Control variables | ||||||||
| Workplace cheating behavior (T1) | 0.15 (0.09) | .09 | 0.17 (0.08) | .03 | 0.67 (0.03) | <.001 | 0.67 (0.03) | <.001 |
| Perceived inequity | 0.14 (0.07) | .05 | 0.12 (0.06) | .07 | 0.00 (0.03) | .97 | 0.01 (0.03) | .85 |
| Job demands | 0.12 (0.05) | .009 | 0.06 (0.04) | .17 | −0.01 (0.02) | .75 | −0.01 (0.02) | .78 |
| Perceived organizational support | 0.14 (0.07) | .06 | 0.16 (0.07) | .01 | −0.04 (0.03) | .17 | −0.04 (0.03) | .22 |
| State anger | 0.28 (0.04) | <.001 | 0.26 (0.04) | <.001 | 0.00 (0.02) | .94 | −0.00 (0.02) | .93 |
| Neuroticism | 0.45 (0.06) | <.001 | 0.36 (0.06) | <.001 | −0.01 (0.03) | .77 | −0.01 (0.03) | .67 |
| Moral disengagement | −0.05 (0.08) | .51 | 0.00 (0.07) | .98 | 0.12 (0.03) | <.001 | 0.11 (0.03) | <.001 |
| Moral identity internalization | 0.29 (0.09) | .001 | 0.18 (0.08) | .03 | −0.05 (0.04) | .18 | −0.05 (0.04) | .18 |
| Belief in a dangerous world | 0.06 (0.06) | .33 | 0.04 (0.05) | .46 | 0.02 (0.02) | .42 | 0.02 (0.02) | .32 |
| Hypothesized predictors | ||||||||
| Threat appraisals of COVID‐19 |
|
| −0.01 (0.03) | .79 | ||||
| State anxiety |
|
| 0.15 (0.05) | .003 | ||||
| Prosocial messages | 0.11 (0.05) | .03 | ||||||
| State anxiety × prosocial messages interaction |
|
| ||||||
|
| .35 | .48 | .61 | .62 | ||||
Note: b = unstandardized regression coefficient. SE = standard error estimates (shown in parentheses). Values in bold are relevant to hypothesis tests.
FIGURE 2Study 1: Conditional effect of state anxiety on workplace cheating behavior (T2) as a function of prosocial messages
Study 2: Means, standard deviations, zero‐order correlations, and reliabilities
| Variable |
|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Threat appraisals manipulation | 0.53 | 0.50 | ‐ | |||||
| 2. State anxiety | 2.95 | 1.02 | .18 | (.89) | ||||
| 3. Prosocial messages manipulation | 0.50 | 0.50 | .05 | −.08 | ‐ | |||
| 4. Self‐interest | 3.70 | 0.71 | −.01 | .04 | −.04 | (.71) | ||
| 5. Cheating behavior | 0.53 | 0.50 | .00 | .11 | −.13 | .20 | ‐ | |
| 6. Threat appraisals manipulation check | 3.50 | 1.03 | .16 | .54 | .03 | .08 | .02 | (.70) |
Note: Reliabilities are shown on the diagonal.
Conditions for threat appraisals were coded as 1 (experimental condition) versus 0 (control condition).
Conditions for prosocial messages were coded as 1 (experimental condition) versus 0 (control condition).
Coin tosses were coded as 1 (two “heads”) versus 0 (not two “heads”).
p < .05.
p < .01.
FIGURE 3Study 2: Self‐interest as a function of state anxiety and prosocial messages
Study 2: Results of regression analyses
| State anxiety | Self‐interest | Cheating behavior | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| Intercept | 2.76 (0.12) | <.001 | 3.30 (0.25) | <.001 | −2.74 (1.03) | .01 |
| Threat appraisals manipulation |
|
| −0.05 (0.12) | .68 | −0.07 (0.33) | .85 |
| State anxiety | 0.15 (0.08) | .07 | 0.25 (0.17) | .13 | ||
| Prosocial messages manipulation | 0.61 (0.35) | .08 | ||||
| State anxiety × prosocial messages manipulation |
|
| ||||
| Self‐interest |
|
| ||||
|
| .03 | .03 | ||||
Note: b = unstandardized regression coefficient. SE = standard error estimates (shown in parentheses). Values in bold are relevant to hypothesis tests.
Conditions for threat appraisals were coded as 1 (experimental condition) versus 0 (control condition).
Conditions for prosocial messages were coded as 1 (experimental condition) versus 0 (control condition).
Coin tosses were coded as 1 (two “heads”) versus 0 (not two “heads”).
Logistic regression was used to estimate the effects on cheating behavior (i.e., self‐reported coin tosses). Results are expressed in a log‐odds metric.