| Literature DB >> 35012981 |
Ingvild Almås1,2, Alexander W Cappelen2, Erik Ø Sørensen2, Bertil Tungodden3.
Abstract
We report on a study of whether people believe that the rich are richer than the poor because they have been more selfish in life, using data from more than 26,000 individuals in 60 countries. The findings show a strong belief in the selfish rich inequality hypothesis at the global level; in the majority of countries, the mode is to strongly agree with it. However, we also identify important between- and within-country variation. We find that the belief in selfish rich inequality is much stronger in countries with extensive corruption and weak institutions and less strong among people who are higher in the income distribution in their society. Finally, we show that the belief in selfish rich inequality is predictive of people's policy views on inequality and redistribution: It is significantly positively associated with agreeing that inequality in their country is unfair, and it is significantly positively associated with agreeing that the government should aim to reduce inequality. These relationships are highly significant both across and within countries and robust to including country-level or individual-level controls and using Lasso-selected regressors. Thus, the data provide compelling evidence of people believing that the rich are richer because they have been more selfish in life and perceiving selfish behavior as creating unfair inequality and justifying equalizing policies.Entities:
Keywords: inequality; redistribution; selfishness
Mesh:
Year: 2022 PMID: 35012981 PMCID: PMC8784141 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2109690119
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A ISSN: 0027-8424 Impact factor: 11.205
Fig. 1.“Belief in selfish rich inequality” around the world. Note: The figure provides an overview of support for the selfish rich inequality hypothesis. Respondents answered the belief in selfish rich inequality question on a discrete 5-point scale from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). A shows the distribution of belief in selfish rich inequality in the pooled global sample; B shows how the level of agreement varies by country (countries not in our sample are shown in gray); and C shows the estimated, population-weighted, average belief in selfish rich inequality and its SE for each country.
Fig. 2.Between-country variation in beliefs. Note: A shows coefficients from a regression of country-level average belief in selfish rich inequality on country indices of corruption (58, 59); (log) gross national income per capita (GNI) (59); income inequality (Gini) from the World Income Distribution (60); average age (from the Gallup World Poll 2018 data); and average years of schooling (61). All explanatory variables have been standardized to unit variance. Estimates are reported for both separate bivariate and a joint specification (with all variables included). See for the complete specifications. B shows the country-level relationship between belief in selfish rich inequality (SRI) and “belief in the role of crime” (which is coded the same way as belief in selfish rich inequality). C shows the country-level distribution of the share of those who believe in selfish rich inequality that also believe in illegal activity being an important cause of inequality. D shows the country-level relationship between belief in the role of crime and belief in economic mobility (“Can people in this country get ahead by working hard, or not?”, yes/no).
Fig. 3.Within-country variation in beliefs. Note: A shows a map of the polarization in belief in selfish rich inequality. Polarization is measured as the SD of reported support within each country relative to the maximum SD possible (scaled zero to one). B reports estimated coefficients from regressing belief in selfish rich inequality on individual characteristics of the respondent: income rank of the household within country (using the square root equivalence scale and scaled from lowest: zero, to highest: one); an indicator for the respondent having high education relative to the national distribution of reported education; an indicator for the respondent being male; and age. High education and gender (male) are coded binary zero/one, while age is standardized to unit variance. Estimates are reported both for separate bivariate specifications and a joint specification (with all variables included, including some nonreported controls; see for the complete specifications). All specifications with country-specific intercepts. Estimates are population-weighted, with weights scaled such that each country has equal weight. Sandwich SEs account for primary sampling unit clustering and weighting.
Unfairness and inequality
| Between-country variation | Within-country variation | |||||
| ( | ( | ( | ( | ( | ( | |
| Agreement with “Current inequality is unfair” | ||||||
| Belief in selfish rich inequality | 0.620 | 0.919 | 0.814 | 0.228 | 0.231 | 0.233 |
| (0.124) | (0.152) | (0.111) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.006) | |
| Controls (not reported) | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lasso selection of controls | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 60 | 57 | 57 | 23,103 | 23,103 | 23,103 |
| Agreement with “Government should aim to reduce economic differences” | ||||||
| Belief in selfish rich inequality | 0.482 | 0.707 | 0.606 | 0.148 | 0.150 | 0.149 |
| (0.096) | (0.121) | (0.097) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.006) | |
| Controls (not reported) | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Lasso selection of controls | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 60 | 57 | 57 | 23,103 | 23,103 | 23,103 |
Notes. Columns 1–3 report between-country regressions of the (country average) “current inequality is unfair”/”government should aim to reduce economic differences” on the (country average) belief in selfish rich inequality and a set of controls. See for the complete specifications. Columns 4–6 report the corresponding within-country regressions (with country-specific intercepts); see for the complete specifications. Column 3 and 6 report regressions with Lasso-selected regressors (selecting from a set of control variables and a quadratic form in these) and, for column 6, always including country-specific intercepts (62). SEs are in parentheses.