| Literature DB >> 34256771 |
Yimei Gu1, Lina Liang2, Liuna Ge1, Ling Jiang1, Xiaole Hu1, Jing Xu1, Yu Cao1, Xiaoting Feng1.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: To explore the effect of applying a comprehensive unit-based safety program (CUSP) in the intrahospital transfer of patients with critical diseases.Entities:
Keywords: Comprehensive unit-based safety program; Emergency intensive care unit; Inter-hospital transfer; Safety culture; Satisfaction
Mesh:
Year: 2021 PMID: 34256771 PMCID: PMC8275901 DOI: 10.1186/s12913-021-06650-7
Source DB: PubMed Journal: BMC Health Serv Res ISSN: 1472-6963 Impact factor: 2.655
Concrete measure of IHT of critically ill patients between control group and observational group
| control group (August 2018 to Novomber 2018) | observational group (December 2018 to February 2019) | |
|---|---|---|
| Safety training | Three theoretical lectures, including the “Chinese guidelines for the transport of critically ill patients, 2010” (draft) [ | ① In addition to the traditional training methods, special safety inspection training modules, such as MRI safety instruction, enhanced CT safety instruction, and hyperbaric oxygen safety instruction, were added. ② Training needs attention with respect to the rescue vehicle and the use of drugs, and all the participating personnel is required to pass the examination. ③ Emphasis on the transfer model in the current situation, background, assessment, and recommendations (SBAR) [ |
| Safety risks | clustered transfer list | optimizing and improving the clustered transfer list |
| Administrative staff participation | a special transfer elevator with a built-in telephone extension was set up in Building 1. b. Elevator workers go to work from 8:00 to 18:00 | ① Increasing transfer elevators (transfer-specific elevators were installed in each building). Eye-catching transfer elevator signs were pasted. Elevator workers wore chest card, and the service attitude was emphasized. ② Adding transfer goods and materials (adding 1 portable invasive ventilator, 2 portable monitors, and 1 transfer bed). ③ Unifying the items, drug types, quantity, and location of the materials in rescue vehicles of the whole hospital to facilitate the use of the second-level first aid site during the rescue. ④ Organizing safe transfer training in the hospital |
| Communication and cooperation | routine transfer | ①Doctors should strengthen communication with the examination department and reduce the waiting time. ② Nurses should focus on health education and psychological nursing to appease the anxiety of the relatives. ③ Arranging for experienced medical technicians to perform the operation. ④ Reports of radiological examination should be obtained within 30 min. ⑤ SBAR model was used when patients were handover to the other departments |
| Learning from defects | quality control analysis of problems was performed every quarter, implementation of planning, implementation, inspection, adjustment, and improvement (plan, do, check, action, and PDCA) [ | ① Training medical staff to understand the root cause of the condition via lectures. ② Transfer defect analysis of critically ill patients was performed once a month, and simple root cause analysis was used to analyze the defects, including what happened, why, what should be done to reduce the risk, and how to confirm that the risk had been reduced |
Comparison of SAQ results of medical staff of the two group (mean ± SD)
| SAQ domain scores | Groups | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Observational group ( | Control group ( | |||
| Before implementation | After implementation | Before implementation | After implementation | |
| Job satisfaction | 3.91 ± 0.26 | 4.27 ± 0.31*# | 3.96 ± 0.31 | 4.05 ± 0.34 |
| Teamwork climate | 4.06 ± 0.34 | 4.36 ± 0.46*# | 4.09 ± 0.36 | 4.15 ± 0.41 |
| Working conditions | 3.97 ± 0.27 | 4.32 ± 0.36*# | 4.02 ± 0.31 | 4.15 ± 0.28 |
| Stress recognition | 4.15 ± 0.33 | 4.45 ± 0.41*# | 4.11 ± 0.29 | 4.24 ± 0.35 |
| Safety climate | 3.43 ± 0.88 | 4.78 ± 1.31*# | 3.54 ± 0.91 | 4.24 ± 1.12 |
| Perception of management | 3.96 ± 0.34 | 4.29 ± 0.36*# | 4.03 ± 0.31 | 4.12 ± 0.34 |
Footnote:*compared to the same group before-implementation P < 0.05, #compared to control group after-implementation P < 0.05
Comparison of the incidence of adverse events in the two groups
| adverse eventsn [n(%)] | Control group( | Observational group( | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number of cases of adverse events | 76 (37.62) | 41 (18.30) | 19.854 | <0.001 |
| Number of cases of adverse events | 12 (5.94) | 6 (2.68) | −3.007 | 0.003 |
| High-risk adverse events | 41 (20.30) | 30 (13.40) | ||
| Events with hidden danger | 23 (11.39) | 5 (2.23) |
Analysis of the causes of adverse events in the observational and control groups [n (%)]
| causes of adverse events [n (%)] | Control group(n = 202) | Observational group(n = 224) | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Disease-related | 40 (19.80) | 28 (12.5) | 4.222 | 0.040 |
| Staff-related | 18 (8.91) | 9 (4.02) | 4.284 | 0.038 |
| Equipment-related | 6 (2.97) | 0 | 4.779# | 0.029 |
| Environment-related | 12 (5.94) | 4 (1.79) | 5.073 | 0.024 |
Footnote: #4.77 was continuous correction
Comparison of transport time between the two groups of patients [n (%)]
| Examination items | N/Time (min) | Group | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Observational group ( | Control group ( | ||||
| CT | n | 203 (90.63) | 189 (93.56) | 1.246 | 0.264 |
| T | 22.52 ± 4.41 | 27.54 ± 3.18 | 13.348 | < 0.001 | |
| MRI | n | 12 (5.36) | 9 (4.46) | 0.183 | 0.668 |
| T | 34.43 ± 5.35 | 39.23 ± 5.92 | 8.79 | < 0.001 | |
| Operation room | n | 15 (6.70) | 11 (5.45) | 2.851 | 0.091 |
| T | 16.44 ± 3.25 | 19.33 ± 3.69 | 8.594 | < 0.001 | |
| Interventional room | n | 12 (5.36) | 10 (4.95) | 2.719 | 0.099 |
| T | 8.02 ± 2.33 | 11.53 ± 2.63 | 14.606 | 0 | |
Footnote:Some patients had multiple examinations that need to be calculated repeatedly