| Literature DB >> 32268902 |
Hacer Tanrikulu1, Daniela Neri1, Aileen Robertson2, Melissa Mialon3.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: The marketing practices of the breastmilk substitutes industry have been known for decades, but little is known about the influence of the baby food industry, more generally, on public health policy, research and practice, also known as 'corporate political activity' (CPA). In this study, the baby food industry refers to for-profit companies that manufacture, market or distribute breastmilk substitutes and food products for infants and young children under two years. In addition, trade associations, public relations firms, marketing agencies and individuals or groups affiliated with the baby food industry are also considered to be part of the baby food industry. The aim of the current study was to systematically identify and monitor the CPA of the baby food industry in the USA, shown by the activities of Nestlé, the largest industry actor in this sector in the country.Entities:
Keywords: Commercial determinants of health; Corporate political activity; Food industry; Infants and young children feeding
Year: 2020 PMID: 32268902 PMCID: PMC7140353 DOI: 10.1186/s13006-020-00268-x
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int Breastfeed J ISSN: 1746-4358 Impact factor: 3.461
Description of different corporate political activity strategies of the food industry
| Instrumental Strategies | Practices | Mechanisms |
|---|---|---|
| Coalition management | Constituency recruitment - Establish relationships with key opinion leaders and health organisations | Promote public-private interactions with health and consumers organisations, among others |
| Support professional organisations, including through their funding and / or advertising in their publications | ||
| Establish informal relationships with key opinion leaders | ||
| Support the placement of industry-friendly personnel within health organisations | ||
| Constituency recruitment - Seek involvement in the community | Undertake corporate philanthropy | |
| Support physical activity initiatives | ||
| Support events (for youth, arts, etc.) and community-level initiatives | ||
| Constituency recruitment - Establish relationships with the media | Establish close relationships with the media, journalists and bloggers, to facilitate media advocacy | |
| Constituency recruitment - internal | Establish relationships with other actors in the industry | |
| Constituency fabrication | Establish fake grassroots organisations (‘astroturfing’) | |
| Procure the support of community and business groups to oppose public health measures | ||
| Opposition fragmentation and destabilisation | Discredit public health advocates personally and publicly | |
| Infiltrate and monitor the operations and advocacy strategies of public health organisations and advocates | ||
| Create antagonism between health professionals | ||
| Information management | Production | Fund research, including through academics, ghost writers, own research institutions and front groups |
| Amplification | Cherry pick data that favours the industry, including through the use of non-peer reviewed or unpublished evidence | |
| Participate in and host scientific events | ||
| Propose industry-sponsored education | ||
| Suppression | Suppress the dissemination of research that does not fit the industry’s interests | |
| Emphasise disagreement among scientists | ||
| Criticise evidence, and emphasise its complexity and uncertainty | ||
| Credibility | Fronting: conceal industry links to information or evidence, including through the use of scientists serving as advisers, consultants or spokespersons | |
| Direct involvement and influence in policy | Indirect access | Lobby directly and indirectly (through third parties) to influence legislation and regulation so that it is favourable to the industry |
| Use the “revolving door”, i.e. ex-food industry staff goes to work in the government, and vice versa | ||
| Incentives | Fund and provide financial incentives to political parties and policy makers (donations, gifts, entertainment or other financial inducements) | |
| Threats | Threaten to withdraw investments if new public health policies are introduced | |
| Actor in government decision making | Seek involvement in working groups, technical groups and advisory groups | |
| Provide technical support and advice to policy-makers | ||
| Legal actions | Use legal action (or the threat thereof) against public policies or opponents | Litigate or threaten to litigate against governments, public health professionals and other institutions or individuals |
| Influence the development of trade and investment agreements | Influence the development of trade and investment agreements to include clauses favourable to the industry (limited trade restrictions, mechanisms for corporations to sue governments, etc.) | |
| The economy | Stress the number of jobs supported and the money generated for the economy | |
| Governance | Demonise the ‘nanny state’ | |
| Expected food industry costs | Claim that proposed policy will lead to a reduction in sales/jobs | |
| Claim that cost of compliance will be high for the industry | ||
| Frame the debate on diet- and public health-related issues | Stress the good traits of the food industry | |
| Shift the blame away from the food industry and its products: focus on individual responsibility, the role of parents, physical inactivity, etc. | ||
| Promote industry’s preferred solutions: education, information, balanced diets, etc. |
Legend: Adapted from [8, 10]
Occurrences of CPA strategies and practices used by Nestlé during the period January to November 2018
| CPA strategies and practices | Total occurrences |
|---|---|
| 69 | |
| Establish relationships with key opinion leaders and health organisations | 44 |
| Seek involvement in the community | 20 |
| Establish relationships with the media | 3 |
| Constituency fabrication | 0 |
| Constituency recruitment – internal | 2 |
| Opposition fragmentation and destabilization | 0 |
| 281 | |
| Production | 48 |
| Amplification | 231 |
| Suppression | 0 |
| Credibility | 2 |
| 25 | |
| Indirect access | 17 |
| Incentives | 0 |
| Threats | 0 |
| Actor in government decision making | 8 |
| 0 | |
| Use legal action against public policies or opponents | 0 |
| Influence the development of trade and investment agreements | 0 |
| 63 | |
| The economy | 1 |
| Governance | 0 |
| Expected food industry costs | 0 |
| Frame the debate on diet- and public health related issues | 62 |
List of events/programs Nestlé supported for the period January to November 2018
| Name of event/program | Dates | Role of Nestlé |
|---|---|---|
| 2018 National Child Nutrition Conference (A65) | April 19–21, 2018 | Sponsor |
| AAP experience. National Conference & Exhibition (A59) | November 2–6, 2018 | Exhibitor |
| NASPGHAN (North American Society for Pediatric Gastroenterology, Hepatology and Nutrition) Foundation/ Nestlé Nutrition Research Young Investigator Development Award (A45) | Submission deadline July 6, 2018 | Award funder and foundation partner (A46) |
| American Society Nutrition 2018 - Samuel J. Fomon Award for Young Investigators (A27) | June 19, 2018 | Funder and sustaining partner (A48) |
| Flux Satellite Conference by University of Chapel Hill (A53) | May 6–8, 2018 | Sponsor |
| Continuing medical education on 12th Advances in Pediatric Nutrition by John Hopkins Medicine (A66) | August 4, 2017- August 3, 2019 | Grant provider |
| Event “A Healthy Start: The Infant and Early Childhood Nutrition”, attended by nutrition experts and lawmakers (A67) | September 12, 2018 | Sponsor |
Fig. 1‘Policy Dystopia Model’ adapted to the baby food industry in the USA. Footnote: Adapted from Ulucanlar S, Fooks GJ & Gilmore AB. The Policy Dystopia Model: An Interpretive Analysis of Tobacco Industry Political Activity. PLoS Med. 2016; 13, 1–21