| Literature DB >> 32043220 |
Martin Harry Turpin1, Ethan A Meyers2, Alexander C Walker3, Michał Białek4, Jennifer A Stolz3, Jonathan A Fugelsang3.
Abstract
Across two experiments (N=799) we demonstrate that people's use of quantitative information (e.g., base-rates) when making a judgment varies as the causal link of qualitative information (e.g., stereotypes) changes. That is, when a clear causal link for stereotypes is provided, people make judgments that are far more in line with them. When the causal link is heavily diminished, people readily incorporate non-causal base-rates into their judgments instead. We suggest that people use and integrate all of the information that is provided to them to make judgements, but heavily prioritize information that is causal in nature. Further, people are sensitive to the underlying causal structures in their environment and adapt their decision making as such.Entities:
Keywords: base-rate neglect; causality; heuristics and biases; probabilistic reasoning; stereotypes
Mesh:
Year: 2020 PMID: 32043220 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-020-01710-1
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Psychon Bull Rev ISSN: 1069-9384