Literature DB >> 1490324

The source of belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning.

S E Newstead1, P Pollard, J S Evans, J L Allen.   

Abstract

In studies of the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning, an interaction between logical validity and the believability of the conclusion has been found; in essence, logic has a larger effect on unbelievable than on believable conclusions. Two main explanations have been proposed for this finding. The selective scrutiny account claims that people focus on the conclusion and only engage in logical processing if this is found to be unbelievable; while the misinterpreted necessity account claims that subjects misunderstand what is meant by logical necessity and respond on the basis of believability when indeterminate syllogisms are presented. Experiments 1 and 2 compared the predictions of these two theories by examining whether the interaction would disappear if only determinate syllogisms were used. It did, thus providing strong support for the misinterpreted necessity explanation. However, the results are also consistent with a version of the mental models theory, and so Experiment 3 was carried out to compare these two explanations. The mental models theory received strong support, as it did also in the follow-up Experiments 4 and 5. It is concluded that people try to construct a mental model of the premises but, if there is a believable conclusion consistent with the first model they produce, then they fail to construct alternative models.

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Year:  1992        PMID: 1490324     DOI: 10.1016/0010-0277(92)90019-e

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Cognition        ISSN: 0010-0277


  18 in total

1.  Falsifying mental models: testing the predictions of theories of syllogistic reasoning.

Authors:  S E Newstead; S J Handley; E Buck
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  1999-03

2.  Syllogistic reasoning time: disconfirmation disconfirmed.

Authors:  Valerie A Thompson; Christopher L Striemer; Rhett Reikoff; Raymond W Gunter; Jamie I D Campbell
Journal:  Psychon Bull Rev       Date:  2003-03

3.  A dual-process model of belief and evidence interactions in causal reasoning.

Authors:  Jonathan A Fugelsang; Valerie A Thompson
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  2003-07

4.  An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning.

Authors:  Magda Osman
Journal:  Psychon Bull Rev       Date:  2004-12

5.  "At least one" problem with "some" formal reasoning paradigms.

Authors:  James R Schmidt; A Thompson
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  2008-01

6.  Negative valence can evoke a liberal response bias in syllogistic reasoning.

Authors:  Oshin Vartanian; Ann Nakashima; Fethi Bouak; Ingrid Smith; Joseph V Baranski; Bob Cheung
Journal:  Cogn Process       Date:  2012-09-26

7.  Who uses base rates and P(D/approximately H)? An analysis of individual differences.

Authors:  K E Stanovich; R F West
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  1998-01

8.  Beyond belief bias: reasoning from conceptual structures by mental models manipulation.

Authors:  C Santamaría; J A García-Madruga; M Carretero
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  1996-03

9.  Confidence and accuracy in deductive reasoning.

Authors:  Jody M Shynkaruk; Valerie A Thompson
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  2006-04

10.  The environmental malleability of base-rate neglect.

Authors:  Martin Harry Turpin; Ethan A Meyers; Alexander C Walker; Michał Białek; Jennifer A Stolz; Jonathan A Fugelsang
Journal:  Psychon Bull Rev       Date:  2020-04
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