| Literature DB >> 28628702 |
Wafaa M El-Sadr1, Deborah Donnell2, Geetha Beauchamp2, H Irene Hall3, Lucia V Torian4, Barry Zingman5, Garret Lum6, Michael Kharfen6, Richard Elion7, Jason Leider8, Fred M Gordin9, Vanessa Elharrar10, David Burns11, Allison Zerbe1, Theresa Gamble12, Bernard Branson13.
Abstract
Importance: Achieving linkage to care and viral suppression in human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)-positive patients improves their well-being and prevents new infections. Current gaps in the HIV care continuum substantially limit such benefits. Objective: To evaluate the effectiveness of financial incentives on linkage to care and viral suppression in HIV-positive patients. Design, Setting, and Participants: A large community-based clinical trial that randomized 37 HIV test and 39 HIV care sites in the Bronx, New York, and Washington, DC, to financial incentives or standard of care. Interventions: Participants at financial incentive test sites who had positive test results for HIV received coupons redeemable for $125 cash-equivalent gift cards upon linkage to care. HIV-positive patients receiving antiretroviral therapy at financial incentive care sites received $70 gift cards quarterly, if virally suppressed. Main Outcomes and Measures: Linkage to care: proportion of HIV-positive persons at the test site who linked to care within 3 months, as indicated by CD4+ and/or viral load test results done at a care site. Viral suppression: proportion of established patients at HIV care sites with suppressed viral load (<400 copies/mL), assessed at each calendar quarter. Outcomes assessed through laboratory test results reported to the National HIV Surveillance System.Entities:
Mesh:
Substances:
Year: 2017 PMID: 28628702 PMCID: PMC5604092 DOI: 10.1001/jamainternmed.2017.2158
Source DB: PubMed Journal: JAMA Intern Med ISSN: 2168-6106 Impact factor: 21.873
Figure 1. CONSORT Flow Diagram of Site Inclusion
DOH indicates Department of Health; FI, financial incentives; HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; SOC, standard of care; VL, viral load.
Intervention Delivery Characteristics at HIV Test and Care Sites Randomized to Financial Incentives
| Characteristic | Bronx, New York | Washington, DC | Overall |
|---|---|---|---|
| HIV test sites | 8 | 10 | 18 |
| HIV-positive patients eligible for coupon | 238 | 823 | 1061 |
| Redeemed first visit incentive [$25], No. (%) | 217 (91) | 713 (87) | 930 (88) |
| Redeemed both visit incentives [$125], No. (%) | 194 (82) | 646 (78) | 840 (79) |
| Test site size (No. of persons testing HIV-positive), cases | |||
| 1-10 | 4 | 0 | 4 |
| 11-50 | 3 | 6 | 9 |
| >50 | 1 | 4 | 5 |
| HIV care sites | 10 | 7 | 17 |
| No. of HIV-positive persons eligible for FI per site, mean (SD) | 528 (651) | 572 (672) | 546 (639) |
| Eligible care visits, mean (SD) | 2930 (3917) | 2661 (3166) | 2819 (3522) |
| Proportion of eligible care visits qualified and received gift card (No.) | 97% (7) | 95% (6) | 96% (6) |
| Care site size (No. of HIV-positive patients in care), patients | |||
| 51-200 | 5 | 3 | 8 |
| 201-400 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| 401-1000 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| >1000 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
Abbreviations: FI, financial incentives; HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; SD, standard deviation.
HIV-positive individuals who received the second $100 financial incentive but whose data were missing for having received the first $25 financial incentive are counted as having received the first financial incentive.
Effectiveness of Linkage to Care by Study Arm and Type of HIV Test Site
| Variable | Sites, Mean (SD), % | Effect of FI, OR of Linkage (95% CI) | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proportion of Patients Linked to Care at Baseline (pbaseline) | Proportion of Patients Linked to Care During Intervention (pfollow-up) | Change in Proportion of Patients Linked to Care From Baseline (pfollow-up—pbaseline) | |||
|
| .65 | ||||
| FI (n = 18) | 75 (30) | 89 (11) | 14 (34) | 1.10 (0.73-1.67) | |
| SOC (n = 16) | 73 (27) | 83 (17) | 11 (19) | ||
|
| |||||
| Bronx, New York | .32 | ||||
| FI (n = 8) | 82 (34) | 93 (12) | 11 (39) | 1.58 (0.64-3.89) | |
| SOC (n = 8) | 75 (28) | 83 (20) | 8 (20) | ||
| Washington, DC | .65 | ||||
| FI (n = 10) | 70 (28) | 86 (10) | 17 (32) | 0.88 (0.52 to 1.50) | |
| SOC (n = 8) | 70 (29) | 84 (14) | 14 (17) | ||
| Community-based | .51 | ||||
| FI (n = 10) | 65 (37) | 92 (9) | 28 (40) | 1.33 (0.57 to 3.14) | |
| SOC (n = 9) | 65 (34) | 81 (22) | 16 (23) | ||
| Hospital-based | .77 | ||||
| FI (n = 8) | 88 (12) | 85 (13) | −3 (14) | 0.94 (0.63 to 1.41) | |
| SOC (n = 7) | 82 (12) | 86 (7) | 4 (7) | ||
Abbreviations: FI, financial incentives; HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; OR, odds ratio; SOC, standard of care.
Baseline period for linkage to care was from April 2010 to March 2011, before financial incentives.
Endpoint assessment period was from first quarter. All financial incentive sites were operating until financial incentives ended (September 1, 2011, to December 31, 2012).
OR from logistic model adjusted for sites' rate of linkage to care at baseline.
Effect of Financial Incentives on Viral Suppression, on Viral Suppression in Patients Not Consistently Suppressed at Baseline, and on Continuity in Care Compared With Standard of Care, Bronx, New York, and Washington, DC
| Variable | Viral Suppression | Viral Suppression in Patients Not Consistently Suppressed at Baseline | Continuity in Care | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Change in Proportion With VS Between Baseline and Intervention, Mean (SD) | Increase in Proportion With VS, % (95% CI) | Change in Proportion With VS Between Baseline and Intervention, Mean (SD) | Increase in Proportion With VS, % (95% CI) | Change in Proportion With CC Between Baseline and Intervention, Mean (SD) | Increase in Proportion of CC, % (95% CI) | ||||
|
| .01 | .007 | <.001 | ||||||
| FI (n = 17) | 11.5 (11.1) | 3.8 (0.7 to 6.8) | 22.3 (10.0) | 4.9 (1.4 to 8.5) | 16.5 (13.9) | 8.7 (4.2 to 13.2) | |||
| SOC (n = 20) | 3.7 (5.9) | 16.1 (8.4) | −1.8 (11.4) | ||||||
|
| |||||||||
| Bronx, NY | .14 | .48 | <.001 | ||||||
| FI (n = 10) | 7.8 (6.7) | 1.6 (−0.6 to 3.9) | 20.5 (8.4) | 0.9 (−1.7 to 3.5) | 9.8 (9.0) | 8.0 (4.1 to 11.9) | |||
| SOC (n = 10) | 5.2 (4.5) | 18.3 (8.5) | 7.0 (12.0) | ||||||
| Washington, DC | .006 | <.001 | .03 | ||||||
| FI (n = 7) | 16.7 (14.4) | 6.6 (1.9 to 11.3) | 24.8 (12.2) | 8.7 (3.9 to 13.4) | 26.0 (14.6) | 10.1 (1.2 to 19) | |||
| SOC (n = 10) | 2.2 (7.0) | 14.0 (8.1) | 3.4 (8.5) | ||||||
| Hospital-based | .007 | .01 | .001 | ||||||
| FI (n = 7) | 14.1 (16.0) | 4.9 (1.4 to 8.5) | 23.1 (12.4) | 5.9 (1.3 to 10.5) | 14.6 (15.2) | 8.7 (3.4 to 14) | |||
| SOC (n = 7) | 2.1 (7.8) | 14.7 (6.9) | −7.7 (14.5) | ||||||
| Community-based | .47 | .11 | .02 | ||||||
| FI (n = 10) | 9.6 (6.2) | 1.2 (−2.0 to 4.3) | 21.7 (8.6) | 3.6 (−0.9 to 8.1) | 17.8 (13.6) | 9.4 (1.7 to 17.1) | |||
| SOC (n = 13) | 4.6 (4.8) | 16.9 (9.3) | 1.4 (8.4) | ||||||
| Smaller (≤196 at baseline) | .05 | .23 | .02 | ||||||
| FI (n = 9) | 16.1 (13.3) | 11.8 (−0.1 to 23.7) | 23.9 (12.8) | 9.2 (−5.7 to 24.1) | 24.4 (13.7) | 10.3 (1.5 to 19.2) | |||
| SOC (n = 10) | 3.8 (5.1) | 15.7 (10.5) | −3.2 (14.9) | ||||||
| Larger (>196 at baseline) | .08 | .008 | .005 | ||||||
| FI (n = 8) | 6.2 (4.3) | 2.7 (−0.3 to 5.7) | 20.4 (5.7) | 4.1 (1.1 to 7.0) | 7.5 (7.4) | 8.0 (2.4 to 13.6) | |||
| SOC (n = 10) | 3.6 (6.9) | 16.5 (6.3) | −0.4 (7.1) | ||||||
| Lower base VS (baseline ≤66%) | .05 | .06 | .27 | ||||||
| FI (n = 11) | 15.1 (12.2) | 5.6 (0.0 to 11.3) | 23.6 (11.9) | 7.7 (−0.5 to 15.9) | 22.3 (13.7) | 5.7 (−4.4 to 15.8) | |||
| SOC (n = 9) | 4.9 (3.9) | 16.0 (7.1) | −4.9 (14.5) | ||||||
| Higher base VS (baseline >66%) | .03 | .02 | <.001 | ||||||
| FI (n = 6) | 4.8 (3.9) | 3.6 (0.3 to 7.0) | 19.7 (4.9) | 4.6 (0.8 to 8.4) | 5.8 (5.8) | 8.7 (3.6 to 13.8) | |||
| SOC (n = 11) | 2.7 (7.2) | 16.3 (9.7) | 0.7 (8.2) | ||||||
Abbreviations: CC, continuity in care; FI, financial incentives; GEE, generalized estimating equation; SOC, standard of care; VS, viral suppression.
Baseline period for VS was January 1, 2010, to March 31, 2011. Intervention assessment period began after financial incentives were in operation at sites for at least 6 months until financial incentives ended (January 1, 2012, to March 31, 2013). Columns report the mean and standard deviation for the average site change in VS from baseline over the sites in each group.
Columns report intervention effect based on a weighted GEE model that estimates the increase in probability of VS (CC) for FI compared with SOC adjusted for baseline VS (CC).
Baseline period for CC was January 1, 2010 to March 31, 2011. Intervention assessment period began after financial incentives were in operation at sites for at least 15 months until financial incentives ended (July 1, 2012 to March 31, 2013). Columns report the mean and standard deviation for the average site change in CC from baseline over the sites in each group.
Figure 2. Change in Proportion of Patients With Viral Suppression by Arm and Site
HIV care sites randomized to the 2 study arms are ordered by baseline viral suppression. Dark blue lines indicate baseline proportion of patients virally suppressed at baseline. Bars for each site indicate mean change in proportion of patients virally suppressed and the width of the bar is relative to the number of patients in care at the site. Bars in blue indicate increase and bars in orange indicate decrease in proportion of patients virally suppressed.