Literature DB >> 25122233

Costs for switching partners reduce network dynamics but not cooperative behaviour.

Peter Bednarik1, Katrin Fehl2, Dirk Semmann2.   

Abstract

Social networks represent the structuring of interactions between group members. Above all, many interactions are profoundly cooperative in humans and other animals. In accordance with this natural observation, theoretical work demonstrates that certain network structures favour the evolution of cooperation. Yet, recent experimental evidence suggests that static networks do not enhance cooperative behaviour in humans. By contrast, dynamic networks do foster cooperation. However, costs associated with dynamism such as time or resource investments in finding and establishing new partnerships have been neglected so far. Here, we show that human participants are much less likely to break links when costs arise for building new links. Especially, when costs were high, the network was nearly static. Surprisingly, cooperation levels in Prisoner's Dilemma games were not affected by reduced dynamism in social networks. We conclude that the mere potential to quit collaborations is sufficient in humans to reach high levels of cooperative behaviour. Effects of self-structuring processes or assortment on the network played a minor role: participants simply adjusted their cooperative behaviour in response to the threats of losing a partner or of being expelled.
© 2014 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.

Entities:  

Keywords:  Prisoner's Dilemma; cooperation; dynamic network; evolutionary game theory; partner switching

Mesh:

Year:  2014        PMID: 25122233      PMCID: PMC4150333          DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2014.1661

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Proc Biol Sci        ISSN: 0962-8452            Impact factor:   5.349


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