Literature DB >> 19332775

Dynamic remodeling of in-group bias during the 2008 presidential election.

David G Rand1, Thomas Pfeiffer, Anna Dreber, Rachel W Sheketoff, Nils C Wernerfelt, Yochai Benkler.   

Abstract

People often favor members of their own group, while discriminating against members of other groups. Such in-group favoritism has been shown to play an important role in human cooperation. However, in the face of changing conflicts and shifting alliances, it is essential for group identities to be flexible. Using the dictator game from behavioral economics, we demonstrate the remodeling of group identities among supporters of Democratic presidential candidates Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. After Clinton's concession in June 2008, Democrats were more generous toward supporters of their own preferred candidate than to supporters of the other Democratic candidate. The bias observed in June persisted into August, and disappeared only in early September after the Democratic National Convention. We also observe a strong gender effect, with bias both appearing and subsiding among men only. This experimental study illustrates a dynamic change in bias, tracking the realignment of real world conflict lines and public efforts to reconstitute group identity. The change in salient group identity we describe here likely contributed to the victory of Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election.

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Year:  2009        PMID: 19332775      PMCID: PMC2664153          DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0811552106

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A        ISSN: 0027-8424            Impact factor:   11.205


  19 in total

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Review 4.  Five rules for the evolution of cooperation.

Authors:  Martin A Nowak
Journal:  Science       Date:  2006-12-08       Impact factor: 47.728

5.  The coevolution of cultural groups and ingroup favoritism.

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6.  Economics. The promise of prediction markets.

Authors:  Kenneth J Arrow; Robert Forsythe; Michael Gorham; Robert Hahn; Robin Hanson; John O Ledyard; Saul Levmore; Robert Litan; Paul Milgrom; Forrest D Nelson; George R Neumann; Marco Ottaviani; Thomas C Schelling; Robert J Shiller; Vernon L Smith; Erik Snowberg; Cass R Sunstein; Paul C Tetlock; Philip E Tetlock; Hal R Varian; Justin Wolfers; Eric Zitzewitz
Journal:  Science       Date:  2008-05-16       Impact factor: 47.728

7.  "In-group love" and "out-group hate" as motives for individual participation in intergroup conflict: a new game paradigm.

Authors:  Nir Halevy; Gary Bornstein; Lilach Sagiv
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8.  The evolution of cooperation.

Authors:  R Axelrod; W D Hamilton
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9.  Group competition, reproductive leveling, and the evolution of human altruism.

Authors:  Samuel Bowles
Journal:  Science       Date:  2006-12-08       Impact factor: 47.728

10.  The coevolution of parochial altruism and war.

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  19 in total

1.  Evolution of cooperation by phenotypic similarity.

Authors:  Tibor Antal; Hisashi Ohtsuki; John Wakeley; Peter D Taylor; Martin A Nowak
Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  2009-04-29       Impact factor: 11.205

2.  Cooperation during cultural group formation promotes trust towards members of out-groups.

Authors:  Xiaofei Sophia Pan; Daniel Houser
Journal:  Proc Biol Sci       Date:  2013-05-08       Impact factor: 5.349

3.  The evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods games.

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4.  Why We Learn Less from Observing Outgroups.

Authors:  Pyungwon Kang; Christopher J Burke; Philippe N Tobler; Grit Hein
Journal:  J Neurosci       Date:  2020-11-17       Impact factor: 6.167

Review 5.  Reframing social categorization as latent structure learning for understanding political behaviour.

Authors:  Tatiana Lau
Journal:  Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci       Date:  2021-02-22       Impact factor: 6.237

6.  Evolution of in-group favoritism.

Authors:  Feng Fu; Corina E Tarnita; Nicholas A Christakis; Long Wang; David G Rand; Martin A Nowak
Journal:  Sci Rep       Date:  2012-06-21       Impact factor: 4.379

7.  Reputation-based conditional interaction supports cooperation in well-mixed prisoner's dilemmas.

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Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2012-05-17       Impact factor: 3.240

8.  Interindividual cooperation mediated by partisanship complicates Madison's cure for "mischiefs of faction".

Authors:  Mari Kawakatsu; Yphtach Lelkes; Simon A Levin; Corina E Tarnita
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9.  Behavioral immune system and ingroup derogation: the effects of infectious diseases on ingroup derogation attitudes.

Authors:  Qi Wu; Chuan Tan; Bo Wang; Ping Zhou
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2015-03-27       Impact factor: 3.240

10.  Groupwise information sharing promotes ingroup favoritism in indirect reciprocity.

Authors:  Mitsuhiro Nakamura; Naoki Masuda
Journal:  BMC Evol Biol       Date:  2012-11-05       Impact factor: 3.260

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