The evolution of mimicry under constraints.

The resemblance between mimetic organisms and their models varies from near perfect to very crude. One possible explanation, which has received surprisingly little attention, is that evolution can improve mimicry only at some cost to the mimetic organism. In this article, an evolutionary game theory model of mimicry is presented that incorporates such constraints. The model generates novel and testable predictions. First, Batesian mimics that are very common and/or mimic very weakly defended models should evolve either inaccurate mimicry (by stabilizing selection) or mimetic polymorphism. Second, Batesian mimics that are very common and/or mimic very weakly defended models are more likely to evolve mimetic polymorphism if they encounter predators at high rates and/or are bad at evading predator attacks. The model also examines how cognitive constraints acting on signal receivers may help determine evolutionarily stable levels of mimicry. Surprisingly, improved discrimination abilities among signal receivers may sometimes select for less accurate mimicry.