Literature DB >> 12035881

On the reality of the conjunction fallacy.

Ashley Sides1, Daniel Osherson, Nicolao Bonini, Riccardo Viale.   

Abstract

Attributing higher "probability" to a sentence of form p-and-q, relative to p, is a reasoning fallacy only if (1) the word probability carries its modern, technical meaning and (2) the sentence p is interpreted as a conjunct of the conjunction p-and-q. Legitimate doubts arise about both conditions in classic demonstrations of the conjunction fallacy. We used betting paradigms and unambiguously conjunctive statements to reduce these sources of ambiguity about conjunctive reasoning. Despite the precautions, conjunction fallacies were as frequent under betting instructions as under standard probability instructions.

Mesh:

Year:  2002        PMID: 12035881     DOI: 10.3758/bf03195280

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Mem Cognit        ISSN: 0090-502X


  8 in total

1.  Do frequency representations eliminate conjunction effects? An exercise in adversarial collaboration.

Authors:  B Mellers; R Hertwig; D Kahneman
Journal:  Psychol Sci       Date:  2001-07

2.  New Evidence for Distinct Right and Left Brain Systems for Deductive versus Probabilistic Reasoning.

Authors:  L M Parsons; D Osherson
Journal:  Cereb Cortex       Date:  2001-10       Impact factor: 5.357

3.  Commentary on Wolford, Taylor, and Beck: The conjunction fallacy?

Authors:  M Bar-Hillel
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  1991-07

Review 4.  Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence.

Authors:  G Gigerenzer; U Hoffrage; H Kleinbölting
Journal:  Psychol Rev       Date:  1991-10       Impact factor: 8.934

5.  Distinct brain loci in deductive versus probabilistic reasoning.

Authors:  D Osherson; D Perani; S Cappa; T Schnur; F Grassi; F Fazio
Journal:  Neuropsychologia       Date:  1998-04       Impact factor: 3.139

6.  On the reality of cognitive illusions.

Authors:  D Kahneman; A Tversky
Journal:  Psychol Rev       Date:  1996-07       Impact factor: 8.934

7.  The conjunction fallacy?

Authors:  G Wolford; H A Taylor; J R Beck
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  1990-01

8.  Coherent probability from incoherent judgment.

Authors:  D Osherson; D Lane; P Hartley; R R Batsell
Journal:  J Exp Psychol Appl       Date:  2001-03
  8 in total
  7 in total

1.  Broadening the study of inductive reasoning: confirmation judgments with uncertain evidence.

Authors:  Tommaso Mastropasqua; Vincenzo Crupi; Katya Tentori
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  2010-10

2.  An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning.

Authors:  Magda Osman
Journal:  Psychon Bull Rev       Date:  2004-12

3.  Determinants of confirmation.

Authors:  Katya Tentori; Vincenzo Crupi; Daniel Osherson
Journal:  Psychon Bull Rev       Date:  2007-10

4.  The Dilution Effect and Information Integration in Perceptual Decision Making.

Authors:  Jared M Hotaling; Andrew L Cohen; Richard M Shiffrin; Jerome R Busemeyer
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2015-09-25       Impact factor: 3.240

5.  Is There a Conjunction Fallacy in Legal Probabilistic Decision Making?

Authors:  Bartosz W Wojciechowski; Emmanuel M Pothos
Journal:  Front Psychol       Date:  2018-04-05

6.  Why the Conjunction Effect Is Rarely a Fallacy: How Learning Influences Uncertainty and the Conjunction Rule.

Authors:  Phil Maguire; Philippe Moser; Rebecca Maguire; Mark T Keane
Journal:  Front Psychol       Date:  2018-07-04

7.  Evidence, probability and relative plausibility.

Authors:  Colin Aitken; Franco Taroni; Silvia Bozza
Journal:  Int J Evid Proof       Date:  2022-07-25
  7 in total

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