Literature DB >> 18087953

Determinants of confirmation.

Katya Tentori1, Vincenzo Crupi, Daniel Osherson.   

Abstract

Epistemologists often suppose that the extent to which evidence e confirms hypothesis H depends on probabilities involving e and H, and nothing more. We show experimentally that human reasoners sometimes violate this assumption.

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Year:  2007        PMID: 18087953     DOI: 10.3758/bf03194115

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Psychon Bull Rev        ISSN: 1069-9384


  4 in total

1.  Do frequency representations eliminate conjunction effects? An exercise in adversarial collaboration.

Authors:  B Mellers; R Hertwig; D Kahneman
Journal:  Psychol Sci       Date:  2001-07

2.  On the reality of the conjunction fallacy.

Authors:  Ashley Sides; Daniel Osherson; Nicolao Bonini; Riccardo Viale
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  2002-03

3.  Probabilities and utilities of fictional outcomes in Wason's four-card selection task.

Authors:  K N Kirby
Journal:  Cognition       Date:  1994-01

4.  Pragmatic reasoning schemas.

Authors:  P W Cheng; K J Holyoak
Journal:  Cogn Psychol       Date:  1985-10       Impact factor: 3.468

  4 in total
  1 in total

1.  Second-order probability affects hypothesis confirmation.

Authors:  Katya Tentori; Vincenzo Crupi; Daniel Osherson
Journal:  Psychon Bull Rev       Date:  2010-02
  1 in total

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