Literature DB >> 11413630

The spatial ultimatum game.

K M Page1, M A Nowak, K Sigmund.   

Abstract

In the ultimatum game, two players are asked to split a certain sum of money. The proposer has to make an offer. If the responder accepts the offer, the money will be shared accordingly. If the responder rejects the offer, both players receive nothing. The rational solution is for the proposer to offer the smallest possible share, and for the responder to accept it. Human players, in contrast, usually prefer fair splits. In this paper, we use evolutionary game theory to analyse the ultimatum game. We first show that in a non-spatial setting, natural selection chooses the unfair, rational solution. In a spatial setting, however, much fairer outcomes evolve.

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Year:  2000        PMID: 11413630      PMCID: PMC1690799          DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2000.1266

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Proc Biol Sci        ISSN: 0962-8452            Impact factor:   5.349


  4 in total

1.  Variable investment, the Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma, and the origin of cooperation.

Authors:  T Killingback; M Doebeli; N Knowlton
Journal:  Proc Biol Sci       Date:  1999-09-07       Impact factor: 5.349

2.  Fairness versus reason in the ultimatum game.

Authors:  M A Nowak; K M Page; K Sigmund
Journal:  Science       Date:  2000-09-08       Impact factor: 47.728

3.  Self-organized criticality in spatial evolutionary game theory.

Authors:  T Killingback; M Doebeli
Journal:  J Theor Biol       Date:  1998-04-07       Impact factor: 2.691

4.  Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation.

Authors:  M A Nowak; S Bonhoeffer; R M May
Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  1994-05-24       Impact factor: 11.205

  4 in total
  33 in total

1.  Spatial invasion of cooperation.

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2.  The evolution of lying in well-mixed populations.

Authors:  Valerio Capraro; Matjaž Perc; Daniele Vilone
Journal:  J R Soc Interface       Date:  2019-07-31       Impact factor: 4.118

3.  Fixation properties of multiple cooperator configurations on regular graphs.

Authors:  Hendrik Richter
Journal:  Theory Biosci       Date:  2019-03-21       Impact factor: 1.919

4.  The evolution of trust and trustworthiness.

Authors:  Aanjaneya Kumar; Valerio Capraro; Matjaž Perc
Journal:  J R Soc Interface       Date:  2020-08-12       Impact factor: 4.118

5.  Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation.

Authors:  David G Rand; Joseph J Armao; Mayuko Nakamaru; Hisashi Ohtsuki
Journal:  J Theor Biol       Date:  2010-06-09       Impact factor: 2.691

6.  Evolutionary games on cycles.

Authors:  Hisashi Ohtsuki; Martin A Nowak
Journal:  Proc Biol Sci       Date:  2006-09-07       Impact factor: 5.349

7.  The replicator equation on graphs.

Authors:  Hisashi Ohtsuki; Martin A Nowak
Journal:  J Theor Biol       Date:  2006-06-13       Impact factor: 2.691

8.  Digit ratio (2D:4D) moderates the impact of sexual cues on men's decisions in ultimatum games.

Authors:  Bram Van den Bergh; Siegfried Dewitte
Journal:  Proc Biol Sci       Date:  2006-08-22       Impact factor: 5.349

9.  Spectral analysis of transient amplifiers for death-birth updating constructed from regular graphs.

Authors:  Hendrik Richter
Journal:  J Math Biol       Date:  2021-05-16       Impact factor: 2.259

Review 10.  Mathematical foundations of moral preferences.

Authors:  Valerio Capraro; Matjaž Perc
Journal:  J R Soc Interface       Date:  2021-02-10       Impact factor: 4.118

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