Literature DB >> 8855053

Strategies for the prevention of a successful biological warfare aerosol attack.

S L Wiener1.   

Abstract

Biological warfare (BW) aerosol attacks are different from chemical attacks in that they may provide no warning/all clear signals that allow the soldier to put on or remove his M17/M40 protective mask. Methods are now being perfected to detect a BW aerosol cloud using an airborne (helicopter) pulsed laser system to scan the lower altitudes upwind from a troop concentration of corps size, and to sample and analyze the nature of the aerosol within a brief time interval. This system has certain limitations and vulnerabilities, since it is designed specifically to detect a line-type aerosol attack. Provision of, training with, and field use of a lightweight dust mist or HEPA filter respirator for each soldier is proposed for protection against undetected aerosol attacks. This particulate filter respirator would be issued in addition to the M17/M40 mask. Such a BW respirator will be able to purify the soldier's air by removing particles in the 0.3- to 15-micro m-diameter range with an efficiency of 98 to 100%. Particle size of BW aerosols is in the same range, with an optimum size for high-efficiency casualty production of 1 to 5 micro m mass median diameter. The proposed BW respirator will be lightweight; will require low inhalation pressures; will be comfortable to wear for prolonged periods; will not interfere with vision, hearing, and communication; and will not degrade overall effectiveness and performance to the degree observed with the M17/M40 masks. Such respirators would be worn as part of a contingency defense against an enemy likely to use BW agents. This respirator could be worn for prolonged periods when under threat of an undetectable BW attack during weather conditions favorable to the success of such an attack (i.e., low wind velocity and temperature inversion in the target area). In addition, tactically important assets such as command and control centers and missile batteries can also be protected continuously by air filtration systems powered by electricity (modular collective protection equipment). Vaccinations against anthrax, botulism, Q fever, plague, and tularemia are now available and immune protection against ricin and staphylococcal toxins appears feasible in the near future. Chemotherapy can also be provided for prophylaxis of infectious agents released on the battlefield. The vaccines and antibiotics can provide back-up protection against an unexpected BW attack during a period when the BW respirator is not in use or malfunctions due to a poor seal or filter leak. Enemy sites of biological weapon production, assembly, testing, and storage, and delivery vehicles can be targeted for destruction by bombs and/or missiles. An integrated, well-planned, BW defense with multiple components can decrease the likelihood of a successful enemy BW aerosol attack.

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Year:  1996        PMID: 8855053

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Mil Med        ISSN: 0026-4075            Impact factor:   1.437


  10 in total

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  10 in total

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