Literature DB >> 3958636

Evolutionary games and two species population dynamics.

R Cressman, A T Dash, E Akin.   

Abstract

Competition between species has long been modeled by population dynamics based on total numbers of each species. Recently, the evolution of strategy frequencies has been used successfully for competition models between individuals. In this paper, we illustrate that these two views of competition are compatible. It is shown that the rate of intra and interspecific competitions between individuals largely determines the population dynamics. Competition models over a single common resource and predator-prey models are developed from this individual competition approach. In particular, the equilibrium strategies in a co-evolving predator-prey system are shown to be more stable than the predicted strategy cycling of standard evolutionary game theory.

Mesh:

Year:  1986        PMID: 3958636     DOI: 10.1007/bf00276958

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  J Math Biol        ISSN: 0303-6812            Impact factor:   2.259


  2 in total

1.  The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts.

Authors:  J M Smith
Journal:  J Theor Biol       Date:  1974-09       Impact factor: 2.691

2.  Random evolutionarily stable strategies.

Authors:  D Auslander; J Guckenheimer; G Oster
Journal:  Theor Popul Biol       Date:  1978-04       Impact factor: 1.570

  2 in total
  2 in total

1.  Cooperation, norms, and revolutions: a unified game-theoretical approach.

Authors:  Dirk Helbing; Anders Johansson
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2010-10-12       Impact factor: 3.240

2.  Interaction rates, vital rates, background fitness and replicator dynamics: how to embed evolutionary game structure into realistic population dynamics.

Authors:  K Argasinski; M Broom
Journal:  Theory Biosci       Date:  2017-11-20       Impact factor: 1.919

  2 in total

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