| Literature DB >> 36231755 |
Tongbo Deng1, Yafan Fan1, Mengdi Wu2, Min Li1,3.
Abstract
The purpose of this paper was to better understand the long-term care preferences of older people based on intergenerational demonstration effects and social exchange theory, derived from the literature on intergenerational family relationships. The authors relied on the 2014 China Longitudinal Ageing Social Survey database to test the study hypotheses. The results indicated that living with grandchildren was negatively related to the institutional care preferences of older people. Family members' attitudes and older people's life satisfaction significantly mediated the relationship between living with grandchildren and their institutional care preferences. Gender and marital status had potentially diverse effects on institutional care preferences. Therefore, in the context of China's culture of filial piety, social exchange, and intergenerational demonstration, motivation may help foster intergenerational exchange and reciprocity in eldercare arrangements.Entities:
Keywords: family members’ attitudes; gender; institutional care preference; older people; social exchange theory; the demonstration effect
Mesh:
Year: 2022 PMID: 36231755 PMCID: PMC9566612 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph191912455
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Environ Res Public Health ISSN: 1660-4601 Impact factor: 4.614
Figure 1Proposed model of the study.
Definition of variables.
| Variables | Operationalization | Mean | SD |
|---|---|---|---|
| Institutional care | 1 = there are some conditions under which I would like to live in a nursing home, 0 = I do not want to live in a nursing home under any conditions | 0.28 | 0.45 |
| Living with | Number of grandchildren under the age of 18 years old you live with | 0.30 | 0.67 |
| Family members’ | 1 = agree to send you to a nursing home/old age home, | 0.29 | 0.45 |
| Life satisfaction | 1 = satisfied with life, 0 = unsatisfied with life | 0.75 | 0.43 |
| The single older | 1 = single or separated/divorced and 0 = married or partnered | 0.33 | 0.47 |
| Gender | 1 = female, 0 = male | 0.52 | 0.50 |
| Age | Measured in years | 70.7 | 8.14 |
| Education | 1 = less than a high school level, 2 = high school, and | 1.22 | 0.54 |
| ADL | Degree of activity of daily living | 1.07 | 0.24 |
| IADL | Degree of instrumental activity of daily living | 1.20 | 0.37 |
| Homeownership | 1 = owned commodity housing in destination counties, | 0.84 | 0.37 |
| Social security | older people’s primary income, including Enterprise Employee Basic Pensions (EEBP), Urban-Rural Resident Social Pensions (URRSP), poverty funds, and advanced-age allowances | 5.99 | 1.72 |
| Family economic | Household income over the last year | 9.10 | 1.41 |
SD = standard deviation.
Marginal effect on determinants of institutional care preference.
| Variables | Institutional Care Preference | Family Members’ Attitude | Institutional Care Preference | Life Satisfaction | Institutional Care Preference | Institutional Care Preference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| Living with grandchildren | −0.0278 *** | −0.0358 * | 0.0112 * | 0.0171 | ||
| (0.0079) | (0.0189) | (0.0067) | (0.0218) | |||
| Family members’ attitude | 0.1838 *** | 0.1685 *** | ||||
| (0.0378) | (0.0369) | |||||
| Life satisfaction | −0.0640 *** | −0.0622 * | ||||
| (0.0117) | (0.0307) | |||||
| Age | −0.0074 *** | −0.0039 * | −0.0053 *** | 0.0068 *** | −0.0068 *** | −0.0048 *** |
| (0.0007) | (0.0015) | (0.0014) | (0.0006) | (0.0007) | (0.0014) | |
| Education | 0.0211* | 0.0142 | 0.0109 | 0.0089 | 0.0237 ** | 0.0153 |
| (0.0088) | (0.0176) | (0.0178) | (0.0091) | (0.0088) | (0.0179) | |
| ADL | 0.0420 | 0.0291 | −0.0891 | −0.0648 * | 0.0470 | −0.0912 |
| (0.0377) | (0.0657) | (0.0638) | (0.0296) | (0.0387) | (0.0628) | |
| IADL | −0.0346 | −0.0098 | 0.0109 | −0.1479 *** | −0.0474 + | −0.0030 |
| (0.0252) | (0.0543) | (0.0522) | (0.0198) | (0.0256) | (0.0512) | |
| Homeownership | 0.0238 | 0.0194 | −0.0313 | −0.0027 | 0.0254 + | −0.0439 |
| (0.0150) | (0.0362) | (0.0344) | (0.0127) | (0.0150) | (0.0353) | |
| Social security benefits | 0.0495 *** | 0.0478 ** | −0.0031 | 0.0145 ** | 0.0519 *** | 0.0038 |
| (0.0056) | (0.0154) | (0.0135) | (0.0049) | (0.0056) | (0.0133) | |
| Family economic status | −0.0123 + | 0.0040 | −0.0216 | 0.0240 *** | −0.0112 + | −0.0261 + |
| (0.0065) | (0.0176) | (0.0159) | (0.0054) | (0.0065) | (0.0158) | |
| Provincial FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 8232 | 1752 | 950 | 8876 | 8177 | 940 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.1230 | 0.1036 | 0.2275 | 0.0916 | 0.1245 | 0.2443 |
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Marginal effect on heterogeneous effects of single older people: determinants of institutional care preference.
| Variables | Institutional Care Preference | Family Members’ Attitude | Institutional Care Preference | Life Satisfaction | Institutional Care Preference | Institutional Care Preference | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Single | With Spouse | Single | With Spouse | Single | With Spouse | Single | With Spouse | Single | With Spouse | Single | With Spouse | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | |
| Living with grandchildren | −0.0317 * | −0.0270 ** | −0.1337 ** | −0.0156 | 0.0075 | 0.0114 * | −0.0693 | 0.0538 | ||||
| (0.0137) | (0.0097) | (0.0467) | (0.0230) | (0.0129) | (0.0800) | (0.0600) | (0.0436) | |||||
| Family members’ attitude | 0.4384 *** | 0.157 0 *** | 0.4517 *** | 0.1424 *** | ||||||||
| (0.1274) | (0.0445) | (0.1240) | (0.0424) | |||||||||
| Life satisfaction | −0.0750 *** | −0.0549 *** | −0.1313 | −0.0784 | ||||||||
| (0.0188) | (0.0149) | (0.0800) | (0.0488) | |||||||||
| Age | −0.0066 *** | −0.0074 *** | −0.0064 * | −0.0028 | −0.0060 | −0.0050 ** | 0.0063 *** | 0.0078 *** | −0.0057 *** | −0.0068 *** | −0.0063 | −0.0042 * |
| (0.0011) | (0.0009) | (0.0031) | (0.0021) | (0.0049) | (0.0019) | (0.0011) | (0.0009) | (0.0011) | (0.0009) | (0.0052) | (0.0019) | |
| Education | 0.0363 * | 0.0156 | 0.0820 + | 0.0135 | 0.1413 | −0.0011 | 0.0023 | 0.0042 | 0.0366* | 0.0180 + | 0.1547 | 0.0016 |
| (0.0180) | (0.0104) | (0.0466) | (0.0211) | (0.1065) | (0.0210) | (0.0212) | (0.0102) | (0.0180) | (0.0104) | (0.0947) | (0.0211) | |
| ADL | 0.0415 | 0.0300 | 0.0097 | −0.0143 | −0.3033 + | 0.0201 | −0.0652 | −0.0530 | 0.0464 | 0.0343 | −0.2201 | 0.0095 |
| (0.0515) | (0.0532) | (0.1067) | (0.1008) | (0.1738) | (0.0891) | (0.0443) | (0.0414) | (0.0528) | (0.0546) | (0.1756) | (0.0909) | |
| IADL | −0.0542 | −0.0055 | 0.0436 | 0.0136 | 0.1558 | −0.0809 | −0.1264 *** | −0.1801 *** | −0.0694 * | −0.0169 | 0.0185 | −0.0912 |
| (0.0347) | (0.0358) | (0.0934) | (0.0779) | (0.1524) | (0.0729) | (0.0300) | (0.0277) | (0.0353) | (0.0363) | (0.1582) | (0.0733) | |
| Homeownership | 0.0241 | 0.0123 | −0.0252 | 0.0381 | −0.0622 | −0.0677 | −0.0279 | 0.0236 | 0.0249 | 0.0146 | −0.0987 | −0.0864 |
| (0.0204) | (0.0214) | (0.0638) | (0.0523) | (0.0861) | (0.0536) | (0.0199) | (0.0171) | (0.0203) | (0.0215) | (0.0863) | (0.0545) | |
| Social security benefits | 0.0355 *** | 0.0566 *** | 0.0480 | 0.0567 ** | −0.0096 | −0.0127 | 0.0063 | 0.0161 ** | 0.0389 *** | 0.0588 *** | 0.0241 | −0.0040 |
| (0.0101) | (0.0068) | (0.0359) | (0.0191) | (0.0420) | (0.0188) | (0.0098) | (0.0056) | (0.0101) | (0.0069) | (0.0403) | (0.0194) | |
| Family economic status | −0.0023 | −0.0144 + | 0.0412 | −0.0144 | −0.0294 | −0.0174 | 0.0274 ** | 0.0239 *** | −0.0026 | −0.0134 | −0.1053 + | −0.0194 |
| (0.0108) | (0.0082) | (0.0389) | (0.0228) | (0.0525) | (0.0214) | (0.0102) | (0.0064) | (0.0109) | (0.0082) | (0.0626) | (0.0221) | |
| Provincial FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 2694 | 5505 | 409 | 1197 | 409 | 1197 | 2822 | 5992 | 2672 | 5472 | 409 | 1197 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.1235 | 0.1254 | 0.1549 | 0.0883 | 0.3512 | 0.2160 | 0.1181 | 0.0931 | 0.1261 | 0.1263 | 0.4036 | 0.2384 |
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Marginal effect on heterogeneous effects of gender: determinants of institutional care preference.
| Variables | Institutional Care Preference | Family Members’ Attitude | Institutional Care Preference | Life Satisfaction | Institutional Care Preference | Institutional Care Preference | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | |
| Living with grandchildren | −0.0298 ** | −0.0304 ** | −0.1055 *** | 0.0379 | 0.0072 * | 0.0113 | 0.0140 | 0.0215 | ||||
| (0.0110) | (0.0114) | (0.0299) | (0.0290) | (0.0095) | (0.0096) | (0.0362) | (0.0424) | |||||
| Family members’ attitude | 0.3467 *** | 0.1740 ** | 0.3088 ** | 0.1610 ** | ||||||||
| (0.1052) | (0.0548) | (0.0955) | (0.0542) | |||||||||
| Life satisfaction | −0.0634 *** | −0.0755 *** | −0.1078 + | −0.0737 | ||||||||
| (0.0164) | (0.0169) | (0.0569) | (0.0591) | |||||||||
| Age | −0.0082 *** | −0.0072 *** | −0.0053 * | −0.0028 | −0.0102 *** | −0.0067 ** | 0.0061 *** | 0.0075 *** | −0.0075 *** | −0.0066 *** | −0.0089 ** | −0.0059 * |
| (0.0010) | (0.0010) | (0.0023) | (0.0024) | (0.0029) | (0.0025) | (0.0009) | (0.0009) | (0.0010) | (0.0010) | (0.0029) | (0.0026) | |
| Education | 0.0345 * | 0.0189 | 0.0662 * | −0.0160 | 0.0401 | −0.0165 | 0.0327 * | −0.0003 | 0.0379 ** | 0.0221 + | 0.0666 | −0.0151 |
| (0.0137) | (0.0119) | (0.0279) | (0.0256) | (0.0380) | (0.0314) | (0.0156) | (0.0113) | (0.0137) | (0.0118) | (0.0421) | (0.0310) | |
| ADL | 0.0052 | 0.0718 | 0.0044 | 0.0283 | −0.2627 + | −0.4906 + | −0.0564 | −0.0834 + | 0.0071 | 0.0765 | −0.2302 | −0.4516 + |
| (0.0498) | (0.0593) | (0.0899) | (0.1239) | (0.1436) | (0.2507) | (0.0372) | (0.0493) | (0.0512) | (0.0606) | (0.1469) | (0.2486) | |
| IADL | −0.0118 | −0.0336 | 0.0701 | −0.0773 | 0.0820 | 0.2142 | −0.1418 *** | −0.1593 *** | −0.0227 | −0.0514 | 0.0331 | 0.1593 |
| (0.0337) | (0.0388) | (0.0793) | (0.0926) | (0.1124) | (0.1534) | (0.0265) | (0.0309) | (0.0344) | (0.0392) | (0.1151) | (0.1498) | |
| Homeownership | 0.0508 * | −0.0151 | 0.0260 | 0.0172 | −0.0118 | 0.0021 | −0.0010 | 0.0002 | 0.0569 ** | −0.0177 | −0.0071 | −0.0381 |
| (0.0200) | (0.0229) | (0.0532) | (0.0566) | (0.0717) | (0.0631) | (0.0167) | (0.0198) | (0.0201) | (0.0230) | (0.0670) | (0.0699) | |
| Social security benefits | 0.0475 *** | 0.0504 *** | 0.0287 | 0.0613 ** | −0.0117 | 0.0218 | 0.0157 * | 0.0119 + | 0.0503 *** | 0.0525 *** | 0.0002 | 0.0263 |
| (0.0084) | (0.0077) | (0.0268) | (0.0214) | (0.0261) | (0.0246) | (0.0074) | (0.0065) | (0.0084) | (0.0077) | (0.0266) | (0.0238) | |
| Family economic status | −0.0074 | −0.0140 | 0.0391 | −0.0136 | −0.0402 | −0.0307 | 0.0203 ** | 0.0342 *** | −0.0060 | −0.0126 | −0.0438 | −0.0414 |
| (0.0093) | (0.0094) | (0.0288) | (0.0264) | (0.0316) | (0.0265) | (0.0077) | (0.0077) | (0.0093) | (0.0095) | (0.0320) | (0.0270) | |
| Provincial FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 4122 | 4053 | 807 | 806 | 807 | 806 | 4500 | 4373 | 4094 | 4026 | 807 | 806 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.1532 | 0.1099 | 0.1400 | 0.1042 | 0.3239 | 0.2475 | 0.1027 | 0.1084 | 0.1544 | 0.1126 | 0.3462 | 0.2743 |
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.