| Literature DB >> 36122242 |
Kaleda K Denton1, Uri Liberman2, Marcus W Feldman1.
Abstract
Conformist and anticonformist transmission of dichotomous cultural traits (i.e., traits with two variants) have been studied both experimentally, in many species, and theoretically, with mathematical models. Signatures of types of conformity to polychotomous traits (with more than two variants; e.g., baby names and syllables in bird song) have been inferred from population-level data, but there are few models that include individual-level biases among more than two discrete variants. We generalize the standard dichotomous trait conformity model by Boyd and Richerson to incorporate [Formula: see text] role models and [Formula: see text] variants. Our analysis shows that in the case of [Formula: see text] role models, under anticonformity, the central polymorphic equilibrium [Formula: see text] is globally stable, whereas under conformity, if initially the frequencies of [Formula: see text] variants are all equal to the maximum variant frequency in the population, there is global convergence to an equilibrium in which the frequencies of these variants are all [Formula: see text] and all other variants are absent. With a general number n of role models, the same result holds with conformity, whereas under anticonformity, global convergence is not guaranteed, and there may be stable frequency cycles or chaos. If both conformity and anticonformity occur for different configurations of variants among the n role models, a variety of novel polymorphic equilibria may exist and be stable. Future empirical studies may use this formulation to directly quantify an individual's level of (anti)conformist bias to a polychotomous trait.Entities:
Keywords: conformity; global convergence; polychotomous trait; polymorphism; stable equilibria
Mesh:
Year: 2022 PMID: 36122242 PMCID: PMC9522326 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2205914119
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A ISSN: 0027-8424 Impact factor: 12.779
role models and variants
| Offspring probabilities | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Role model state, |
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| (3, 0, 0) | 1 | 0 | 0 |
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| (0, 3, 0) | 0 | 1 | 0 |
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| (0, 0, 3) | 0 | 0 | 1 |
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| (2, 1, 0) |
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| 0 |
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| (2, 0, 1) |
| 0 |
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| (1, 2, 0) |
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| 0 |
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| (1, 0, 2) |
| 0 |
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| (0, 2, 1) | 0 |
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| (0, 1, 2) | 0 |
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Population dynamics for dichotomous and polychotomous traits, assuming that initially, and the population is not at equilibrium
| Transmission | Role models | Dichotomous trait ( | Polychotomous trait ( |
|---|---|---|---|
| Purely conformist | Global convergence to a corner. | Global convergence to an equilibrium. If initially, the frequencies of | |
| Purely conformist | Any | Global convergence to a corner. | Same as above. |
| Purely anticonformist | Global convergence to | Global convergence to | |
| Purely anticonformist | Global convergence to | Numerical results suggest convergence to | |
| Purely anticonformist | Convergence is not guaranteed. | Numerical results suggest convergence to | |
| Purely anticonformist | Any | Convergence is not guaranteed. | Convergence is not guaranteed. |
| Conformist and anticonformist | Not possible. | A variety of population dynamics are possible (e.g., | |
| Conformist and anticonformist | It is possible that corners and | A variety of population dynamics are possible; e.g., asymmetric interior equilibria may be stable ( |
Fig. 1.Dynamics with n = 4 role models and m = 3 variants, where and D = 0.9 in Eq. . The base of each arrow is located at a starting position , and the tip of the arrow is at the final position after five generations. Filled circles mark stable equilibria, and open circles mark unstable equilibria, although unstable equilibria may be stable along an axis (for example, see , where ). Here , so there are unstable interior equilibria given by Eq. , and the equilibria , and are stable. Corner equilibria are unstable, and is unstable because .
Fig. 2.Dynamics with n = 5 role models and m = 3 variants, where , and . The base of each arrow is at the starting point , and the top of the arrow is at the ending point after 20 generations. Stable equilibria are shown as filled circles, and unstable equilibria are shown as open circles.
Fig. 3.Variant frequencies over time for n = 15 role models and m = 3 variants. In both A and B, Eq. is iterated from initial variant frequencies (red), (orange), and (purple). (A) for all and (B) (where ; Eq. . Both simulations ran for 10,000 generations, and the last 60 are plotted. In A, there is an exact two-generation cycle between and . In B, there are chaotic fluctuations around an average frequency (calculated over the last 5,000 generations) of .