| Literature DB >> 35910749 |
Tingting Liu1, Kai Gao2, Sajid Anwar3.
Abstract
In recent years, the "Belt and Road" Initiative (BRI) has paid more and more attention to practicing the concept of green development. The concept of green development in the BRI will help promote the active response to climate change in the regions along the route and maintain global ecological security and is of great significance to the green transformation and development of energy-intensive enterprises. Using company-level data from China over the 2011-2020 period, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the BRI on energy-intensive enterprise accounting conservatism. We find that BRI has decreased the energy-intensive enterprise accounting conservatism, and this result continues to hold after a series of robustness tests. We also examine the effect of the RBI on accounting conservatism across company types and ages and find that the BRI is beneficial to energy-intensive state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and young companies. Furthermore, analysis reveals that BRI changes the accounting conservatism of energy-intensive enterprises mainly through debt financing, tax burden, and legal environment channels.Entities:
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Year: 2022 PMID: 35910749 PMCID: PMC9328970 DOI: 10.1155/2022/4239939
Source DB: PubMed Journal: J Environ Public Health ISSN: 1687-9805
Figure 1Greenhouse gas emissions in 2019.
Figure 2The theoretical framework of how the BRI affects accounting conservatism.
Definition of variables.
| Variable type | Symbol | Definition |
|---|---|---|
| Explained variable |
| Using Khan and Watts's (2009) model of company level accounting conservatism, the accounting conservatism index of the sample is calculated. The larger the value, the higher the company's accounting conservatism. |
|
| ||
| Explanatory variables |
| For energy-intensive enterprises involved in BRI, the value is 1; 0 otherwise. |
|
| In 2015, the RBI “vision and action” was promulgated, in 2015 and after 2015, the value is 1; 0 otherwise. | |
|
| ||
| Control variable |
| Natural logarithm of total assets. |
|
| If the enterprise is a state-owned enterprise, the value is 1; 0 otherwise. | |
|
| Equity market value/equity book value. | |
Descriptive statistics of the data.
| Stats |
| Mean | Median | SD | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
| 2,225 | 0.038 | 0.033 | 0.065 | −0.077 | 0.172 |
| Treat | 2,225 | 0.071 | 0.000 | 0.256 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Size | 2,225 | 22.165 | 22.016 | 1.159 | 20.422 | 24.621 |
| SOE | 2,225 | 0.382 | 0.000 | 0.486 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| MB | 2,225 | 0.618 | 0.622 | 0.231 | 0.222 | 1.007 |
The BRI and accounting conservatism: univariate t-test results.
| Treatment group (1) | Control group (2) | Difference (1)-(2) |
| ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| C_score | Before the BRI | 0.045 | 0.033 | 0.012 | 11.67 |
| After the BRI | 0.024 | 0.014 | 0.010 | 3.77 | |
Note. p < 0.01;p < 0.05;p < 0.1.
The BRI and accounting robustness: DID estimation results.
| (1) | (2) | |
|---|---|---|
| Treat × Inyear | −0.005 | −0.005 |
| (−1.84) | (−2.12) | |
| Treat | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| (0.34) | (0.27) | |
| Inyear | 0.032 | 0.032 |
| (42.46) | (42.33) | |
| Size | −0.043 | −0.043 |
| (−62.54) | (−61.36) | |
| SOE | 0.006 | 0.008 |
| (3.38) | (4.92) | |
| MB | 0.118 | 0.117 |
| (54.04) | (52.8) | |
| Industry | No | Yes |
| _Cons | 0.897 | 0.907 |
| (61.38) | (51.79) | |
|
| 2,225 | 2,225 |
| Adjusted | 0.178 | 0.185 |
Note. p < 0.01;p < 0.05;p < 0.1.
Figure 3The parallel trend test of accounting conservatism.
The robustness test.
| Accounting conservatism | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSM-DID | Using alternativeproxy variables | Removing the2015 pilot data | Controlling provincecharacteristics | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Treat × Inyear | −0.006 | −0.010 | −0.006 | −0.005 |
| (−1.69) | (−1.87) | (−2.16) | (−2.06) | |
| Treat | 0.006 | −0.008 | 0.002 | 0 |
| (1.39) | (−1.40) | (0.72) | (−0.09) | |
| Inyear | 0.026 | 0.012 | 0.037 | 0.032 |
| (10.73) | (7.5) | (46.92) | (42.06) | |
| Control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| _Cons | 0.973 | −0.428 | 0.920 | 0.899 |
| (27.86) | (13.70) | (55.33) | (50.8) | |
| N | 443 | 2,193 | 1,955 | 2,225 |
| Adjusted | 0.203 | 0.076 | 0.185 | 0.185 |
Note. p < 0.01;p < 0.05;p < 0.1.
Potential endogeneity: instrumental variable estimation.
| Variable | First stage return | Second stage return |
|---|---|---|
| Treat × Inyear | C_score | |
| (1) | (2) | |
| IV × Inyear | 0.175 | |
| (20.19) | ||
| Treat × Inyear | −0.027 | |
| −1.83 | ||
| Treat | −0.010 | 0.002 |
| (−3.55) | (2.33) | |
| Inyear | 0.055 | 0.032 |
| (19.93) | (25.57) | |
| Size | 0.016 | 0.047 |
| (10.18) | (92.5) | |
| SOE | 0.015 | 0.011 |
| (4.82) | (11.09) | |
| MB | 0.022 | 0.101 |
| (3.08) | (46.47) | |
| Industry | Yes | Yes |
| _Cons | −0.401 | 0.997 |
| (11.22) | (83.38) | |
| Kleibergen–paap rk | 73.45 | |
| [0.000] | ||
| Kleibergen–paap wald rk | 84.54 | |
| {16.38} | ||
| Cragg–Donald Wald | 407.54 | |
|
| 2,225 | 2,225 |
Note. The values in round brackets underneath the estimated coefficients are the estimated t-values; the symbols ,, and , respectively, represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Values inside the square brackets ate the corresponding p values, and the value inside the curly bracket { } is the Stock–Yogo weak IV test critical value at the 10% level.
Figure 4The impact of the BRI on the accounting conservatism of SOEs.
The impact of the BRI on accounting conservatism: results of the heterogeneity test.
| Ownership differences | Company age differences | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Young enterprises | Mature enterprises | ||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | |
| Treat × Inyear × SOEs | −0.011 | ||
| (−2.52) | |||
| Treat × Inyear | 0.002 | −0.010 | −0.002 |
| −0.52 | (−2.70) | (−0.77) | |
| Treat | 0 | 0.001 | −0.002 |
| (−0.02) | −0.33 | (−0.42) | |
| Inyear | 0.032 | 0.041 | 0.025 |
| −42.36 | −37.55 | −25.28 | |
| Control | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| _Cons | 0.907 | 0.807 | 1.095 |
| −51.77 | −32.59 | −44.9 | |
|
| 2,225 | 1,213 | 1,012 |
| Adjusted | 0.185 | 0.196 | 0.22 |
Note. p < 0.01;p < 0.05;p < 0.1.
Figure 5The impact of the BRI on the accounting conservatism of young companies.
Channels through which the BRI affects accounting conservatism.
| Accounting conservatism | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt financing | Executive compensation | Tax burden | Legal environment | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Treat × Inyear × Bankloan | −0.039 | |||
| (−4.05) | ||||
| Treat × Inyear × Pay | −0.001 | |||
| (−0.41) | ||||
| Treat × Inyear × Tax | −0.119 | |||
| (−1.73) | ||||
| Treat × Inyear × Law | 0.024 | |||
| (2.07) | ||||
| Treat × Inyear | −0.015 | 0.015 | −0.019 | −0.100 |
| (−2.58) | (0.31) | (−6.75) | (−2.19) | |
| Bankloan | 0.0668 | |||
| 3.04 | ||||
| Pay | 0.005 | |||
| (5.07) | ||||
| Tax | 0.327 | |||
| (14.05) | ||||
| Law | 0.253 | |||
| (10.54) | ||||
| Control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| _Cons | 0.907 | 0.863 | 0.683 | 0.960 |
| (51.92) | (43.41) | (35.9) | (54.95) | |
|
| 2,225 | 2,225 | 2,225 | 2,179 |
| Adjusted | 0.186 | 0.188 | 0.116 | 0.208 |
Note. p < 0.01;p < 0.05;p < 0.1.
Figure 6The impact of the BRI on the accounting conservatism of the energy-intensive enterprises.