| Literature DB >> 35873083 |
Iftekhar Hasan1, Miriam Marra2, Thomas Y To3, Eliza Wu3, Gaiyan Zhang4.
Abstract
We examine the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the credit risk of companies around the world. We find that increased infection rates affect firms more adversely as reflected by the wider increase in their credit default swap (CDS) spreads if they are larger, more leveraged, closer to default, have poorer governance and more limited stakeholder engagement, and operate in more highly exposed industries. We observe that country-level determinants like GDP, political stability, foreign direct investment, and commitment to crisis management (income support, health and lockdown policies) also affect the sensitivity of CDS spreads to COVID-19 infection rates. A negative amplification effect exists for firms with high default probability in countries with fiscal constraints. A direct comparison between global CDS and stock markets reveals that the CDS market prices in a distinct set of corporate traits and government policies in pandemic times.Entities:
Keywords: COVID-19; Global corporate CDS; corporate resilience; government policies; relative market efficiency
Year: 2022 PMID: 35873083 PMCID: PMC9287578 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106618
Source DB: PubMed Journal: J Bank Financ ISSN: 0378-4266
Figure 1COVID-19 Infection Rates.
This figure shows the weekly COVID-19 infection rates in 2020, measured as the number of infections per 1000 people, for Asia-Pacific, Americas, and Europe, respectively.
Figure 2Cumulative Change in Log CDS Spreads.
This figure shows the cumulative change in log CDS spreads in 2020 for our sample firms located in Asia-Pacific, Americas, and Europe, respectively.
Figure 3Weekly Change in Log CDS Spreads.
This figure shows the average weekly change in log CDS spreads for our sample firms in 2020. Some major events related to significant changes in CDS spreads are enumerated: 1) the week ending February 28, 2020 (increase of 17.9%) when cases in Italy started spiking and the Dow Jones Industrial Average experienced the worst day in two years (on February, 24); 2) the week ending March 13, 2020 (increase of 21.4%) when the WHO declared COVID-19 a pandemic (on March, 11); 3) the week ending March 27, 2020 (drop of 10.5%) when the Dow Jones Industrial Average surged by more than 2,000 points after news that in the U.S. a $2 trillion stimulus bill was close to approval (on March, 24) and when President Trump signed the stimulus bill after the legislation was passed in a bipartisan vote by US Congress (on March, 27); 4) the week ending April 3, 2020 (increase of 4.8%) as further bad news arrive, including the positivity to COVID-19 of the UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson; 5) the week ending April 10, 2020 (drop of 13.4%) when the second COVID-19 vaccine trial began in the U.S.; 6) the week ending May 22, 2020 (drop of 6.5%) when the U.S. and AstraZeneca announced a collaboration to speed up the development of a vaccine; 7) the week ending June 12, 2020 (increase of 7.2%) when the total number of confirmed cases hits 2 million in the U.S.; and 8) the week ending September 25, 2020 (increase of 12.7%) when the UK upgraded the COVID-19 alert level from 3 to 4 (on September, 21) with over 4,000 daily confirmed cases (start of a ‘second wave’).
Summary statistics.
| Firm-level variables | Mean | Std. dev. | Q1 | Median | Q3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CDS spread (bps) | 140.009 | 202.171 | 39.156 | 70.596 | 140.035 |
| Weekly change in log CDS spread (%) | 0.264 | 11.808 | -2.607 | -0.002 | 1.404 |
| Weekly stock return (%) | -0.224 | 7.435 | -3.349 | 0.117 | 3.563 |
| Size | 10.045 | 1.270 | 9.143 | 9.899 | 10.767 |
| Leverage | 0.340 | 0.175 | 0.214 | 0.319 | 0.453 |
| Debt rollover risk | 0.789 | 2.540 | 0.102 | 0.255 | 0.621 |
| Investment grade | 0.488 | 0.500 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Profitability | 0.107 | 0.054 | 0.071 | 0.098 | 0.137 |
| Cash holding | 0.095 | 0.082 | 0.036 | 0.073 | 0.126 |
| Stock volatility | 0.018 | 0.010 | 0.013 | 0.016 | 0.020 |
| Distance to default | 3.696 | 1.167 | 3.086 | 3.849 | 4.549 |
| Stakeholder engagement | 0.695 | 0.461 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| CSR reporting | 0.851 | 0.356 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| CSR strategy score | 0.602 | 0.309 | 0.397 | 0.674 | 0.839 |
| Antitakeover provisions | 3.791 | 2.560 | 2.000 | 4.000 | 6.000 |
| Independent Directors | 0.649 | 0.272 | 0.429 | 0.769 | 0.889 |
| Employee health policy | 0.931 | 0.253 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Employee health training | 0.839 | 0.368 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Supply chain health policy | 0.623 | 0.485 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Industry exposure to COVID19 | 3.248 | 0.598 | 2.890 | 3.091 | 3.761 |
| Country-level variables | |||||
| COVID19 | 0.261 | 0.490 | 0.026 | 0.076 | 0.214 |
| GDP | 27.741 | 1.085 | 26.787 | 27.901 | 28.484 |
| GDP growth (%) | 1.682 | 1.331 | 0.929 | 1.463 | 1.950 |
| Debt to GDP | 0.792 | 0.484 | 0.421 | 0.621 | 0.981 |
| Foreign direct investment | 0.030 | 0.056 | 0.013 | 0.020 | 0.032 |
| Political stability | 0.472 | 0.626 | 0.206 | 0.481 | 1.030 |
| Income Support | 1.354 | 0.754 | 1.000 | 2.000 | 2.000 |
| Lockdown Policies | 0.574 | 0.207 | 0.444 | 0.620 | 0.727 |
| Health and Lockdown Policies | 0.555 | 0.163 | 0.482 | 0.595 | 0.664 |
This table reports the summary statistics for the full sample. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile levels. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Figure 4Corporate characteristics and COVID-19-induced CDS spread changes.
This figure plots the cumulative change in log CDS spreads at the peak of COVID-19 (the 4 weeks from 21st of February to 20th of March 2020). Firms are divided into terciles within each country according to different firm characteristics and a firm is classified as “high” (“low”) if the firm ranks in the top (bottom) tercile. Firms with (without) an investment grade credit rating, employee health policy and stakeholder engagement policy are classified as “high” (“low”), respectively. CSR performance is proxied by the existence of some stockholder engagement policy and managerial entrenchment is proxied by the number of antitakeover provisions.
Corporate characteristics and COVID-19-induced CDS spread changes.
| Dep. = ∆CDS Spreads | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| COVID19 | 0.049*** | |||||||
| (18.967) | ||||||||
| Size × COVID19 | 0.004* | 0.008*** | ||||||
| (1.958) | (3.393) | |||||||
| Leverage × COVID19 | 0.046*** | 0.052*** | ||||||
| (3.244) | (3.217) | |||||||
| Investment grade × COVID19 | -0.010* | -0.010* | ||||||
| (-1.841) | (-1.771) | |||||||
| Profitability × COVID19 | -0.063 | -0.084 | ||||||
| (-1.543) | (-1.503) | |||||||
| Cash holding × COVID19 | -0.006 | 0.015 | ||||||
| (-0.287) | (0.553) | |||||||
| Stock volatility × COVID19 | 0.970** | 0.293 | ||||||
| (2.376) | (0.697) | |||||||
| Firm fixed effects | N | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Industry-time fixed effects | N | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Country-time fixed effects | N | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Number of observations | 29119 | 29119 | 29119 | 29119 | 29119 | 29119 | 29119 | 29119 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.048 | 0.327 | 0.328 | 0.327 | 0.327 | 0.326 | 0.327 | 0.355 |
This table reports regression results on the relation between corporate characteristics and the reaction of CDS spread changes to changes in COVID-19 infection rates. The dependent variable is the weekly change in log CDS spreads for each firm. COVID19 is the weekly percentage change in COVID-19 infection rates in a country. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm and are displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Corporate policies and COVID-19-induced CDS spread changes.
| Dep. = ∆CDS Spreads | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stakeholder engagement × COVID19 | -0.018*** | -0.015** | -0.017*** | ||
| (-2.982) | (-2.399) | (-2.711) | |||
| Antitakeover provisions × COVID19 | 0.003** | 0.003* | 0.003* | ||
| (2.035) | (1.841) | (1.802) | |||
| Employee health policy × COVID19 | -0.019* | -0.012 | -0.012 | ||
| (-1.667) | (-1.055) | (-0.970) | |||
| Size × COVID19 | 0.010*** | 0.009*** | 0.009*** | 0.011*** | 0.010*** |
| (4.158) | (3.674) | (3.629) | (4.385) | (4.113) | |
| Leverage × COVID19 | 0.050*** | 0.053*** | 0.054*** | 0.052*** | |
| (3.132) | (3.278) | (3.352) | (3.269) | ||
| Stock volatility × COVID19 | 0.267 | 0.304 | 0.310 | 0.292 | |
| (0.631) | (0.713) | (0.746) | (0.686) | ||
| Investment grade × COVID19 | -0.008 | -0.009 | -0.009 | -0.007 | |
| (-1.410) | (-1.646) | (-1.603) | (-1.240) | ||
| Profitability × COVID19 | -0.073 | -0.078 | -0.083 | -0.069 | 0.001 |
| (-1.307) | (-1.424) | (-1.499) | (-1.263) | (0.012) | |
| Cash holding × COVID19 | 0.018 | 0.016 | 0.009 | 0.014 | 0.014 |
| (0.653) | (0.594) | (0.340) | (0.531) | (0.546) | |
| Distance to default × COVID19 | -0.009*** | ||||
| (-3.601) | |||||
| Firm fixed effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Industry-time fixed effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Country-time fixed effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Number of observations | 29119 | 29119 | 29119 | 29119 | 29119 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.356 | 0.355 | 0.355 | 0.356 | 0.356 |
This table reports regression results on the relation between corporate policies and the reaction of CDS spreads to changes in COVID-19 infection rates. Corporate policies include corporate social responsibility performance (stakeholder engagement), corporate governance (number of antitakeover provisions, and employee health policies. The dependent variable is the weekly change in log CDS spreads for each firm. COVID19 is the weekly percentage change in COVID-19 infection rates in a country. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm and are displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Robustness tests.
| Dep. = ∆CDS Spreads | (1) Model includes currency-time fixed effects | (2) COVID19 = Change in number of | (3) Model adds control for weekly stock return | (4) Model adds interaction between debt rollover risk and distance to default | (5) Model adds interaction between cash holding and distance to default | (6) Controls for industry exposure to COVID19 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size × COVID19 | 0.010*** | 0.007*** | 0.010*** | 0.011*** | 0.009*** | 0.012*** |
| (4.113) | (3.999) | (4.464) | (4.371) | (4.061) | (5.263) | |
| Distance to default × COVID19 | -0.009*** | -0.486*** | -0.008*** | -0.009*** | ||
| (-3.601) | (-2.807) | (-3.485) | (-3.557) | |||
| Profitability × COVID19 | 0.001 | -0.014 | 0.009 | -0.036 | -0.047 | -0.035 |
| (0.012) | (-0.339) | (0.157) | (-0.616) | (-0.870) | (-0.654) | |
| Cash holding × COVID19 | 0.014 | 0.003 | 0.016 | 0.000 | 0.034 | 0.037 |
| (0.546) | (0.161) | (0.609) | (0.006) | (1.133) | (1.300) | |
| Stakeholder engagement × COVID19 | -0.017*** | -0.013*** | -0.017*** | -0.020*** | -0.018*** | -0.018*** |
| (-2.711) | (-2.620) | (-2.740) | (-2.864) | (-2.883) | (-2.887) | |
| Antitakeover provisions × COVID19 | 0.003* | 0.191* | 0.003* | 0.003** | 0.003* | 0.002* |
| (1.802) | (1.712) | (1.763) | (2.317) | (1.938) | (1.654) | |
| Employee health policy × COVID19 | -0.012 | -0.007 | -0.012 | -0.002 | -0.009 | -0.003 |
| (-0.970) | (-0.701) | (-0.939) | (-0.148) | (-0.690) | (-0.239) | |
| Industry exposure to COVID-19 × COVID19 | 0.013** | |||||
| (2.577) | ||||||
| Weekly stock return | -0.201*** | |||||
| (-6.875) | ||||||
| Debt rollover risk * COVID19 | -0.005 | |||||
| (-0.106) | ||||||
| Low Distance to default × Debt rollover risk * COVID19 | 0.269** | |||||
| (2.302) | ||||||
| Low Distance to default × Cash holding * COVID19 | -0.136** | |||||
| (-2.222) | ||||||
| Low Distance to default × COVID19 | 0.017** | 0.025*** | ||||
| (2.466) | (3.204) | |||||
| Firm fixed effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Industry-time fixed effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Country-time fixed effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Number of observations | 29119 | 28210 | 27644 | 24659 | 29119 | 27760 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.356 | 0.349 | 0.370 | 0.350 | 0.356 | 0.358 |
This table reports various robustness checks for regression results on the relation between all corporate characteristics and policies and the reaction of CDS spread changes to changes in COVID-19 infection rates. The dependent variable is the weekly change in log CDS spreads for each firm. COVID19 is the weekly percentage change in COVID-19 infection rates in a country. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm and are displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Country characteristics and COVID-19-induced CDS spread changes.
| Dep. = ∆CDS Spreads | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| COVID19 | 0.417*** | 0.383*** | 0.435*** | 0.432*** | 0.430*** | 0.448*** |
| (4.050) | (3.537) | (4.141) | (4.046) | (4.053) | (4.231) | |
| GDP × COVID19 | -0.014*** | -0.013*** | -0.015*** | -0.015*** | -0.015*** | -0.015*** |
| (-4.047) | (-3.739) | (-4.212) | (-4.147) | (-4.155) | (-4.315) | |
| GDP growth × COVID19 | -0.012** | -0.012** | -0.013** | -0.013** | -0.013** | -0.012** |
| (-2.049) | (-2.041) | (-2.044) | (-2.065) | (-2.020) | (-1.988) | |
| Political stability × COVID19 | -0.046*** | -0.046*** | -0.044*** | -0.042*** | -0.042*** | -0.043*** |
| (-3.529) | (-3.872) | (-3.298) | (-3.166) | (-3.118) | (-3.190) | |
| Foreign direct investment × COVID19 | 0.189** | 0.151** | 0.137 | 0.179** | 0.187** | 0.155* |
| (2.207) | (1.987) | (1.615) | (2.098) | (2.193) | (1.817) | |
| Debt to GDP × COVID19 | 0.004 | -0.001 | 0.005 | 0.007 | 0.004 | |
| (0.599) | (-0.164) | (0.801) | (0.956) | (0.547) | ||
| High debt to GDP × COVID19 | -0.009 | |||||
| (-1.031) | ||||||
| Low Distance to default × COVID19 | -0.007 | |||||
| (-0.612) | ||||||
| High debt to GDP × Low distance to default × COVID19 | 0.025** | |||||
| (2.069) | ||||||
| Income support policies | -0.010*** | -0.008** | ||||
| (-2.825) | (-2.385) | |||||
| Lockdown policies | -0.028** | |||||
| (-2.570) | ||||||
| Health and lockdown policies | -0.047*** | -0.037** | ||||
| (-2.975) | (-2.451) | |||||
| Corporate characteristics and policies × COVID19 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Firm fixed effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Industry-time fixed effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Number of observations | 28772 | 28772 | 28772 | 28772 | 28772 | 28772 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.322 | 0.322 | 0.323 | 0.323 | 0.323 | 0.323 |
This table reports regression results on the relation between country characteristics and the reaction of CDS spread changes to changes in COVID-19 infection rates, with controls for COVID-19 government policies and corporate characteristic/policies. The dependent variable is the weekly change in log CDS spreads for each firm. COVID19 is the weekly percentage change in COVID-19 infection rates in a country. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm and are displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Summary of impact of firm and country-level factors on pandemic-induced CDS spread changes.
| Firm-level variables (Coefficients from | Q3 - Q1 | Statistical Significance |
|---|---|---|
| Size | 1.786 | 1% |
| Leverage | 1.243 | 1% |
| Stakeholder engagement | -1.500 | 5% |
| Antitakeover provisions | 1.200 | 10% |
| Distance to Default+ | -1.317 | 1% |
| Country-level variables | Q3 - Q1 | Statistical Significance |
| GDP | -2.376 | 1% |
| GDP growth (%) | -1.225 | 5% |
| Political stability | -3.790 | 1% |
| Foreign direct investment | 0.359 | 10% |
This table summarizes the impact of firm-specific and country-level characteristics on pandemic-induced CDS spread changes. For a country where the COVID-19 infections rate doubles in a week (100% increase), we calculate the difference in pandemic-induced weekly CDS spread changes between firms with the value of characteristics at the top quartile (Q3) and those at the bottom quartile (Q1) and report the statistical significance. For instance, the impact of ‘Size’ is given by
[βsize × Q3(Size) × 100 − βsize × Q1(Size) × 100], where βsize is the coefficient of ‘Size × COVID19’ estimated in Table 3 Column 4.
Comparison of stock price and CDS spread changes in response to COVID-19.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dep. = ∆Daily CDS Spreads (%) | Dep. = Daily Stock returns (%) | |||||
| Daily stock returns in day | -5.431*** | |||||
| (-4.947) | ||||||
| Daily stock returns in week | -0.075*** | |||||
| (-5.350) | ||||||
| ∆Daily CDS Spreads in day | -0.613** | |||||
| (-2.398) | ||||||
| ∆Daily CDS Spreads in day | -0.022*** | |||||
| (-5.262) | ||||||
| Size × Daily COVID19 | 1.225*** | 1.245*** | 1.233*** | 0.029 | 0.040 | 0.062 |
| (5.657) | (5.749) | (5.693) | (0.490) | (0.666) | (1.046) | |
| Leverage × Daily COVID19 | 5.194*** | 5.232*** | 5.183*** | -0.580 | -0.493 | -0.423 |
| (3.210) | (3.247) | (3.182) | (-1.436) | (-1.204) | (-1.032) | |
| Stock volatility × Daily COVID19 | 69.177 | 67.310 | 68.807 | -41.658*** | -38.677** | -38.151** |
| (1.446) | (1.401) | (1.437) | (-2.637) | (-2.365) | (-2.362) | |
| Investment grade × Daily COVID19 | -0.979* | -0.968* | -0.984* | 0.103 | 0.101 | 0.077 |
| (-1.941) | (-1.918) | (-1.951) | (0.733) | (0.714) | (0.551) | |
| Profitability × Daily COVID19 | -5.365 | -4.901 | -5.225 | 4.742*** | 4.546*** | 4.442*** |
| (-1.023) | (-0.934) | (-0.997) | (3.498) | (3.355) | (3.303) | |
| Cash holding × Daily COVID19 | 1.775 | 1.809 | 1.812 | 0.849 | 0.838 | 0.906 |
| (0.629) | (0.639) | (0.642) | (1.032) | (1.022) | (1.113) | |
| Stakeholder engagement × Daily COVID19 | -1.402** | -1.372** | -1.423** | 0.103 | 0.062 | 0.031 |
| (-2.426) | (-2.373) | (-2.458) | (0.608) | (0.365) | (0.180) | |
| Antitakeover provisions × Daily COVID19 | 0.216 | 0.214 | 0.211 | -0.047 | -0.050 | -0.046 |
| (1.580) | (1.556) | (1.542) | (-1.268) | (-1.331) | (-1.223) | |
| Employee health policy × Daily COVID19 | -0.554 | -0.593 | -0.530 | -0.046 | -0.035 | -0.044 |
| (-0.496) | (-0.531) | (-0.473) | (-0.194) | (-0.147) | (-0.185) | |
| Firm fixed effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Industry-time fixed effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Country-time fixed effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Number of observations | 149437 | 147346 | 147356 | 147926 | 147319 | 147356 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.249 | 0.252 | 0.253 | 0.516 | 0.523 | 0.524 |
This table reports regression results on the lead-lag reaction of stock price changes and CDS spread changes in response to COVID-19. The dependent variables are the daily change in log CDS spreads for each firm in columns 1 to 3 and the daily stock returns for each firm in columns 4 to 6. Daily COVID19 is the daily percentage change in COVID-19 infection rates in a country. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm and are displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
| Variable name | Variable definition | Source |
| Weekly change in log CDS spreads for each firm, calculated as log(CDS in week | Markit | |
| Weekly percentage change in COVID-19 infection rates in a country. Infection rate is measured as the number of COVID-19 infections per million people. For economy c in week t, | Our World in Data | |
| Natural logarithm of total assets (AT) in US dollars. | Compustat Global | |
| Book value of debt (DLTT+DLC) scaled by the book value of total assets (AT). | Compustat Global | |
| Indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm has an investment grade credit rating, and 0 otherwise. | Capital IQ | |
| Operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) scaled by the book value of total assets (AT). | Compustat Global | |
| Cash holding (CHE) scaled by the book value of total assets (AT). | Compustat Global | |
| Standard deviation of daily stock returns over the year. | Compustat Global | |
| Weekly stock return for each firm, calculated as log(Stock price in week | Compustat Global | |
| Long term debt due in one year (DD1) divided by cash holding (CHE). | Compustat Global | |
| Natural logarithm of one plus (naïve) distance to default calculated following | Compustat Global | |
| Indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm explains how it engages with its stakeholders and how it involves the stakeholders in its decision-making process, and 0 otherwise. | Refinitiv Eikon | |
| Indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm publishes a separate CSR report or publishes a section in its annual report on its CSR activities, and 0 otherwise. | Refinitiv Eikon | |
| CSR strategy score reflects a firm's practices to communicate that it integrates the economic, social and environmental dimensions into its day-to-day decision-making processes. The score ranges from 0 to 100. We divide the score by 100. | Refinitiv Eikon | |
| Percentage of independent directors in the firm. | Refinitiv Eikon | |
| Number of antitakeover provisions in place for the firm. | Refinitiv Eikon | |
| Indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm has a policy to improve employee health and safety, and 0 otherwise. Indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm trains its employees on | Refinitiv Eikon | |
| health and safety, and 0 otherwise.Indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm has a policy to improve | Refinitiv Eikon | |
| employee health and safety in its supply chain, and 0 otherwise. | Refinitiv Eikon | |
| Measure of industry's exposure to COVID19 using data on task description of occupations within industries and data on the geographic location of businesses within industries. We take | ||
| logs of the score as the score is right skewed.Natural logarithm of a country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). A country's GDP growth. | World Development Indicators World Development Indicators | |
| A country's government debt to GDP rati | World Development Indicators | |
| A country's foreign direct investment inflow as a proportion of its GDP. | World Development Indicators | |
| Perception of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence for a country. | World Governance Indicators | |
| Indicator variable that equals 0 for governments that do not provide income support, equals 1 for governments that are replacing less than 50% of lost salary, and equals 2 for | Our World in Data | |
| governments that are replacing 50% or more of lost salary. | Our World in Data | |
| A composite measure based on thirteen indicators including school closures, workplace closures, travel bans, testing policy, contact tracing, face coverings and vaccine policy, rescaled to a value from 0 to 100. We divide the score by 100. | Our World in Data |