Literature DB >> 35090018

Who is paid in pay-for-performance? Inequalities in the distribution of financial bonuses amongst health centres in Zimbabwe.

Roxanne Kovacs1, Garrett W Brown2, Artwell Kadungure3, Søren R Kristensen4, Gwati Gwati5, Laura Anselmi6, Nicholas Midzi7, Josephine Borghi1.   

Abstract

Although pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes have been implemented across low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), little is known about their distributional consequences. A key concern is that financial bonuses are primarily captured by providers who are already better able to perform (for example, those in wealthier areas), P4P could exacerbate existing inequalities within the health system. We examine inequalities in the distribution of pay-outs in Zimbabwe's national P4P scheme (2014-2016) using quantitative data on bonus payments and facility characteristics and findings from a thematic policy review and 28 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders at all system levels. We found that in Zimbabwe, facilities with better baseline access to guidelines, more staff, higher consultation volumes and wealthier and less remote target populations earned significantly higher P4P bonuses throughout the programme. For instance, facilities that were 1 SD above the mean in terms of access to guidelines, earned 90 USD more per quarter than those that were 1 SD below the mean. Differences in bonus pay-outs for facilities that were 1 SD above and below the mean in terms of the number of staff and consultation volumes are even more pronounced at 348 USD and 445 USD per quarter. Similarly, facilities with villages in the poorest wealth quintile in their vicinity earned less than all others-and 752 USD less per quarter than those serving villages in the richest quintile. Qualitative data confirm these findings. Respondents identified facility baseline structural quality, leadership, catchment population size and remoteness as affecting performance in the scheme. Unequal distribution of P4P pay-outs was identified as having negative consequences on staff retention, absenteeism and motivation. Based on our findings and previous work, we provide some guidance to policymakers on how to design more equitable P4P schemes.
© The Author(s) 2022. Published by Oxford University Press in association with The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.

Entities:  

Keywords:  Health financing; Zimbabwe; inequality; pay-for-performance

Mesh:

Year:  2022        PMID: 35090018      PMCID: PMC9006063          DOI: 10.1093/heapol/czab154

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Health Policy Plan        ISSN: 0268-1080            Impact factor:   3.344


  16 in total

1.  Effect on maternal and child health services in Rwanda of payment to primary health-care providers for performance: an impact evaluation.

Authors:  Paulin Basinga; Paul J Gertler; Agnes Binagwaho; Agnes L B Soucat; Jennifer Sturdy; Christel M J Vermeersch
Journal:  Lancet       Date:  2011-04-23       Impact factor: 79.321

2.  Effect of financial incentives on inequalities in the delivery of primary clinical care in England: analysis of clinical activity indicators for the quality and outcomes framework.

Authors:  Tim Doran; Catherine Fullwood; Evangelos Kontopantelis; David Reeves
Journal:  Lancet       Date:  2008-08-11       Impact factor: 79.321

3.  Improving quality of care through payment for performance: examining effects on the availability and stock-out of essential medical commodities in Tanzania.

Authors:  Peter Binyaruka; Josephine Borghi
Journal:  Trop Med Int Health       Date:  2016-12-07       Impact factor: 2.622

Review 4.  Effects of pay for performance in health care: a systematic review of systematic reviews.

Authors:  Frank Eijkenaar; Martin Emmert; Manfred Scheppach; Oliver Schöffski
Journal:  Health Policy       Date:  2013-02-04       Impact factor: 2.980

5.  Hospital Characteristics Associated With Postdischarge Hospital Readmission, Observation, and Emergency Department Utilization.

Authors:  Leora I Horwitz; Yongfei Wang; Faseeha K Altaf; Changqin Wang; Zhenqiu Lin; Shuling Liu; Jacqueline Grady; Susannah M Bernheim; Nihar R Desai; Arjun K Venkatesh; Jeph Herrin
Journal:  Med Care       Date:  2018-04       Impact factor: 2.983

6.  Hospital Characteristics Associated With Penalties in the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program.

Authors:  Ravi Rajaram; Jeanette W Chung; Christine V Kinnier; Cynthia Barnard; Sanjay Mohanty; Emily S Pavey; Megan C McHugh; Karl Y Bilimoria
Journal:  JAMA       Date:  2015-07-28       Impact factor: 56.272

7.  Understanding efficiency and the effect of pay-for-performance across health facilities in Tanzania.

Authors:  Peter Binyaruka; Laura Anselmi
Journal:  BMJ Glob Health       Date:  2020-05

8.  Socioeconomic inequalities in the quality of primary care under Brazil's national pay-for-performance programme: a longitudinal study of family health teams.

Authors:  Roxanne Kovacs; Jorge O Maia Barreto; Everton Nunes da Silva; Josephine Borghi; Søren Rud Kristensen; Deivson Rayner T Costa; Luciano Bezerra Gomes; Garibaldi D Gurgel; Juliana Sampaio; Timothy Powell-Jackson
Journal:  Lancet Glob Health       Date:  2021-03       Impact factor: 26.763

9.  Effectiveness of a pay-for-performance intervention to improve maternal and child health services in Afghanistan: a cluster-randomized trial.

Authors:  Cyrus Y Engineer; Elina Dale; Anubhav Agarwal; Arunika Agarwal; Olakunle Alonge; Anbrasi Edward; Shivam Gupta; Holly B Schuh; Gilbert Burnham; David H Peters
Journal:  Int J Epidemiol       Date:  2016-02-13       Impact factor: 7.196

10.  How are pay-for-performance schemes in healthcare designed in low- and middle-income countries? Typology and systematic literature review.

Authors:  Roxanne J Kovacs; Timothy Powell-Jackson; Søren R Kristensen; Neha Singh; Josephine Borghi
Journal:  BMC Health Serv Res       Date:  2020-04-07       Impact factor: 2.655

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