| Literature DB >> 35035371 |
Abstract
Digital technology has gained momentum in the recent decade, with its relationships with digital entrepreneurship, digital economies, digital social interaction, green economies, etc. These have changed the perspective of business and hence digitalized the strategic policies through blockchains. The current study aims to identify such benefits that have changed the day-to-day life processes and procedures for carrying out different tasks due to the convenience of adopting digital technology. Those benefits have been classified as transparency, centralization, and access to new markets for the organizations considering their consequences, especially when using digital technology. When processes are taking place online, there are fair chances of hiding knowledge about certain products or procedures to gain particular benefits. Hence, this study has considered the moderating role of product knowledge hiding while interacting online. This study is a quantitative post-positivist cross-sectional study that has followed a survey technique for data collection. The population used in this study is the managerial staff of the telecom sector in the mainland in China. The sample size used in this study is 358. The software used in this study is Smart-PLS 3.3. The technique used in this study for data analysis is structural equation modeling with measurement modeling. The findings of this study show that digital technology has led to many benefits for organizations like centralization, access to the new markets, and transparency, which have been made possible remotely only because of the use of digital technology in business operations. However, the moderating role of product knowledge hiding has been found significant only for transparency. This research paper highlights the important benefits of the use of technological use in the corporate world. Also, it contributes to expanding the network of knowledge hiding, addressing the moderation of product knowledge hiding, and extending the known consequences of digital technology influencing knowledge hiding.Entities:
Keywords: centralization; digital technology; education; entertainment; green economy; knowledge hiding; misinformation; transparency
Year: 2021 PMID: 35035371 PMCID: PMC8754051 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.792550
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Front Psychol ISSN: 1664-1078
Figure 1Conceptual framework. Central, Centralization; DT, Digital technology; NM, Access to new markets.
Demographics of the respondents.
| Age | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| <20 | 74 | 20.67 |
| 21–29 | 115 | 32.12 |
| 30–39 | 84 | 23.46 |
| 40–49 | 35 | 9.77 |
| 49> | 50 | 13.96 |
|
| ||
| Bachelor | 80 | 22.34 |
| Masters | 189 | 52.79 |
| Doctorate | 65 | 18.15 |
| Others | 24 | 6.70 |
|
| ||
| <10 | 201 | 56.14 |
| 11–20 | 56 | 15.64 |
| 20> | 101 | 28.21 |
N = 358.
Figure 2Measurement model algorithm. Central, Centralization; DT, Digital technology; NM, Access to new markets; KH, Knowledge hiding; TrpMod, Transparency moderation; NMMod, Access to new market moderation; Cent Mod, Centralization moderation.
Model measurements.
| Constructs | Code | FD |
| CR | AVE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Access to New Market |
|
|
| ||
| access1 | 0.838 | ||||
| access2 | 0.883 | ||||
| access3 | 0.843 | ||||
| access4 | 0.853 | ||||
| Transparency |
|
|
| ||
| trans1 | 0.883 | ||||
| trans2 | 0.838 | ||||
| trans3 | 0.875 | ||||
| trans4 | 0.865 | ||||
| Centralization |
|
|
| ||
| cent1 | 0.903 | ||||
| cent2 | 0.898 | ||||
| cent3 | 0.901 | ||||
| Digital Technology |
|
|
| ||
| DT1 | 0.941 | ||||
| DT2 | 0.925 | ||||
| DT3 | 0.934 | ||||
| DT4 | 0.933 | ||||
| DT5 | 0.917 | ||||
| Knowledge Hiding |
|
|
| ||
| KH1 | 0.778 | ||||
| KH2 | 0.810 | ||||
| KH3 | 0.809 | ||||
| KH4 | 0.809 | ||||
| KH5 | 0.856 | ||||
| KH6 | 0.878 | ||||
| KH7 | 0.886 | ||||
| KH8 | 0.875 | ||||
| KH9 | 0.764 | ||||
| KH10 | 0.743 | ||||
| KH11 | 0.754 | ||||
| KH12 | 0.758 |
N = 358, FD = Factor loading, AVE = Average variance extracted, CR = Composite reliability. Bold mean optimal values.
Fornell and Larcker criterion.
| DT | KH | NM | TRP | CENT | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DT |
| ||||
| Kh | −0.310 |
| |||
| NM | 0.298 | −0.609 |
| ||
| TRP | 0.389 | −0.689 | 0.658 |
| |
| CENT | 0.153 | −0.332 | 0.512 | 0.513 |
|
N = 358, CNT = Centralization, DT = Digital technology, NM = Access to new markets, TRP = Transparency, KH = Knowledge hiding. Bold mean optimal values.
HTMT ratio.
| DT | KH | NM | TRP | CENT | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DT | |||||
| Kh | 0.326 | ||||
| NM | 0.320 | 0.656 | |||
| TRP | 0.420 | 0.747 | 0.741 | ||
| CENT | 0.164 | 0.361 | 0.591 | 0.580 |
N = 358, CNT = Centralization, DT = Digital Technology, NM = Access to New Markets, TRP = Transparency, KH = Knowledge hiding.
Figure 3Graphical model for bootstrapping algorithm.
Results for structural model.
| Paths | H | O | M | SD | T-Stats | P-Value | Results |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DT →TRP | H1 | 0.200 | 0.203 | 0.039 | 5.098 | 0.000*** |
|
| DT →NM | H2 | 0.125 | 0.130 | 0.048 | 2.638 | 0.009** |
|
| DT →CNT | H3 | 0.058 | 0.062 | 0.048 | 1.211 | 0.226* | Rejected |
N = 358, H = Hypotheses, O = Original sample, M = Sample mean, SD = Standard deviation, ***p < 0.0005, **p < 0.005, *p < 0.5, CNT = Centralization, DT = Digital technology, NM = Access to new markets, TRP = Transparency.
Moderation effect.
| Paths | H | O | M | SD | T-Stats | Value of | Results |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TrpMod →TRP | H4 | 0.158 | 0.159 | 0.038 | 4.219 | 0.000*** |
|
| NM Mod→NM | H5 | 0.117 | 0.120 | 0.051 | 2.309 | 0.021* |
|
| CNTMod →CNT | H6 | 0.066 | 0.075 | 0.055 | 1.198 | 0.002** | Rejected |
N = 358, H = Hypotheses, O = Original sample, M = Sample mean, SD = Standard deviation, ***p < 0.0005, **p < 0.005, *p < 0.5, TrpMod = Transparency moderation, NMMod = Access to new market moderation, Cent Mod = Centralization moderation, CNT = Centralization, NM = Access to new markets, TRP = Transparency.