| Literature DB >> 35035363 |
Riaqa Mubeen1, Dongping Han1, Jaffar Abbas2, Susana Álvarez-Otero3, Muhammad Safdar Sial4.
Abstract
This study focuses on exploring the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) duality and firm performance. We focus on how the size and corporate social responsibility (CSR) of firms moderate this relationship. In terms of size, business organizations are of two types: small and large firms. This study uses datasets of listed Chinese business firms included in the China Stock Market and Accounting Research database. It employs a generalized method of moment's technique to explore the connection between CEO duality and the performance of Chinese business firms through double mediation effects. Our empirical analysis showed that CEO duality has a significant negative relationship with firm performance. We also explored the moderating effects of firm size (small and large) and CSR practices on the relationship between CEO duality and improved performance of Chinese firms. Large firms and CSR practices showed significant and positive moderating effects on the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. Conversely, with CEO duality, small firms showed a negative moderating influence on firm performance. This inclusive model provides valuable insights into how the dual role of the CEO of a firm affected the performance of Chinese firms through the moderating role of CSR practices and firm size for better business performance. The study offers empirical and theoretical contributions to the corporate governance literature. This research framework might help researchers in designing robust strategies to evaluate the effects on firm performance. Researchers may gain helpful insights using this methodology.Entities:
Keywords: CEO duality; board of directors; corporate social responsibility; firm performance; firm size
Year: 2021 PMID: 35035363 PMCID: PMC8757377 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.669715
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Front Psychol ISSN: 1664-1078
FIGURE 1Theoretical framework with selected variables of this proposed study: CEO duality (independent variable, IV), the performance of Chinese firms (dependent variable, DV), and firm size (small and large) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices (moderating variables, MV).
Some critical studies on the chief executive officer (CEO) duality, firm size, corporate social responsibility (CSR), and firm performance.
| Authors | Dependent/independent (Variables) | Country | Relationships | Method |
|
| Total shareholder return and CEO duality | Canada | Negative relationship | GEE |
|
| Performance variables (ROA, ROE, ROS) and CEO duality | United States | Negative relationship | System GMM |
| ( | CSR and firm growth | Pakistan | Positive relationship | 2SLS and GMM |
| ( | Tobin’s Q and ROA | Pakistan | Negative | Fixed effects Model |
| ( | Tobin’s Q, ROA, and ROE with CEO duality | United States | Positive relationship | Baseline model |
| ( | Performance variables (ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q) with CEO duality | Vietnam | Positive relationship | Two-stage least squares |
| ( | Performance variables (ROA and Tobin’s Q) with CEO duality | United States | Positive relationship | Two-way random-effects |
| ( | Performance variables (ROA, MARKET, and Tobin’s Q) with CEO duality | United States | No significant relationship | Two-step treatment effects |
|
| ROA and CEO duality | United States | Negative and positive relations | Panel data regression analysis |
| ( | Performance variables (ROA and Tobin’s Q) with CEO duality | Egypt | No significant relationship | LAV regression |
| ( | The market value of a firm with CEO duality | Bangladesh | No relationship | OLS and 2OLS |
Table 1 summarizes useful studies related to this proposed framework.
Measurement of variables.
| Variables name | Measures |
|
| |
| ROI (Returns on the investment) | Net profit divided by invested capital |
| ROE (Returns on equity) | Operating income divided by shareholders’ equity |
|
| |
| CEO duality | It has been coded as “1” for CEO’s who hold a chairman position for board of director, and coded “0” for other variables |
| Firm size | Log of firms’ total sales |
| Corporate social responsibility (CSR) | This study applied an index to CSR (Corporate social responsibility) as the firms’ social contributions per share (SCV), by following a past study ( |
| Growth opportunities | It indicates a change in firms’ sales revenue of doing business activities. |
| Leverage | Leverage shows firms total liabilities and then divide it by total assets ratio |
| Asset tangibility | The ratio of plant, equipment, and property related to total revenue of a firm |
Variables detailed information and coding.
Chief executive officer (CEO) duality and firm performance with the moderating impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices.
| Model 1 (ROI) | Model 2 (ROE) | ROI (3) | ROE (4) | |
| CEO Duality | −0.534 | −1.21 | 1.521 | 1.01 |
| CSR | 0.198 | 0.289 | ||
| CSR*CEO duality | 0.924 | 0.588 | ||
| Leverage | −5.44 | −6.08 | −6.86 | −5.62 |
| Growth | 0.068 | −0.112 | 3.021 | 1.949* |
| Firm size | 2.73 | 4.65 | −1.25 | 4.97 |
| Assets tangibility | −1.41 | −1.48 | 2.55 | 0.038 |
| Constant | −26.36 | −45.1 | −25.24 | −0.403 |
| Wald test | 42.24 | 44.87 | 8.76 | 10.40 |
| AR (1) | −1.94 | −2.16 | −0.65 | −1.02 |
| AR (2) | −1.37 | 0.30 | −0.42 | 0.95 |
| Sargan Test | 311.2 | 208.4 | 4.48 | 98.25 |
| Observation | 2,502 | 2,502 | 2,502 | 2,502 |
Level of significance in this study is indicated with “*” [***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.1].
Firm size moderates the relationship between CEO duality and Chinese firm performance.
| Variables | Model 5 (ROI) | Model 6 (ROE) | Model 7 (ROI) | Model 8 (ROE) |
| CEO duality | −1.58 | −2.11 | 0.155 | 1.027 |
| Small firm | −1.32 | −2.24 | ||
| Large firm | 0.503 | −1.72 | ||
| Small firm*CEO duality | −2.81 | −2.99 | ||
| Large firm*CEO duality | 0.178 | 2.35 | ||
| Leverage | −14.16 | −15.87 | −2.54 | −2.97 |
| Growth | 0.154 | 0.205 | 0.085 | 0.096 |
| Firm size | −6.31 | −5.37 | −1.74 | 9.55 |
| Assets tangibility | 1.785 | 3.17 | 0.754 | −1.61 |
| Constant | −15.5 | −28.7 | −7.28 | 17.54 |
| Wald test | 27.75 | 28.73 | 28.44 | 29.99 |
| AR (1) | −3.17 | −3.31 | −2.56 | −2.90 |
| AR (2) | −1.60 | −0.81 | −1.36 | 0.29 |
| Sargan Test | 43.66 | 41.15 | 1,773.48 | 587.41 |
| Observation | 2,502 | 2,502 | 2,502 | 2,502 |
Level of significance in this study is indicated with “*” [***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.1].
Variance inflation factor analysis and descriptive statistics.
| Items | Panel A | Panel B | |||
| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | VIF | 1/VIF |
| ROI | 2,502 | 0.340 | 0.605 | 1.33 | 0.750 |
| ROE | 2,502 | 0.461 | 0.985 | 1.40 | 0.712 |
| Firm Size | 2,502 | 10.09 | 0.570 | 2.33 | 0.43 |
| CEO Duality | 2,502 | 0.258 | 0.437 | 1.02 | 0.984 |
| Growth | 2,502 | 0.139 | 0.575 | 1.08 | 0.922 |
| Leverage | 2,502 | 0.088 | 0.094 | 1.26 | 0.794 |
| Asset tangibility | 2,502 | 3.00 | 5.87 | 2.20 | 0.453 |
| CSR | 2,502 | 1.950 | 1.76 | 1.04 | 0.96 |
| VIF mean | 1.49 | ||||
Std. Dev., standard deviation (SD); VIF, variance inflation factor.