Literature DB >> 34960777

Simulated Flock-Level Shedding Characteristics of Turkeys in Ten Thousand Bird Houses Infected with H7 Low Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus Strains.

Peter J Bonney1, Sasidhar Malladi1, Amos Ssematimba1,2, Kaitlyn M St Charles1, Emily Walz1, Marie R Culhane1, David A Halvorson1, Carol J Cardona1.   

Abstract

Understanding the amount of virus shed at the flock level by birds infected with low pathogenicity avian influenza virus (LPAIV) over time can help inform the type and timing of activities performed in response to a confirmed LPAIV-positive premises. To this end, we developed a mathematical model which allows us to estimate viral shedding by 10,000 turkey toms raised in commercial turkey production in the United States, and infected by H7 LPAIV strains. We simulated the amount of virus shed orally and from the cloaca over time, as well as the amount of virus in manure. In addition, we simulated the threshold cycle value (Ct) of pooled oropharyngeal swabs from birds in the infected flock tested by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction. The simulation model predicted that little to no shedding would occur once the highest threshold of seroconversion was reached. Substantial amounts of virus in manure (median 1.5×108 and 5.8×109; 50% egg infectious dose) were predicted at the peak. Lastly, the model results suggested that higher Ct values, indicating less viral shedding, are more likely to be observed later in the infection process as the flock approaches recovery.

Entities:  

Keywords:  avian influenza; epidemiology; mathematical modeling; outbreak management; poultry

Mesh:

Year:  2021        PMID: 34960777      PMCID: PMC8706675          DOI: 10.3390/v13122509

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Viruses        ISSN: 1999-4915            Impact factor:   5.048


1. Introduction

Low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) can cause reduced egg production and weight gain in infected birds, cause increased flock mortality, and impact the trade of poultry and poultry products [1]. H5 and H7 LPAI virus (LPAIV) strains are of special concern, as they have been known to mutate into highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), a devastating virus that can cause close to 100% mortality in an infected flock. Historically, LPAI outbreak responses in the United States (U.S.) have used one of three strategies: depopulation (on-site destruction of the birds on infected premises), controlled marketing (maintaining birds on premises with heightened biosecurity until birds recover and are sent to processing), and, though less common in the U.S., vaccination [1,2]. LPAIV has been documented to be spread by activities and movements of people, especially due to direct contact with infected manure [1]. As such, heightened levels of activity on a confirmed LPAI-infected premises can increase risk of virus transmission. Halvorson, (2008) stresses the need to “do no harm” following detection of LPAI, and provides case reports where depopulation was implicated in virus spread [1,3,4]. In order to “do no harm,” the outbreak response must be carefully considered prior to any action taken. The decision of whether to depopulate, do controlled marketing, or vaccinate depends on many factors, including flock production considerations, local and regional outbreak status, and biosecurity. This is a decision that must be carefully discussed between state and industry partners, and is most easily reached when each has a well-thought-out LPAI outbreak plan. An important tool for outbreak response is diagnostic testing by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR), which can be used for detection and monitoring of avian influenza virus in infected flocks [5]. Pooled samples of oropharyngeal (OP) swabs from 11 birds tested by rRT-PCR are a common suggestion for surveillance. Spackman et al. (2013) explain that 11 OP swabs from a flock of 10,000 or more birds has been determined to be sufficient to achieve the National Poultry Improvement Plan target of detecting 25% infection prevalence with 95% confidence [6]. The threshold cycle (Ct) value derived from rRT-PCR testing can indicate the amount of virus in the sample. Higher Ct values are associated with lower amounts of virus, and for most laboratories, Ct values < 40 are considered positive [7]. Birds infected with LPAIV typically shed lower amounts of virus as they approach recovery, and have weak-positive or negative LPAIV rRT-PCR results with Ct values that are often between 35 and 40 [8,9]. Though it is understood that the individual birds in an infected poultry house shed large amounts of virus, to our knowledge, no attempt has been made to quantify this amount for LPAIV-infected poultry flocks. Only rarely has the amount of virus shed by an infected flock been modeled for avian diseases in general [10]. Therefore, we developed mathematical models to analyze flock shedding dynamics. The model was developed based on largescale commercial turkey houses in the U.S., and H7 LPAIV strains. We simulated the amount of oral and cloacal viral shedding with a stochastic disease transmission model for a poultry house containing 10,000 turkey toms. Viral shedding was simulated at the individual bird level, and allowed to vary over time, diverging from the assumption in classical epidemiological models of constant shedding during the infectious period [11]. The viral shedding model was extended to (1) approximate the amount of virus in manure over time, and (2) estimate the likelihood of observing higher (>30 and ≤40) and lower (≤30) threshold cycle (Ct) values following testing of 11 OP swabs sampled from turkeys in the house by rRT-PCR. This was done to investigate whether having LPAIV rRT-PCR results with Ct values approaching 40 could be used as a flock-level indicator that a previously positive flock is nearing recovery. The models were developed to provide insight into the transmission risk that infected flocks pose following LPAIV exposure, and to inform appropriate outbreak response strategies in order to minimize the risk of LPAI spread to other flocks.

2. Materials and Methods

2.1. Simulation of Virus Shedding over Time in a Turkey Flock

We simulated the amount of LPAIV shed in a house of turkey toms via oral and cloacal routes over time using an individual-based stochastic disease transmission model. The transmission model consisted of (1) a compartmental component that tracked the number of birds in the following disease states: susceptible, latently infected, infectious, seroconverted, dead, or recovered per simulation time step (set to 0.01 days); (2) a component that simulated the amount of virus shed from oral and cloacal routes by infected birds per simulation time step; and (3) a component that simulated the amount of infectious virus in manure.

2.2. Simulation of Disease State Transitions

Specific methodology and parameterization of the compartmental component was implemented as described in [12]. The outbreak was assumed to begin with a single latently infected bird. The transition of turkeys from the susceptible to the latently infected state was simulated from a binomial distribution where the probability of infection depended on the adequate contact rate (transmission rate parameter), and proportion of infectious and alive (susceptible, latently infected, infectious, and recovered) birds. Random numbers were generated from distributions modeling the length of the latent, and infectious periods for each infected bird that determined the transition times out of the latent and infectious states. Birds transition from the infectious state into either the recovered or dead state according to a binomial distribution. The number of infected turkeys that seroconvert, i.e., develop detectable antibodies, was also simulated from a binomial distribution. The transition of infected birds into the seroconverted state was determined by a random number generated from a distribution modeling the time between infection and seroconversion. A summary of the algorithm is given by Algorithm 1. The length of the latent and infectious periods, and time to seroconversion were all assumed to be gamma distributed. The shape and scale parameters of the gamma distributions were estimated using a maximum likelihood estimation approach from data obtained from experimental inoculations of turkeys in controlled settings [8,9,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20]. The experiments used to estimate the latent and infectious period distributions involved H5 and H7 LPAIV strains [8,9,13,14,15,16]. The experiments used to estimate the seroconversion distribution involved H4, H6, H7, and H9 LPAIV strains, due to insufficient H5 and H7 antibody data [17,18,19,20]. The proportion of turkeys infected with LPAIV that die was set to 1% based on mortality observed during the 2018 LPAI H5N2 outbreak in Minnesota [21]. The proportion of turkeys that seroconvert was set to 99% based on the results of Spackman et al. (2010) [8]. The adequate contact rate for a simulation iteration was drawn from a uniform distribution with minimum 0.5, and maximum 4.0, based on the results of Bonney et al. (2021) [12]. A summary of the transmission model parameters is given in Table 1.
Table 1

Input parameters for the Within House Turkey Tom LPAI Transmission Model.

Parameter DescriptionDistribution/ValueReferences
Adequate contact rate, the parameter that determines the rate of disease transmission~Uniform (min = 0.5, max = 4.0)[12]
Latent period length distribution~Gamma (shape = 2.58, scale = 0.24); mean = 0.63 days, standard deviation = 0.39 days[9,14,15]
Infectious period length distribution~Gamma (shape = 4.04, scale = 2.92); mean = 11.78 days, standard deviation = 5.86 days[8,9,13,14,15,16]
Time from infection to seroconversion distribution~Gamma (shape = 3.56, scale = 1.63); mean = 5.80 days, standard deviation = 3.07 days[17,18,19,20]
Proportion of infected birds that die0.01[12]
Proportion of infected birds that seroconvert0.99[8]

2.3. Simulation of Viral Shedding

Viral shedding from oral and cloacal routes was simulated using experimental data from two inoculation studies in order to capture potential differences in shedding between virus strains [8,9]. A different simulation approach was used for each study, depending on the data characteristics. The first method involved selecting data directly from a turkey inoculation experiment performed by Iqbal et al. (2012) [9]. The data used from this experiment consisted of thirty turkeys that had been inoculated or placed with birds that had been inoculated with a H7N1 LPAIV strain collected in 1999 during an outbreak in Italy. Ten turkeys were inoculated with a dose of 50% egg infectious dose per milliliter (), whereas ten naïve turkeys were placed with ten turkeys inoculated with a dose of . The unit of measurement represents the amount of virus that will infect 50% of inoculated eggs. Buccal and cloacal swabs were collected daily from the turkeys, and tested by quantitative RT-PCR (qRT-PCR) to obtain the Ct value. The Ct was converted to using a standard curve [9]. The Iqbal et al. (2012) data were implemented into the transmission model as follows [9]. First, the data were prepared for use in the model. The amount of buccal and cloacal shedding per simulation time step was estimated by linear interpolation between observed data points. Contact turkeys were assumed to be infected one day prior to the first positive test. In the transmission model, for each infected turkey, the shedding pattern of an individual bird was selected at random from the data. Once the turkey transitioned into the infectious period, the selected oral and cloacal shedding pattern per simulation time period was added to the existing amounts to estimate a total for all the birds in the house. In the second method, viral shedding was simulated from regression models fit to turkey inoculation data from Spackman et al. (2010) [8]. Spackman et al. (2010) inoculated turkeys with twelve North American H7 LPAIVs, where 13 to 15 turkeys were inoculated per strain [8]. Oropharyngeal (OP) and cloacal swabs were taken 2, 4, 7, 10, and 14 days post inoculation, and tested by qrRT-PCR. The Ct values were converted to using standard curves [8]. The experimental data were zero inflated because many birds did not shed virus every day post inoculation. Therefore, two-part models were fit to the OP and cloacal swab data to accommodate the intermittent shedding observed in the experiment. In a two-part model, the observed data is treated as a mixture of the zero and nonzero components [22]. In the context of the Spackman et al. (2010) data, the probability that a bird does not shed at a given time post inoculation, and the amount of virus that a bird sheds, given the amount is not zero, were estimated by mixed-effects regression models [8,23]. Several regression models were evaluated, varying by the inclusion of a quadratic term for the number of days post exposure, and random intercept and slope terms for each virus strain [24,25,26]. Models were selected according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) where differences of less than 2 were not considered significant, per the suggestion of Burnham and Anderson (2002) [27,28]. Though the amount of virus shed by individual birds is likely correlated between time points, this information was not available in the data. The two-part model selected from the cloacal swab data had the following form. The probability that a bird i inoculated with virus strain j did not shed at time was given by: where is the observed for bird i inoculated with virus j; , , and are the fixed effects; is the random intercept, and is the random slope for virus j with , where is the variance-covariance matrix. Given bird i inoculated with virus strain j sheds virus at time , the amount in , was given by:where , , and are the fixed effects; is the random intercept, and is the random slope for virus j with , where is the variance-covariance matrix; and is the random error with . The two-part model selected from the OP swab data was similar, except for the exclusion of the random slope term in Equation (1). The random slope term was excluded since its inclusion resulted in a higher AIC value as compared to the model with only a random intercept. Parameters were estimated using the lme4 and nlme packages in R [29,30,31]. Further details on the two-part regression models are given in Appendix A. The regression equations were implemented into the transmission model by first randomly selecting a virus strain for the iteration. Once a turkey transitioned into the infectious state, the amount of virus shed from OP and cloacal routes was simulated from the appropriate regression equations for each simulation time step until 21 days post inoculation, by which point, birds would be expected to have stopped shedding [32]. The algorithm used to simulate oral and cloacal shedding over time by turkeys infected with LPAIV is summarized by Algorithm 2.

2.4. Simulation of the Amount of Virus in Manure

The of virus shed from cloacal routes simulated for individual birds based on the Iqbal et al. (2012) and Spackman et al. (2010) data was translated into the virus titer in manure by multiplying the exponentiated simulated by the average volume of feces produced in a simulation time period [8,9]. The milliliters of feces excreted in a simulation time period was approximated based on mean feed consumption by weight of adult turkey toms between 16 and 20 weeks of age [33]. The weight of feed was converted to volume of waste produced using a 1:1 conversion ratio for the mass of waste produced per mass of feed consumed [33], and the feces density derived from [34]. In addition to the amount of virus present in the manure produced during a given time period, the virus titer in the cumulative amount of feces produced over time was estimated as well. This was done for time t by adding the virus titer of feces newly produced in the simulation time period t to the cumulative amount of virus estimated for time t-1 reduced by a scaled decay rate. The decay rate was derived from experimental data from Wood et al. (2010) and Lu et al. (2003), and estimated as the decrease in of virus in feces per day [35,36]. The rates taken from Lu et al. (2003) involved the decay of a LPAIV H7N2 strain in feces from a specific pathogen-free chicken stored at 15–20 °C, feces from an industry-raised chicken stored at 28–30 and 15–20 °C, and feces sampled directly from a commercial flock stored at 28–30 °C [36]. The selected Wood et al. (2010) scenarios involved the decay of an HPAIV H5N1 strain in feces stored at 23 °C in conditions of low and high relative humidity [35]. The algorithm used to simulate the amount of LPAIV in manure is summarized by Algorithm 3.

2.5. Simulation of Ct Values from OP Swabs Tested by rRT-PCR

The expected Ct value from a pooled sample of OP swabs tested by rRT-PCR was simulated from the amount of viral shedding from oral routes in individual birds estimated from the transmission model as an exploratory analysis. In the disease transmission model, the simulated amount of oral shedding of an individual bird was converted into a Ct value using a standard curve from Spackman et al. (2010) [8]. The Ct values were then sorted into groupings of values to estimate the number of birds over time expected to have certain Ct values. The Ct values were stored in this way to ease computational demands. The Ct values were grouped as follows: 10–14, 14–18, 18–22, …, 34–38, or 38–40. The Ct value of birds that died due to LPAI was set equal to the value simulated in the time step immediately prior to death. The likelihood of observing a Ct value ≤ 30 (i.e., a strong positive), and the likelihood of observing a Ct value > 30 but ≤40 (i.e., a weak positive) over time following the testing of a pooled sample of 11 OP swabs by rRT-PCR were estimated using forward simulation. The application of the testing protocol was simulated at each 0.25 day from the time of virus exposure until 80 days post exposure for 6000 transmission model iterations. The likelihoods were determined by the proportion of iterations with simulated Ct values falling within the desired ranges. The testing protocol consisted of a single pooled sample of 11 OP swabs. Dead birds were prioritized for sampling. If fewer than 11 birds had died, samples were taken from live birds until the total of 11 swabs was reached. To simulate the application of the testing protocol, first daily mortality was estimated by summing the normal mortality, simulated from industry data using the approach described in Weaver et al. (2016), and mortality due to LPAI, taken from the transmission model output [37]. Three sources of positive swabs were considered: birds that died directly due to LPAI, birds that died while infected (but not due to infection), and infected live birds. The number of birds that died while infected, but not due to infection, was simulated from the normal mortality where the probability a dead bird was infected was set equal to the infection prevalence in the flock. The number of swabs from infected birds in the daily mortality was simulated from a hypergeometric distribution. The number of swabs from infected live birds was simulated from a binomial distribution with the probability of success equal to the infection prevalence at the time of sampling taken from transmission model output. If a swab from at least one positive bird was included in the pooled sample, the test outcome was simulated as a Bernoulli trial with probability of success equal to the test sensitivity, here set to 0.90 [37,38]. A Ct value was simulated for each positive simulated rRT-PCR result. The amount of virus in the sample contributed by each swab from a positive bird was estimated by first simulating the number of swabs belonging to each Ct value range (10–14, 14–18, etc.). This was simulated from a multinomial distribution where the probabilities were determined by the number of birds in each category (as simulated from the transmission model) divided by the total across all categories at the time of sampling. For each swab in a certain Ct value range, the exact value was simulated from a uniform distribution. The Ct values were then converted back into using the standard curve. The amount of virus in the pooled sample was assumed to be additive, that is, the amounts were exponentiated and summed. In the last step, the sum was converted into a Ct value with the standard curve from Spackman et al. (2010) [8]. The algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 4. The models were programmed and run using R statistical software, and C programming language [39,40]. The simulations were run for 6000 iterations for a flock size of 10,000 turkey toms.

3. Results

Epidemiological outcomes (seropositivity) estimated from the disease transmission model are given in Table 2. Median estimates and 95% prediction intervals are given for the number of days post virus exposure, infection prevalence, and the proportion of the cumulative oral and cloacal shedding from both datasets reached when the given seropositive thresholds are first surpassed. The highest seropositive threshold was set to 98% due to variance in the number of birds that seroconvert following infection, which was given a 99% probability of occurring [8]. As expected, the number of seropositive birds increased over time, with the 98% seropositive threshold reached 3–6 weeks post virus exposure. Peak infection prevalence was predicted to occur around 30% seroconversion, before dropping down to a median of 23% when 98% seropositive birds was first reached. The shedding by infectious birds when the 98% seropositive threshold was first reached was at post-peak amounts: the median across all simulation iterations of the average amount of shedding by infectious birds at the time the 98% seropositive threshold was first reached was 2.46 for oral shedding, and 3.06 for cloacal shedding in the Spackman et al. (2010) scenario; whereas in the Iqbal et al. (2012) scenario, the amount was 1.05 for oral shedding, and 0.22 for cloacal shedding [8,9]. The amount of virus shed by infectious birds subsequent to this time accounted for very little of the total: Approximately all shedding from oral and cloacal routes was predicted to have occurred by the time 98% seroconversion was observed for both datasets. Peak cloacal shedding was predicted to occur after peak oral shedding, an effect more pronounced in the Spackman et al. (2010) as compared to the Iqbal et al. (2012) scenario [8,9].
Table 2

Transmission Model Output by Seroprevalence. Median and 95% prediction interval for the number of days post virus exposure, infection prevalence in the house, and proportion of oral and cloacal shedding that already occurred, simulated from the Spackman et al. (2010), and Iqbal et al. (2012) data when certain levels of seroprevalence were first reached, as estimated from 6000 disease transmission model iterations [8,9].

SeroprevalenceNumber of Days Post Virus ExposurePrevalence of Infectious BirdsProportion of Total Oral Shedding Already Occurred (Spackman et al. (2010) Data [8])Proportion of Cloacal Shedding Already Occurred (Spackman et al. (2010) Data [8])Proportion of Total Oral Shedding Already Occurred (Iqbal et al. (2012) Data [9])Proportion of Cloacal Shedding Already Occurred (Iqbal et al. (2012) Data [9])
10%11 (8–22)0.88(0.39–0.97)0.46 (0.23–0.72)0.02 (0.01–0.06)0.30 (0.20–0.36)0.07 (0.03–0.08)
20%12 (9–24)0.96(0.59–0.98)0.65 (0.40–0.86)0.05 (0.02–0.13)0.53 (0.38–0.60)0.12 (0.10–0.17)
30%12 (10–25)0.95(0.70–0.97)0.77 (0.53–0.93)0.09 (0.03–0.20)0.71 (0.54–0.77)0.21 (0.18–0.27)
40%13 (10–27)0.93(0.75–0.94)0.84 (0.63–0.96)0.13 (0.05–0.28)0.84 (0.66–0.88)0.31 (0.28–0.37)
50%14 (11–28)0.90(0.75–0.91)0.89 (0.71–0.98)0.20 (0.08–0.38)0.91 (0.77–0.94)0.43 (0.39–0.48)
60%15 (12–29)0.85(0.73–0.87)0.93 (0.78–0.99)0.29 (0.13–0.49)0.95 (0.85–0.96)0.57 (0.53–0.61)
70%16 (13–30)0.79(0.67–0.81)0.96 (0.85–1.00)0.41 (0.22–0.62)0.98 (0.91–0.98)0.71 (0.68–0.74)
80%17 (14–32)0.70(0.58–0.73)0.98 (0.91–1.00)0.58 (0.37–0.77)0.99 (0.95–0.99)0.84 (0.81–0.86)
90%19 (16–35)0.55(0.43–0.58)1.00 (0.96–1.00)0.81 (0.64–0.93)1.00 (0.98–1.00)0.96 (0.93–0.97)
98%24 (21–42)0.23(0.13–0.27)1.00 (1.00–1.00)1.00 (0.98–1.00)1.00 (1.00–1.00)1.00 (1.00–1.00)
The median amount of virus in feces over time following virus exposure compared to the median seroprevalence and infection prevalence is shown in Figure 1 for Spackman et al. (2010), and Figure 2 for Iqbal et al. (2012) [8,9]. The maximum amount of virus was an order of magnitude larger in the Spackman et al. (2010) as compared to the Iqbal et al. (2012) scenario ( compared to ). In both cases, the peak amount of virus was predicted to occur after the peak infection prevalence. This time lag was more pronounced in the Spackman et al. (2010) data, leading to substantial shedding occurring when large numbers of birds were predicted to be seroconverted. Virus was still predicted to be present at the lower levels of infection prevalence early and late in the infection process, but in amounts that were dwarfed by the amounts observed at the peak, and, therefore, are not visible in Figure 1 or Figure 2.
Figure 1

Amount of LPAIV in Feces Simulated from the Spackman et al. (2010) Data. Median total amount of LPAIV in feces over time simulated for a 10,000 bird turkey tom flock from the Spackman et al. (2010) data compared to the seroprevalence and infection prevalence in the flock [8]. The amount of virus is represented by the bars, whereas the seroprevalence and infection prevalence are represented by the dashed and solid lines, respectively.

Figure 2

Amount of LPAIV in Feces Simulated from the Iqbal et al. (2012) Data. Median total amount of LPAIV in feces over time simulated for a 10,000 bird turkey tom flock from the Iqbal et al. (2012) data compared to the seroprevalence and infection prevalence in the flock [9]. The amount of virus is represented by the bars, whereas the seroprevalence and infection prevalence are represented by the dashed and solid lines, respectively.

The likelihood of observing a Ct value of ≤30 and >30 but ≤40 following exposure of a turkey tom house to LPAIV is given in Figure 3. The likelihood was estimated for a testing protocol of 11 OP swabs pooled and tested by rRT-PCR. The likelihood of obtaining a Ct value > 30 was estimated to be highest several weeks after exposure. The peak likelihood of obtaining a Ct value < 30 was comparably earlier by about 10 days. Ct values below 30 were estimated to have a much higher likelihood, in general. Though the likelihood of observing a Ct value above 30 was estimated to occur primarily later in the infection, there was a slightly elevated likelihood predicted approximately seven days post exposure.
Figure 3

Simulated Likelihood of Observing a High or Low Ct Value from a Pooled Sample of 11 OP Swabs. The likelihood of observing a Ct value less than or equal to 30, or between 30 and 40 over time in a 10,000 bird turkey tom house based on a testing protocol of one pooled sample of 11 OP swabs collected from dead birds first, and then live birds as needed.

4. Discussion

In this analysis, the amount of virus shed from oral and cloacal routes over time by ten thousand turkey toms in a house exposed to LPAIV was simulated from a stochastic disease transmission model, parameterized based on largescale production in the U.S., to provide insight into the risk of disease spread posed by infected flocks over time. The results suggest that oral shedding more closely relates to infection prevalence than cloacal shedding, which occurs later in the disease course. This is consistent with the experimental data used from Spackman et al. (2010), and Iqbal et al. (2012), in which peak cloacal shedding occurred after peak oral shedding in individual birds [8,9]. See [41] for more discussion. The disposal of infected birds by controlled marketing or destruction must be carefully considered. Transporting actively shedding birds off-farm poses a substantial risk to poultry premises located along the route, due to contaminated feathers and feces dropped from the truck [42]. Similarly, destruction of actively shedding birds on-site can create opportunities to spread infectious material that poses a risk to nearby premises [4]. Depopulation activities can bring large amounts of people and equipment onto the premises, which may also pose transmission risk [1,3]. In this analysis, nearly all shedding was predicted to have occurred by the time the highest seropositive threshold was reached (see Table 2). This suggests that a diagnostic test result of 100% seropositive serum samples could provide evidence that the flock is at or close to recovery. The confidence that a flock is at or near recovery could be further improved with rRT-PCR testing. In particular, the results in Figure 3 predict that higher Ct values are more likely at the later stages of infection in the flock. Though diagnostic testing can improve confidence that the amount of viral shedding in an infected flock is low, it should be a part of a more comprehensive strategy that includes other risk mitigation measures, such as monitoring the flock for clinical signs, and heightened biosecurity. The analysis provided here could inform a broader risk-based analysis related to decision-making regarding outbreak response, specifically in relation to the disposal of the exposed flock(s). Halvorson (2008) identified that live avian influenza virus generally cannot be detected two weeks after the peak of clinical signs in past applications of controlled marketing [1]. Assuming the clinical signs peak is highly correlated with the peak of infection prevalence, this observation is fairly consistent with the predicted amount of virus in feces shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. As can also be seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the peak amount of virus is considerable. Knowing the infection status of the flock in relation to the peak amount of shedding would be advantageous for deciding on the outbreak response, for example when and how to dispose of the birds. However, detection can occur at any time, and it can be difficult to know with certainty where the flock is in the infection process initially following detection. The spread of LPAIV within a turkey house is an incredibly complex process subject to numerous variables, including the virus strain, environmental conditions, housing structure, and production practices. Due to the number of variables involved in LPAIV spread, the results presented here likely do not represent the diversity of outcomes that may be observed in the field. The analysis conducted here is meant to be an example or approximation of the LPAIV spread that may be observed in largescale turkey production in the U.S. based on available experimental and outbreak data. The data used in the analysis involved unvaccinated turkeys not infected previously with LPAIV. Vaccination can reduce the amount and duration of viral shedding, as well as increase the minimum infectious dose necessary for a bird to become infected [43]. Therefore, the flock-level virus shedding characteristics of vaccinated turkeys or turkeys exposed to LPAIV in the past would likely be quite different from the results presented here. To have sufficient data, a variety of sources involving different LPAIV strains were used. Consequently, this analysis does not capture the behavior of any one virus strain. As the amount of shedding was simulated based on experimental data involving H7 strains, the results may be regarded as for a generic H7 virus. As a result of the variety and limitations of the sources used to parameterize the simulation model, the biological processes may not be captured perfectly. For example, though nearly all shedding was predicted to have occurred when the highest threshold of seroconversion was first achieved, there were still a considerable number of infectious birds at this time, an estimated median of 23%. In particular, substantial cloacal shedding was predicted at high levels of seroconversion in the Spackman et al. (2010) scenario [8]. In Table 1, at 80% seroconversion, a median of 58% of the cloacal shedding was estimated to have occurred, meaning 42% remained. Virus was detected post seroconversion in Preskenis et al. (2010), a study used to estimate the infectious period length and time to seroconversion distributions [20]. However, Preskenis et al. (2010), and the other studies used to estimate parameters for the transmission model, tested for or quantified the amount of virus using rRT-PCR [20]. Therefore, the model parameters are derived from data on the presence of virus, as opposed to the presence and viability of the virus. In addition, as discussed earlier, simulation inputs for the distributions for the length of the infectious and latent periods, the distribution for the time to seroconversion, and the amount of shedding over time were estimated independently, from an amalgamation of sources. In reality, these processes are likely correlated. Sufficient data was not available for joint estimation, but the associations between the responses to infection may not be captured as a result. There are also uncertainties related to the estimation of the amount of virus in manure. A constant decay rate was used for the virus shed in feces in all previous time periods. However, the decay rate would likely be different between the newly excreted feces on top, and the buried feces excreted several days prior. For example, Beard et al. (1984) found avian influenza virus lasted one day longer in manure placed in vials with a cap (comparable to buried feces) as compared to vials without a cap (comparable to newly excreted feces) at 25 °C [44]. The amount of virus in feces over time is likely highly variable between flocks due to the dependence on multiple environmental factors, such as temperature and humidity [35,36]. It should be noted that the results given in Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the median amounts of virus in feces estimated from the simulation runs. Therefore, Figure 1 and Figure 2 may underrepresent the transmission risk posed by virus in feces for some cases. In the experience of Kradel (2003), during the 1983-84 LPAI/HPAI H5N2 outbreak in Pennsylvania, virus isolation was generally not successful 2 weeks after depopulation [3]. However, he notes that virus was recovered on five farms one month or more after depopulation [3]. Considerable uncertainty surrounds the effect of pooling multiple swabs from positive birds on the Ct value. Ladman et al. (2012), Arnold et al. (2013), and Spackman et al. (2013) explored the effect of pooling a single swab from chickens or turkeys inoculated with LPAI with swabs from uninfected birds on the resulting Ct value [6,45,46]. The results of these studies suggest pooling may affect the Ct value, but the nature of this effect remains unclear. Furthermore, no studies were identified at the time of writing that explored the effect of pooling swabs from more than one infected bird on the Ct value. The assumption made in the current analysis was that the amount of virus in the sample is additive per swab from an infected bird, with no diluting effect from swabs from uninfected birds. Although the uncertainty surrounding the effect of pooling on the Ct value exists, the likelihood of observing a pooled sample with Ct 30, or 30 and 40 resembled the makeup of the disease mortality. The estimated proportion of the disease mortality containing birds with Ct values greater than 30 increased with the number of days post exposure, which suggests that the likelihood of observing Ct values greater than 30 would follow a similar pattern under a testing program consisting of individual OP swab samples tested by rRT-PCR. Though higher Ct values could be more likely later in the infection process, they are not confined to this time period. For example, a Ct value of 37.7 was observed over 30 days prior to the last positive test in a barn infected during the 2018 LPAI H5N2 outbreak in Minnesota [21]. However, Ct values in the thirties were more often observed closer to when house testing started to yield rRT-PCR negative results on these premises [21]. In Figure 3, a small bump in the likelihood of observing a Ct value between 30 and 40 was estimated less than 10 days following exposure. This could be due to the combination of low prevalence in the flock, and few birds dying from LPAI early in the outbreak, which would mean detection would occur primarily by collecting a sample from the infected bird, or two in the daily mortality. The instances where those initially dying birds pass while not shedding very much virus could account for the higher Ct values estimated at that point in the outbreak. Overall, the Ct simulation model requires further validation with field data where infected flocks are monitored prior to marketing. The virus shedding model has several potential applications for informing risk management during an LPAI outbreak. For example, the Ct component could improve estimates for the time of virus introduction from diagnostic test results, especially when few results are available [12]. Nickbakhsh et al. (2013) included a transmission term in their within flock HPAI transmission model for spread due to susceptible bird contacts with infectious fecal contaminated dust or equipment [47]. The output from the virus shedding model in this analysis could be similarly used to model transmission due to environmental contamination in a LPAI transmission model. Furthermore, the virus shedding model could be used to adjust the transmission rate according to the amount of virus shed by a bird over time, as opposed to a constant rate across the bird’s infectious period, which is the current assumption in the model.
Table A1

Two-part Regression Model Comparisons. AIC values of the regression models estimated from the zero and nonzero portions of the OP and cloacal swab data from Spackman et al. (2010) [8].

Swab TypeTwo-Part Model ComponentRegression EquationAIC
Oropharyngeal P(yij=0) Equation (A1)251.28
Equation (A2)243.50
Equation (A3)247.10
yij|yij>0 Equation (A7)1391.75
Equation (A8)1225.04
Equation (A9)1183.44
Cloacal P(yij=0) Equation (A4)806.08
Equation (A5)758.90
Equation (A6)742.60
yij|yij>0 Equation (A7)980.74
Equation (A8)938.63
Equation (A9)934.86
Table A2

Regression Model Estimates for OP Swab Zero Component. Parameter estimates for the probability of observing no viral shedding over time from a turkey sampled with an OP swab modeled by regression Equation (A2).

ParameterDescriptionMean (95% CI)
β0 Fixed intercept−5.88 (−7.57, −4.77)
β1 Fixed coefficient for the number of days post exposure0.38 (0.29, 0.50)
d1 Random intercept standard deviation0.96 (0.15, 1.55)
Table A3

Regression Model Estimates for Cloacal Swab Zero Component. Parameter estimates for the probability of observing no viral shedding over time from a turkey sampled with a cloacal swab modeled by regression Equation (A6).

ParameterDescriptionMean (95% CI)
β0 Fixed intercept−0.42 (−1.74, 0.82)
β1 Fixed coefficient for the number of days post exposure−0.22 (−0.47, 0.02)
β2 Fixed coefficient for the number of days post exposure squared0.02 (0.01, 0.04)
d1 Random intercept standard deviation1.78 (0.81, 2.68)
d2 Random slope standard deviation0.17 (0.07, 0.27)
ρ12 Random intercept and random slope correlation−0.83 (−0.99, −0.28)
Table A4

Regression Model Estimates for OP Swab Nonzero Component. Parameter estimates for the amount of virus observed from a turkey sampled with an OP swab over time, given the amount is not zero. This amount was modeled by regression Equation (A9).

ParameterDescriptionMean (95% CI)
β0* Fixed intercept5.13 (4.47, 5.79)
β1* Fixed coefficient for the number of days post exposure−0.18 (−0.28, −0.08)
β2* Fixed coefficient for the number of days post exposure squared−0.007 (−0.013, −0.001)
σ Standard deviation of the normal distribution for the errors0.88 (0.82, 0.94)
d1* Random intercept standard deviation1.07 (0.71, 1.59)
d2* Random slope standard deviation0.10 (0.07, 0.16)
ρ12* Random intercept and random slope correlation−0.80 (−0.94, −0.45)
Table A5

Regression Model Estimates for Cloacal Swab Nonzero Component. Parameter estimates for the amount of virus observed from a turkey sampled with a cloacal swab over time, given the amount is not zero. This amount was modeled by regression Equation (A9).

ParameterDescriptionMean (95% CI)
β0* Fixed intercept0.84 (0.34, 1.33)
β1* Fixed coefficient for the number of days post exposure0.47 (0.31, 0.62)
β2* Fixed coefficient for the number of days post exposure squared−0.03 (−0.04, −0.02)
σ Standard deviation of the normal distribution for the errors1.21 (1.12, 1.31)
d1* Random intercept standard deviation0.30 (0.10, 0.93)
d2* Random slope standard deviation0.06 (0.03, 0.13)
ρ12* Random intercept and random slope correlation0.64 (−0.95, 1.00)
Table A6

Estimated Strain-specific Two-part Models for OP and Cloacal Swabs.

LPAIV StrainStrain-Specific Two-Part Model for OP and Cloacal (CL) Swabs
A/chicken/MD/MinhMa/2004(H7N2)OP:logit{P(yij=0)}=5.14+0.38tijE[yij|yij>0]=5.360.30tij0.007tij2CL:logit{P(yij=0)}=0.130.09tij+0.02tij2E[yij|yij>0]=0.67+0.43tij0.03tij2
A/chicken/NJ/15086-3/1994(H7N3)OP:logit{P(yij=0)}=7.00+0.38tijE[yij|yij>0]=3.910.07tij0.007tij2CL:logit{P(yij=0)}=0.240.46tij+0.02tij2E[yij|yij>0]=0.90+0.48tij0.03tij2
A/chicken/NY/12273-11/1999(H7N3)OP:logit{P(yij=0)}=6.61+0.38tijE[yij|yij>0]=4.480.15tij0.007tij2CL:logit{P(yij=0)}=0.030.19tij+0.02tij2E[yij|yij>0]=0.50+0.40tij0.03tij2
A/chicken/NY/30749-3/2000(H7N2)OP:logit{P(yij=0)}=5.66+0.38tijE[yij|yij>0]=7.010.28tij0.007tij2CL:logit{P(yij=0)}=0.210.01tij+0.02tij2E[yij|yij>0]=1.24+0.54tij0.03tij2
A/chicken/NY/3112-1/1995(H7N2)OP:logit{P(yij=0)}=5.66+0.38tijE[yij|yij>0]=3.580.02tij0.007tij2CL:logit{P(yij=0)}=0.090.31tij+0.02tij2E[yij|yij>0]=0.74+0.45tij0.03tij2
A/chicken/PA/9801289/1998(H7N2)OP:logit{P(yij=0)}=4.59+0.38tijE[yij|yij>0]=5.740.28tij0.007tij2CL:logit{P(yij=0)}=0.150.37tij+0.02tij2E[yij|yij>0]=0.78+0.44tij0.03tij2
A/guinea hen/MA/148081-11/2002(H7N2)OP:logit{P(yij=0)}=6.39+0.38tijE[yij|yij>0]=6.420.30tij0.007tij2CL:logit{P(yij=0)}=0.200.02tij+0.02tij2E[yij|yij>0]=0.74+0.42tij0.03tij2
A/mallard/OH/421/1987(H7N8)OP:logit{P(yij=0)}=6.33+0.38tijE[yij|yij>0]=3.990.12tij0.007tij2CL:logit{P(yij=0)}=0.140.36tij+0.02tij2E[yij|yij>0]=0.59+0.42tij0.03tij2
A/pintail/MN/423/1999(H7N3)OP:logit{P(yij=0)}=5.10+0.38tijE[yij|yij>0]=4.980.15tij0.007tij2CL:logit{P(yij=0)}=0.060.28tij+0.02tij2E[yij|yij>0]=1.22+0.53tij0.03tij2
A/ruddy turnstone/DE/1538/2000(H7N9)OP:logit{P(yij=0)}=5.86+0.38tijE[yij|yij>0]=6.060.13tij0.007tij2CL:logit{P(yij=0)}=0.130.09tij+0.02tij2E[yij|yij>0]=1.09+0.55tij0.03tij2
A/turkey/NY/4450-4/1994(H7N2)OP:logit{P(yij=0)}=6.88+0.38tijE[yij|yij>0]=4.420.09tij0.007tij2CL:logit{P(yij=0)}=0.170.39tij+0.02tij2E[yij|yij>0]=1.02+0.49tij0.03tij2
A/turkey/VA/SEP-67/2002(H7N2)OP:logit{P(yij=0)}=4.78+0.38tijE[yij|yij>0]=5.640.29tij0.007tij2CL:logit{P(yij=0)}=0.070.15tij+0.02tij2E[yij|yij>0]=0.54+0.42tij0.03tij2
  24 in total

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