| Literature DB >> 34629753 |
Xin Ma1, Xue Zhao2, Pengfei Guo3.
Abstract
In many countries and territories, public hospitals play a major role in coping with the COVID-19 pandemic. For public hospital managers, on the one hand, they must best utilize their hospital beds to serve the COVID-19 patients immediately. On the other hand, they need to consider the need of bed resources from non-COVID-19 patients, including emergency and elective patients. In this work, we consider two control mechanisms for public hospital managers to maximize the overall utility of patients. One is the dynamic allocation of bed resources according to the evolution process of the COVID-19 pandemic. The other is the usage of a subsidy scheme to move elective patients from the public to private hospitals. We develop a dynamic programming model to study the allocation of isolation and ordinary beds and the effect of the subsidy policy in serving three types of patients, COVID-19, emergency, and elective-care. We first show that the dynamic allocation between isolation and ordinary beds can provide a better utilization of bed resources, by cutting down at least 33.5% of the total cost compared with the static policy (i.e., keeping a fixed number of isolation beds) when facing a medium pandemic alert. Our results further show that subsidizing elective patients and referring them to private hospitals is an efficient way to ease the overcrowded situation in public hospitals. Our results demonstrate that, by dynamically conducting bed allocation and subsidy scheme in different phases of the COVID-19 pandemic, patient overall utility can be greatly improved.Entities:
Keywords: Capacity planning; Dynamic allocation; Health care; Hospital beds; Pandemic
Year: 2021 PMID: 34629753 PMCID: PMC8489298 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108320
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Prod Econ ISSN: 0925-5273 Impact factor: 7.885
Fig. 1The illustration of patient flow and bed allocation.
Fig. 2The changes of marginal costs on w and y.
Numerical settings.
| Parameters | Value |
|---|---|
| Total number of decision periods | 16 |
| Total number of inpatient beds | 120 |
| The initial number of isolation beds | 20 |
| The initial number of elective patients on the waiting list | 50 |
| The arrival rate of COVID-19 patients | |
| The arrival rate of elective patients | |
| The arrival rate of emergency patients | Following a Poisson with mean 2 |
| The number of COVID-19 patients being discharged from the system | Uniformly distributed over [0.4, 0.5] |
| The number of non-COVID-19 patients being discharged from the system | Uniformly distributed over [0.4, 0.5] |
| The unit idling cost of an isolation bed | 3 |
| The unit cost of retrofitting an ordinary bed into an isolation bed | 10 |
| The unit cost for admitting a non-COVID-19 patient | 1 |
| The unit penalty cost if a COVID-19 patient is not timely admitted | 500 |
| The unit transferring cost of using an isolation bed to admit non-COVID-19 patients | 2 |
| The unit waiting cost | 1 |
| The financial subsidy | ( |
| The discount factor | 0.9 |
Note: The normal distribution is referred to as N(μ, σ) with mean μ and variance σ.
Fig. 3The hospital beds allocation at different phases of pandemic (K = 120).
The length of the waiting list in each time period (K = 120).
| Time | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 50 | 35 | 26 | 21 | 16 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| 50 | 37 | 21 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 10 | 13 | 18 | 28 | 51 | 20 | 12 | 8 | 18 | 28 | |
| 50 | 34 | 14 | 0 | 5 | 7 | 11 | 16 | 20 | 34 | 62 | 33 | 21 | 14 | 24 | 33 |
The cost ratio between the static policy and the dynamic scheduling rule (K = 120).
| Fixed isolation beds | 10 | 20 | 30 | 40 | 50 | 60 | 70 | 80 | 90 | 100 | 110 | 120 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.284 | 0.814 | 0.725 | 0.575 | 0.439 | 0.343 | 0.272 | 0.218 | 0.179 | 0.160 | 0.157 | 0.156 | |
| 0.269 | 0.336 | 0.418 | 0.497 | 0.583 | 0.653 | 0.665 | 0.628 | 0.525 | 0.471 | 0.460 | 0.458 | |
| 0.297 | 0.342 | 0.387 | 0.436 | 0.485 | 0.530 | 0.579 | 0.621 | 0.664 | 0.701 | 0.776 | 0.872 |
The effects of the subsidy scheme (α = 2).
| Evaluation criteria | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subsidy rule | Total cost | Average queue length | |||
| Value | Δ | Value | Δ | ||
| Without Subsidy | – | 120,108 | – | 67.9 | – |
| Subsidy Rule 1 | 36,897 | 0.31 | 11.3 | 0.17 | |
| Subsidy Rule 2 | 50,294 | 0.42 | 17.9 | 0.26 | |
| Subsidy Rule 3 | 62,987 | 0.52 | 23.6 | 0.35 | |
| Subsidy Rule 4 | 75,080 | 0.62 | 28.5 | 0.42 | |
Fig. 4The effects of bed capacity and waiting cost on the total cost.
The cost ratio between the static policy and the dynamic scheduling rule (K = 360).
| Fixed Isolation Beds | 30 | 60 | 90 | 120 | 150 | 180 | 210 | 240 | 270 | 300 | 330 | 360 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.381 | 0.653 | 0.714 | 0.437 | 0.288 | 0.205 | 0.155 | 0.134 | 0.119 | 0.109 | 0.108 | 0.108 | |
| 0.414 | 0.486 | 0.550 | 0.595 | 0.605 | 0.595 | 0.570 | 0.564 | 0.552 | 0.537 | 0.537 | 0.536 | |
| 0.562 | 0.623 | 0.681 | 0.719 | 0.744 | 0.757 | 0.748 | 0.764 | 0.778 | 0.804 | 0867 | 0.935 |