Where is the Trouble in Pseudo-empirical Research?

Smedslund (Psychol Inq 2(4):325-338, 1991) has demonstrated that much of the experimental research in psychology is pseudo-empirical-empirically testing what can be determined a priori based on the meanings of everyday psychological terminology. The present article shows how Smedslund's general perspective is consistent with certain aspects of a theoretical model of the narrative form, and how the latter provides a useful lens for making sense of pseudo-empiricism. This raises a paradox: While something along the lines of the narrative element of 'trouble' is required as a premise for research, trouble is not possible in the context of questions of the general relation between everyday psychological concepts. This paradox is resolved by showing how certain methodological and discursive characteristics of research-specifically, the reification and abstraction of psychological terminology, quantification, and the statistical analysis of group-level results function to obscure the absence (and impossibility) of trouble and/or to create the illusion of its presence.