| Literature DB >> 34220344 |
Naeun Lauren Kim1, Hyunjoo Im1.
Abstract
Consumers showed a dramatically increased interest in contactless shopping in reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on the protection motivation theory, this study investigated how contactless shopping grew as a protectionary action against COVID-19. Findings from a nationwide online survey (n = 311) confirmed the impact of politicization of the pandemic on consumer responses for contactless shopping intention and the significance of threat and coping appraisals in taking protectionary actions. This study adds knowledge to the existing literature on contactless shopping and protection motivation theory. Results imply that retailers must invest in contactless shopping and provide an in-store shopping environment that prioritizes the health and safety of shoppers and employees to decrease the threat of virus infection during shopping. However, in doing so, retailers are recommended to develop different marketing strategies regarding contactless shopping based on consumers' political orientations.Entities:
Keywords: COVID‐19; contactless shopping; curbside pickup; political orientation; protection motivation theory
Year: 2021 PMID: 34220344 PMCID: PMC8237026 DOI: 10.1111/ijcs.12714
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Consum Stud ISSN: 1470-6423
Sample demographics
| Variable |
| % |
|---|---|---|
| Gender | ||
| Male | 156 | 50.2 |
| Female | 155 | 49.8 |
| Age | ||
| 18–27 | 38 | 12.2 |
| 28–37 | 57 | 18.3 |
| 38–47 | 64 | 20.6 |
| 48–57 | 40 | 12.9 |
| 58–67 | 59 | 19.0 |
| >68 | 53 | 17.0 |
| Race | ||
| White or Caucasian | 249 | 80.1 |
| Black or African American | 36 | 11.6 |
| Hispanic or Latino | 14 | 4.5 |
| Asian | 8 | 2.6 |
| Others | 4 | 1.3 |
| Education | ||
| High school or less | 67 | 21.6 |
| College | 188 | 60.4 |
| Graduate school | 56 | 18.0 |
| Individual Income | ||
| <$25,000 | 84 | 27.0 |
| $25,001–$49,999 | 73 | 23.5 |
| $50,000–$74,999 | 51 | 16.4 |
| $75,000–$99,999 | 40 | 12.9 |
| >$100,000 | 63 | 20.3 |
Measurement items and factor analysis results
| Items | Factor loadings | AVE | Composite reliability | Cronbach's alpha |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Perceived severity | 0.864 | 0.962 | .907 | |
| If I catch COVID‐19, I am likely to become seriously ill | 0.862 | |||
| Catching COVID‐19 could have severe consequences for my health | 0.898 | |||
| Catching COVID‐19 could have major consequences for my life | 0.875 | |||
| If I catch COVID‐19, it will cause me serious problems | 0.878 | |||
| Perceived vulnerability | 0.661 | 0.795 | .754 | |
| If I don't take preventative action, I am likely to catch COVID‐19 | 0.668 | |||
| My chances of catching COVID‐19 are high if I don't take action to prevent it | 0.786 | |||
| Response efficacy | 0.848 | 0.944 | .929 | |
| If I stay at home, I will be protecting others from COVID‐19 | 0.861 | |||
| If I stay at home, I will be protecting the people I care about from COVID‐19 | 0.875 | |||
| If I stay at home, I will be protecting others who are at high risk from COVID‐19 | 0.862 | |||
| Self‐efficacy | 0.813 | 0.897 | .930 | |
| It will be possible for me to stay at home, if I want to | 0.816 | |||
| If I want to, I am confident that I can stay at home | 0.861 | |||
| Stay at home intention | 0.745 | 0.894 | .841 | |
| I will try to stay at home | 0.893 | |||
| I intend to stay at home | 0.886 | |||
| I want to stay at home | 0.569 | |||
| Political orientation | 0.768 | 0.908 | .874 | |
| Democrat – Republican | 0.702 | |||
| Left – Right | 0.893 | |||
| Progressive – Conservative | 0.814 | |||
| Intention to use contactless shopping services | 0.685 | 0.860 | .777 | |
| In the next month, I will have greater interest in using curbside pickup services | 0.973 | |||
| In the next month, I will have greater interest in using delivery services | 0.716 | |||
| In the next month, I will have greater interest in using self‐checkout services | 0.517 |
FIGURE 1Structure model results
Estimates of the original and revised models for mediation test
| Model element | Original model | Revised model with direct effect |
|---|---|---|
| Model fit | ||
|
| 360.489 | 351.716 |
|
| 159 | 158 |
| Probability | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| RMSEA | 0.064 | 0.063 |
| CFI | 0.946 | 0.948 |
| Standardized parameter estimates | ||
| PO → VUL | −0.30 | −0.30 |
| PO → SEV | −0.20 | −0.20 |
| PO → RES | −0.22 | −0.22 |
| PO → SELF | 0.08 | −0.07 |
| VUL → STAY | 0.39 | 0.39 |
| SEV → STAY | −0.05 | −0.04 |
| RES → STAY | 0.45 | 0.45 |
| SELF → STAY | 0.38 | 0.39 |
| STAY → SHOP | 0.19 | 0.15 |
| PO → SHOP | Not estimated | −0.19 |
Abbreviations: PO, political orientation; RES, response efficacy; SELF, self‐efficacy; SEV, severity; SHOP, contactless shopping intention; STAY, stay at home intention; VUL, vulnerability.
Statistically significant at .05 level.
Assessing direct and indirect effects in a mediated model
| Effects of PO → SHOP | Original model (only indirect effects) | Revised model (indirect & direct effects) |
|---|---|---|
| Total effects | −0.044 [−0.099;−0.018] | −0.225 [−0.327;−0.109] |
| Direct effects | 0.00 | −0.189 [−0.295;−0.081] |
| Indirect effects | −0.044 [−0.099;−0.018] | −0.036 [−0.073;−0.005] |