| Literature DB >> 34203918 |
Constanze Eib1,2, Paraskevi Peristera2, Claudia Bernhard-Oettel3, Constanze Leineweber2.
Abstract
Organizational justice is an important aspect of the psychosocial work environment, but there is a lack of studies on whether justice perceptions also predict retirement decisions. The aim of this study is to examine trajectories of procedural and interactional justice perceptions prior to retirement of three groups of retirees while considering self-rated health and important demographics. Data from the Swedish Longitudinal Occupational Survey of Health (2006-2018, N = 3000) were used. Respondents were grouped into early retirement, normative retirement and late retirement. Latent growth curve models and multinomial logistic regressions were conducted to test whether trajectories of justice perceptions prior to retirement differed between retirement groups while controlling for self-rated health development and demographic variables. Late retirees had higher intercept levels of interactional justice and higher intercept levels of self-rated health prior to retirement, compared to early retirees. Late retirees also showed a slower decrease in procedural justice compared to early retirees. Only intercept levels of self-rated health differed between early retirees and normative retirees, such that early retirees had lower levels of self-rated health prior to retirement. Keeping employees in the workforce is a major challenge for any aging society. Organizational justice perceptions in the years prior to retirement seem particularly influential for delaying retirement.Entities:
Keywords: Sweden; fairness; organizational justice; retirement; self-rated health; trajectories
Year: 2021 PMID: 34203918 PMCID: PMC8296311 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph18126472
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Environ Res Public Health ISSN: 1660-4601 Impact factor: 3.390
Justice items.
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| 1 Decision are taken on the basis of correct information |
| 2 Bad decisions can be revoked or changed |
| 3 All sides affected by the decision are represented |
| 4 Decisions taken are consistent (the same rules apply to everyone) |
| 5 Everyone is entitled to give their opinion in matters of immediate personal concern |
| 6 Feedback is provided regarding the consequences of decisions and people are informed accordingly |
| 7 It is possible to obtain a more detailed account of the information that underlies decisions, if needed |
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| 1 I receive praise from my boss if I have done something good |
| 2 My boss shows that he/she cares how things are for me and how I feel. |
| 3 My boss encourages my participation in the scheduling of my work. |
| 4 My boss takes the time to become involved in his/her employees’ professional development. |
| 5 My boss gives me the information I need. |
| 6 I have a clear picture of what my boss expects of me. |
| 7 My boss explains goals and sub-goals for our work so that I understand what they mean for my particular part of the work |
Description of retirement groups.
| Variable | Normative | Early | Late | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Women % (n) | 55.5 (683) | 56.2 (535) | 47.0 (384) | <0.0001 |
| Age at retirement mean (SD) | 65.23 (0.42) | 62.82 (1.48) | 67.73 (1.32) | <0.0001 |
| White-collar worker % (n) | 66.5 (794) | 71.7 (669) | 74.1 (585) | <0.001 |
| Married/cohabiting % (n) | 78.3 (945) | 86.3 (816) | 72.2 (582) | <0.0001 |
| Income (two waves prior retirement) mean (SD) | 372.80 (164.90) | 412.76 (464.94) | 475.93 (231.58) | <0.0001 |
| Procedural justice (one wave before retirement or current) mean (SD) | 3.36 (0.94) | 3.27 (0.93) | 3.50 (0.92) | <0.0001 |
| Interactional justice (one wave before retirement or current) mean (SD) | 3.13 (0.64) | 3.10 (0.67) | 3.26 (0.62) | <0.0001 |
| Self-rated health (one wave before retirement or current) mean (SD) | 4.04 (0.75) | 3.96 (0.79) | 4.13 (0.75) | <0.0001 |
Notes. For sex, socioeconomic status, civil status, chi-square tests were conducted. For age, income, procedural and interactional justice and self-rated health, ANOVAs were conducted.
Model comparisons for creating intercepts and slopes including means and variances for intercepts and slopes.
| Models | SBIC | χ2 (df) | Change in χ2 | CFI | RMSEA | SRMR | I Mean | I Variance | S Mean | S Variance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Procedural justice 4 waves | ||||||||||
| Model 0: fixed intercept | 18,478.03 | 1831.27 (9) | - | 0.000 | 0.265 | 0.360 | 3.41 *** | |||
| Model 1: random intercept | 16,699.76 | 48.20 (8) | - | 0.978 | 0.042 | 0.085 | 3.40 *** | 0.48 *** | ||
| Model 2: random intercept, fixed slope | 16,684.39 | 28.05 (7) | 20.15 *** | 0.988 | 0.032 | 0.066 | 3.37 *** | 0.48 *** | 0.04 *** | |
| Model 3: random intercept, random slope | 16,683.72 | 17.80 (5) | 10.25 *** | 0.993 | 0.030 | 0.039 | 3.37 *** | 0.53 *** | 0.04 *** | 0.02 ** |
| Self-rated health 4 waves | ||||||||||
| Model 0: fixed intercept | 17,116.37 | 2304.08 (9) | - | 0.001 | 0.292 | 0.386 | 4.04 *** | |||
| Model 1: random intercept | 14,829.43 | 12.31 (8) | - | 0.998 | 0.013 | 0.051 | 4.04 *** | 0.36 *** | ||
| Model 2: random intercept, fixed slope | 14,834.01 | 12.07 (7) | 0.24 ns | 0.998 | 0.016 | 0.049 | 4.04 *** | 0.36 *** | 0.00 | |
| Model 3: random intercept, random slope | 14,834.37 | 2.78 (5) | 9.29 * | 1.000 | 0.000 | 0.018 | 4.04 *** | 0.39 *** | 0.00 | 0.01 ** |
| Interactional justice 3 waves | ||||||||||
| Model 0: fixed intercept | 8767.10 | 951.74 (5) | - | 0.000 | 0.285 | 0.334 | 3.16 *** | |||
| Model 1: random intercept | 7852.06 | 32.13 (4) | - | 0.970 | 0.055 | 0.044 | 3.16 *** | 0.24 *** | ||
| Model 2: random intercept, fixed slope | 7847.93 | 23.42 (3) | 8.70 *** | 0.978 | 0.054 | 0.036 | 3.17 *** | 0.24 *** | −0.03 ** | |
| Model 3: random intercept, random slope | 7844.96 | 11.29 (1) | 12.13 *** | 0.989 | 0.066 | 0.027 | 3.17 *** | 0.29 *** | −0.03 ** | 0.04 *** |
| Self-rated health 3 waves | ||||||||||
| Model 0: fixed intercept | 15,003.77 | 1791.18 (5) | - | 0.000 | 0.346 | 0.351 | 4.04 *** | |||
| Model 1: random intercept | 13,222.46 | 5.04 (4) | - | 0.999 | 0.009 | 0.041 | 4.04 *** | 0.37 *** | ||
| Model 2: random intercept, fixed slope | 13,226.92 | 4.68 (3) | 0.36 ns | 0.999 | 0.014 | 0.039 | 4.04 *** | 0.37 *** | 0.01 | |
| Model 3: random intercept, random slope | 13,232.63 | 0.74 (1) | 3.94 * | 1.000 | 0.000 | 0.004 | 4.04 *** | 0.40 *** | 0.01 | 0.02 |
Notes. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Change in χ2 Model 2 is compared to Model 1 and Model 3 is compared to Model 2.
ORs for late retirement as compared to early retirement (reference) for procedural justice and interactional justice.
| Procedural Justice | Interactional Justice | |||||||||||
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| Variables | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | ||||||
| OR | 95% CI | OR | 95% CI | OR | 95% CI | OR | 95% CI | OR | 95% CI | OR | 95% CI | |
| Intercept J |
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| 1.03 | 1.00–1.06 | 1.03 | 0.99–1.06 |
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| Slope J | 0.68 | 0.46–1.01 |
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| 1.17 | 0.31–4.49 | 1.13 | 0.29–4.36 | 0.98 | 0.24–3.95 |
| Intercept SRH |
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| Gender (male) | 1.10 | 0.89–1.37 | 1.20 | 0.94–1.53 | ||||||||
| Married (not-married) |
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| SES (lower) | 1.24 | 0.97–1.60 | 1.18 | 0.90–1.55 | ||||||||
| Ln (Income) |
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| −2 Log Likelihood | 4581.36 *** | 5256.67 *** | 5739.76 *** | 2720.30 *** | 4180.63 *** | 4703.86 *** | ||||||
| Cox and Snell Pseudo R2 | 0.009 | 0.017 | 0.087 | 0.012 | 0.021 | 0.079 | ||||||
Notes. *** p < 0.001. Numbers in bold font are statistically significant with a 95% confidence interval. J = justice perception aspect; SRH = self-rated health; SES = socioeconomic status. Reference group is early retirement group.
ORs for late retirement as compared to normative retirement (reference group) for procedural justice and interactional justice.
| Procedural Justice | Interactional Justice | |||||||||||
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| Variables | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | ||||||
| OR | 95% CI | OR | 95% CI | OR | 95% CI | OR | 95% CI | OR | 95% CI | OR | 95% CI | |
| Intercept J | 1.02 | 1.00–1.05 | 1.02 | 0.99–1.05 | 1.02 | 0.99–1.04 |
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| Slope J | 0.83 | 0.57–1.20 | 0.82 | 0.56–1.18 | 0.78 | 0.53–1.15 | 1.34 | 0.37–4.80 | 1.30 | 0.36–4.66 | 1.12 | 0.30–4.19 |
| Intercept SRH |
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| 1.12 | 0.92–1.36 |
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| 1.18 | 0.96–1.45 | ||||
| Gender (male) | 1.00 | 0.81–1.23 | 1.06 | 0.84–1.33 | ||||||||
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| SES (lower) | 1.10 | 0.87–1.40 | 1.07 | 0.83–1.37 | ||||||||
| Ln (Income) |
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| −2 Log Likelihood | 4581.36 *** | 5256.67 *** | 5739.76 *** | 2720.30 *** | 4180.63 *** | 4703.86 *** | ||||||
| Cox and Snell Pseudo R2 | 0.009 | 0.017 | 0.087 | 0.012 | 0.021 | 0.079 | ||||||
Notes. *** p < 0.001. Numbers in bold font are statistically significant with a 95% confidence interval. J = justice perception aspect; SRH = self-rated health; SES = socioeconomic status. Reference group is normative retirement group.
ORs for early retirement as compared to normative retirement (reference group) for procedural justice and interactional justice.
| Procedural Justice | Interactional Justice | |||||||||||
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| Variables | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | ||||||
| OR | 95% CI | OR | 95% CI | OR | 95% CI | OR | 95% CI | OR | 95% CI | OR | 95% CI | |
| Intercept J | 0.99 | 0.96–1.01 | 0.99 | 0.97–1.02 | 0.99 | 0.96–1.01 | 0.90 | 0.70–1.14 | 0.93 | 0.73–1.19 | 0.86 | 0.67–1.11 |
| Slope J | 1.21 | 0.85–1.73 | 1.22 | 0.86–1.74 | 1.25 | 0.86–1.80 | 1.14 | 0.33–3.98 | 1.15 | 0.33–4.01 | 1.14 | 0.31–4.20 |
| Intercept SRH |
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| 0.85 | 0.71–1.03 |
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| Gender (male) | 0.91 | 0.74–1.10 | 0.88 | 0.70–1.10 | ||||||||
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| SES (lower) | 0.89 | 0.72–1.10 | 0.90 | 0.71–1.15 | ||||||||
| Ln (Income) |
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| 1.37 | 0.99–1.89 | ||||||||
| −2 Log Likelihood | 4581.36 *** | 5256.67 *** | 5739.76 *** | 2720.30 *** | 4180.63 *** | 4703.86 *** | ||||||
| Cox and Snell Pseudo R2 | 0.009 | 0.017 | 0.087 | 0.012 | 0.021 | 0.079 | ||||||
Notes. *** p < 0.001. Numbers in bold font are statistically significant with a 95% confidence interval. J = justice perception aspect; SRH = self-rated health; SES = socioeconomic status. Reference group is normative retirement group.