Michael S Dunbar1, Nancy Nicosia2, Beau Kilmer3. 1. RAND Corporation, 4750 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA, 15213, USA. Electronic address: mdunbar@rand.org. 2. RAND Corporation, 20 Park Plaza, Suite 920, Boston, MA, 02116, USA. 3. RAND Corporation, 1776 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA, 90407, USA.
Abstract
INTRODUCTION: Cigarette excise taxes are a well-established policy lever for reducing tobacco use. However, estimating the effect of taxes on smoking behavior can be confounded by endogeneity concerns such as selection. This study leverages a unique natural experiment -compulsory relocation of U.S. military service members to installations - to estimate the relationship between state cigarette taxes and smoking behavior without concerns about selection into environments. METHODS: The current study uses data from the Department of Defense's 2011 Health-Related Behaviors Survey and 2011 state cigarette excise taxes from the CDC STATE System. Logistic and Poisson regression analyses estimate the cross-sectional associations between state cigarette excise taxes and the following smoking behaviors: current cigarette smoking, frequency of smoking, heaviness of consumption, and cigarette cessation among individuals who smoked while at the current installation. RESULTS: Higher taxes are associated with lower odds of current cigarette smoking (AOR = 0.94; 95 % CI: 0.89-0.98), fewer smoking days per month among current cigarette smokers (IRR = 0.98, 95 % CI 0.97-0.996), and higher likelihood of quitting smoking among individuals who had smoked at their current installation (AOR = 1.14, 95 % CI 1.05-1.25). Taxes are not associated with the number of cigarettes smoked per day among current smokers. CONCLUSIONS: Exogenous assignment to installations in states with higher cigarette taxes is associated with lower likelihood of smoking and greater likelihood of quitting. Findings provide novel evidence in support of a causal impact of cigarette taxes on lower smoking levels among adults.
INTRODUCTION: Cigarette excise taxes are a well-established policy lever for reducing tobacco use. However, estimating the effect of taxes on smoking behavior can be confounded by endogeneity concerns such as selection. This study leverages a unique natural experiment -compulsory relocation of U.S. military service members to installations - to estimate the relationship between state cigarette taxes and smoking behavior without concerns about selection into environments. METHODS: The current study uses data from the Department of Defense's 2011 Health-Related Behaviors Survey and 2011 state cigarette excise taxes from the CDC STATE System. Logistic and Poisson regression analyses estimate the cross-sectional associations between state cigarette excise taxes and the following smoking behaviors: current cigarette smoking, frequency of smoking, heaviness of consumption, and cigarette cessation among individuals who smoked while at the current installation. RESULTS: Higher taxes are associated with lower odds of current cigarette smoking (AOR = 0.94; 95 % CI: 0.89-0.98), fewer smoking days per month among current cigarette smokers (IRR = 0.98, 95 % CI 0.97-0.996), and higher likelihood of quitting smoking among individuals who had smoked at their current installation (AOR = 1.14, 95 % CI 1.05-1.25). Taxes are not associated with the number of cigarettes smoked per day among current smokers. CONCLUSIONS: Exogenous assignment to installations in states with higher cigarette taxes is associated with lower likelihood of smoking and greater likelihood of quitting. Findings provide novel evidence in support of a causal impact of cigarette taxes on lower smoking levels among adults.
Authors: D P Hopkins; P A Briss; C J Ricard; C G Husten; V G Carande-Kulis; J E Fielding; M O Alao; J W McKenna; D J Sharp; J R Harris; T A Woollery; K W Harris Journal: Am J Prev Med Date: 2001-02 Impact factor: 5.043
Authors: Christopher J Ruhm; Alison Snow Jones; Kerry Anne McGeary; William C Kerr; Joseph V Terza; Thomas K Greenfield; Ravi S Pandian Journal: J Health Econ Date: 2012-08-31 Impact factor: 3.804