| Literature DB >> 33834100 |
Shilan S Hameed1,2, Wan Haslina Hassan1, Liza Abdul Latiff3, Fahad Ghabban4.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: The Internet of Medical Things (IoMTs) is gradually replacing the traditional healthcare system. However, little attention has been paid to their security requirements in the development of the IoMT devices and systems. One of the main reasons can be the difficulty of tuning conventional security solutions to the IoMT system. Machine Learning (ML) has been successfully employed in the attack detection and mitigation process. Advanced ML technique can also be a promising approach to address the existing and anticipated IoMT security and privacy issues. However, because of the existing challenges of IoMT system, it is imperative to know how these techniques can be effectively utilized to meet the security and privacy requirements without affecting the IoMT systems quality, services, and device's lifespan.Entities:
Keywords: A review; Artificial intelligence; IoMT; Machine learning; Security and privacy; Smart health; Systematic review; The internet of medical things
Year: 2021 PMID: 33834100 PMCID: PMC8022640 DOI: 10.7717/peerj-cs.414
Source DB: PubMed Journal: PeerJ Comput Sci ISSN: 2376-5992
The types and characteristics of medical devices used in the IoMT system.
| Device type | Placement | Example | Risk Value | References |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Implantable | Within the human tissues | deep brain implants, heart pacemaker and insulin pump | High | |
| Wearable | On the human body | smart watches, fitness devices | Low | |
| Ambient | Outside the human body | elderly monitoring devices in smart home | Low | |
| Stationary | Inside hospitals | medical image processing devices of MRI and CT-Scan | Low |
Note:
Each row represents a different type of medical device, and each column represents characteristics of that device.
Attacks on different IoMT layers with their respective impact on security requirements.
| Attacks | Impact | References |
|---|---|---|
| Targeted layer: Server/Database layer | ||
| Malware attack | Integrity, Availability | |
| Ransomware attack | Integrity, Availability | |
| SQL injection | All | |
| Social Engineering (Reverse Engineering, Shoulder-surfing) | All | |
| Brute Force | Confidentiality, Integrity | |
| Adversarial Machine Learning attacks (Causative (Poisoning and Evasion attacks), Exploratory) | Confidentiality, Integrity | |
| Targeted layer: Network layer | ||
| Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed DoS (DDoS) | All | |
| Man in the Middle (MIM) attack | Confidentiality, Integrity | |
| Eavesdropping attack | Confidentiality, Non-repudiation, Privacy | |
| Replay attack | Confidentiality, Integrity | |
| botnet attack | Availability, Confidentiality | |
| Mirai attack | Availability, Confidentiality | |
| Jamming attack | Availability | |
| Flooding attack | Availability | |
| Packet Analysis attacks | Integrity, Confidentiality, Non-repudiation, Privacy | |
| Targeted layer: Device/sensor layer | ||
| Physical Sensor/Node tampering | All | |
| False data Injection | Integrity, Confidentiality, Non-repudiation, Privacy | |
| Resource Depletion Attacks (Battery drain, Sleep deprivation, Buffer overflow) | Availability | |
| Side-channel | Confidentiality, Non-repudiation, Privacy | |
| Hardware Trojan | All | |
| Eavesdropping | Confidentiality, Non-repudiation, Privacy | |
Note:
Each row represents a different type of attack, and the rows show their targeted layer, impact, and reference.
The evaluation metrics used for ML techniques.
| Metric | Description | Formula |
|---|---|---|
| Accuracy | Determines the performance of the model in recognizing all classes, respectively | |
| Sensitivity (Recall) | Measures the completeness, which is the percentage of positive predicted samples to the positive samples in dataset is depicted. | |
| Specificity (Precision) | Shows the exactness, in which the percentage of correctly positive predictive samples to all positive predictive samples by the model are calculated. | |
| False Positive Rate (FPR) | Measures the number of those normal network behaviors which are calculated as attack. | |
| Performance overhead | It is the calculation of any combination of (memory, CPU, energy) overhead taken by the ML techniques to perform a task. | |
Notes:
Each row represents a metric, and the columns show their description, and formula.
TP, True Positive; TN, True Negative; N, total number of samples; FN, False Negative; FP, False Positive.
Comparison between this survey and other related surveys.
| Year | References | IoT domain | Architecture | Threats | ML methods | Big data | ML for IoMT security | Systematic analysis |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | Generic | NA | NA | Discussed | NA | NA | NA | |
| 2020 | Generic | IoT architecture | IoT attacks | Discussed | NA | NA | NA | |
| 2020 | Generic | NA | IoT attacks | Discussed | Big data at cloud | NA | NA | |
| 2019 | IoMT | IoMT architecture | IoMT Security requirement | NA | NA | Partially discussed | NA | |
| 2020 | IoMT | IoMT architecture | IoMT attacks | NA | NA | Partially discussed | NA | |
| 2020 | IoMT | IoMT architecture | IoT attacks | NA | NA | NA | NA | |
| – | This study | IoMT | IoMT architecture | IoMT attacks | Discussed | Discussed | Discussed | Comprehensive and Systematic Review |
Note:
Each row shows a different related study, and the columns show their features.
Figure 1The keywords used in the Research Information Template (RIT).
The entire Mind Map shows the keywords used in the Research Information Template (RIT). The rectangular box at the middle represents the main keywords, while the square boxes represent the derived similar words from the main words. The oval shaped keywords are dervied from their previous sequare box keywords.
The searching queries and results achieved from five different databases.
| Searching texts vs databases | IEEE | SpringerLink | Scopus | Science direct | Web of science |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Machine Learning AND Medical Internet of Things AND Security | 89 | 3,431 | 63 | 2,459 | 33 |
| Machine Learning AND Medical Internet of Things AND Privacy | 37 | 1,093 | 43 | 1,494 | 31 |
| Machine Learning AND Medical Internet of Things AND Intrusion | 6 | 336 | 2 | 445 | 3 |
| Machine Learning AND Medical Internet of Things AND Attack | 13 | 1,225 | 2 | 1,203 | 18 |
| Machine Learning AND IoMT AND Security | 9 | 81 | 3 | 929 | 5 |
| Machine Learning AND IoMT AND Privacy | 8 | 44 | 3 | 78 | 6 |
| Machine Learning AND IoMT AND Intrusion | 0 | 8 | 1 | 21 | 1 |
| Machine Learning AND IoMT AND Attack | 0 | 33 | 64 | 5 | |
| Machine Learning AND Medical Cyber Physical system AND Security | 30 | 481 | 5 | 1,038 | 11 |
| Machine Learning AND Medical Cyber Physical system AND Privacy | 8 | 429 | 3 | 693 | 4 |
| Machine Learning AND Medical Cyber Physical system AND Intrusion | 6 | 321 | 3 | 301 | 4 |
| Machine Learning AND Medical Cyber Physical system AND Attack | 9 | 494 | 0 | 699 | 11 |
| Machine Learning AND Smart healthcare AND Security | 57 | 1,971 | 12 | 2,134 | 52 |
| Machine Learning AND Smart healthcare AND Privacy | 25 | 1,012 | 3 | 1,901 | 36 |
| Machine Learning AND Smart healthcare AND Intrusion | 7 | 334 | 1 | 431 | 21 |
| Machine Learning AND Smart healthcare AND Attack | 20 | 1,031 | 3 | 1,209 | 20 |
| Total including duplicates | 324 | 12,324 | 147 | 15,099 | 261 |
Note:
Each row shows different queries used for all databases, and the columns show their results. The searching queries and results achieved from five different databases.
Selection criteria of the papers at final stage.
| Criteria# | Questions | Answer |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Does the paper relevant to the topic? | Y/N |
| 2 | Does the work propose a machine learning related solution and method to solve a problem in the IoMT security and/or privacy? | Y/N |
| 3 | Is the paper published in scholarly journals, conferences, books? | Y/N |
Note:
Each row represent a criteria for selecting the papers, and the column shows the response.
Figure 2The search strategy used for selecting the research papers based on the PRISMA guideline.
The flow chart represents the procedure of searching in different databases using PRISMA guideline. It starts from top to bottom, showing each step of the paper selection and fileteration.
Figure 3Geographical distribution of the papers.
The pie chart shows the percentage of the papers by each country.
Figure 4Distribution of the papers by year.
Each Blue Bar represents the number of papers published in each year and the orange line shows the percentage of the reviewed papers in each single year.
Figure 5The type of analyzed papers used in the current research.
The pie chart shows the percentage of the analyzed papers in each catgory of Journal, Conference, and Book chapter.
Figure 6Distribution of the papers according to the publishers.
The curve shows the percentage of the analyzed papers that were published by each publisher.
Classification of papers based on ML category, medical device, and the IoMT layer.
The table shows a matrix representation of the paper’s classification to different categories. Classification of papers based on ML category, medical device, and the IoMT layer.
| ML category—medical device category | IoMT layer-References |
|---|---|
| Supervised ML—Implantable, wearable | |
| Supervised ML—Wearable, smart watches, smart fitness | |
| Unsupervised ML—Implantable, wearable | |
| Unsupervised ML—Wearable | |
| Unsupervised ML—ICD, Programmer | |
| Deep learning—Wearable | |
| Big data—Wearable |
Details of published studies on anomaly and attack detection to the sensors/medical devices.
| Ref. | Methods | Detection type | Good features | Limitations | Tools | Dataset info. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SMO | Anomaly detection | -high detection rate | -high computation overhead | Weka | -10 real | |
| Deep Learning | Anomaly based false alarm detection | -real time | -high computation overhead | Tensor flow and Keras in Python | John Radcliffe Hospital data | |
| neural network-based MLP | Anomaly based false alarm detection | -real time | -high memory requirement due to training overhead | -NI myRIO | UCI | |
| DWT and | Anomaly based false data detection | -high detection rate | -detection rate decreases when there is too much attack | MATLAB | The ECG dataset from MIT-PHYSIOBANK | |
| Decision tree, SVM and K-means | Anomaly-based attack detection | -high accuracy | -no validation | Castalia | Simulation data | |
| (K-S test) on external hardware device | malware Anomaly detection | -high TPR | -external device needs maintenance and the device itself could be hacked (stolen or lost) | -Open Syringe Pump | Testbed data | |
| a model is embedded on an external device | multi-layered anomaly detection. | -zero overhead on battery | -protecting only integrity | USRP | Testbed data | |
| ANN, DT, RF, and k-NN | Anomaly detection | -high accuracy | -high training overhead | MATLAB | A set of heath dataset from different sources | |
| PCA and Correlation Coefficient | Anomaly based faulty sensor data detection. | -real time | -energy, CPU usage is not considered | -AUDITmodule | MIMIC | |
| Statistical signal amplitude calculation | Anomaly based intrusion cancelation | -using more than one type of Sensor type | -not lightweight | MATLAB | real | |
| Classifiers (SVM, RF, K-NN, Decision Trees) and Regression | Anomaly detection for | -Low detection time | -Not lightweight | Weka | MIMIC dataset | |
| Time series approach | Anomaly based false data injection attack detection. | -High detection for single sensor | -Long detection time | Not given | MIMIC dataset | |
| combined ANN with Ensemble LinReg | Classification of anomalous and faulty sensor physiological data | -High TPR | -Not real-time | Weka | ECG dataset | |
| Otsu’s Thresholding, and Linear SVM | Sensor data modification detection. | -High precision | -Not real-time | MATLAB | (JDRF) (CGM) Clinical Trial dataset | |
| statistical and One class SVM | Rule and knowledge based anomaly attack detection. | -High TPR | -Layer III-V is useless | Not given | Self-created clinical data | |
| Deep Learning classifier | Attack prediction | -Classify different attacks | -Not lightweight | Keras with Theano in Python | Parkinson tremor |
Note:
Each row represent each paper under category anomaly and attack detection to the sensors/medical devices, and the columns show the characteristics that are used for evaluating them.
The summary of the studies reported on authentication and access control.
| References | Methods | Good features | Gaps and limitation | Tools | Data info |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Legendre approximation and MLP | -High testing accuracy | -High computational overhead for IMD | -MATLAB | ECG-ID dataset | |
| MLP | -Efficient | -Evaluation not given | Not given | Not given | |
| SVM and trust management | -Low resource consumption | -Performance overhead not calculated | Not given | Not available | |
| MLP, RF, SVM and Naïve bayes | -Low complexity | -Performance overhead not calculated | Weka | Stress Recognition in Automobile | |
| 2DPCA, LDA, and MapReduce | -Improved accuracy | -Performance overhead not calculated | Hadoop | MIT-BIH Database | |
| LOF model | -Improved accuracy in acceptance and rejection | -Not accurate when user’s behavior not stable | Samsung | Self-created | |
| Statistical filers, RF, KNN, | -Lightweight | -Performance overhead not calculated | -Motorola | Self-created | |
| A combination of filters ((KS)-test, PC, SD based filter) and SVM | -Use of hybrid biometric. | -Degradation of Non-Sedentary performance for highly active periods | MATLAB | NetHealth Study Dataset | |
| Cryptography, convolutional Neural network (CNN) | -End to end security | -Communication overhead is still high for medical devices | Not available | Not available | |
| a lightweight random projection technique | -Low complexity | -Rejection rate not calculated | OpenCV 3.6 in Python 3.4. | DB1 and DB2 of FVC2002 and FVC2004 | |
| Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) | -Lightweight | -Missing validation against attacks | -LabVIEW | ECG-ID dataset | |
| PSO, Blockchain, AES | -Higher secure transmission | -Key distribution in AES adds extra load on the channels | Not given | MMCBNU_6000 database |
Note:
Each row represents each paper under category authentication and access control, and the columns show the characteristics that are used for evaluating them.
Summary of the studies reported on intrusion and malware detection.
| Ref. | Method | Type of intrusion detection | Good features | Gaps and limitations | Tools (software & hardware) | Datasets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SVM | Anomaly and signature-based IDS | -High detection accuracy | -High memory overhead | R program | NSL-KDD | |
| a multivariate correlation analysis | Hybrid Anomaly and rule based IDS | -Improved accuracy | -High learning overhead | Not given | Not given | |
| Federated Learning | Anomaly based false data injection, data modification, DoS IDS | -Multiple attack detection | -Reduced accuracy and increased FPR in some cases | -Sci-kit Learn’s on Raspberry Pi’s | -MIMIC dataset from PhysioNet | |
| Hierarchical and distributed classifiers (NBC, KNN, SVM, RF and DT) | Anomaly based IDS | -High accuracy | -High training time for some methods | Castalia WBAN | Self-created simulated data | |
| feature selection (Laplacian scoring) | Signature based intrusion detection. | -Reduced the detection time | -Accuracy reduced upon selecting more features | Not given | MIT-BIH Arrhythmia dataset | |
| SAE is used for feature selection | Signature based intrusion detection | -Improved accuracy and detection overhead | -High training overhead | Not given | real CHS Source not given | |
| Feature selection using PCA and GWO with DL classifier | Signature based IDS | -High accuracy | -High Memory and CPU overhead | Not given | NSL-KDD | |
| multi-objective | -Signature based IDS | -Feature selection reduced the complexity | -Not lightweight | MATLAB | Self-created by simulation | |
| Data mining-based Association rule mining | -Anomaly based HIDS | -Ability to detect anomalous activity. | -Lacks model evaluation | -J2ME | Self-created | |
| Deep Belief Network (DBN) | -Anomaly based NIDS | -High accuracy | -FPR and performance overhead neglected | MATLAB | CICIDS2017 dataset | |
| Ensemble | -Anomaly based NIDS | -Lower latency compared with cloud-based | -Memory and CPU usage are not considered | -Python (scikit-learn, Tensorflow, Keras, Numpy, HDF5) | NSL-KDD dataset | |
| Machine Learning, Data mining, Blockchain | -Signature and Anomaly based Malware detection | Discussed current IoMT malware detection | Most papers are generic IoT especially Smart phone-based solutions. | Not given | Not given | |
| NFV/SDN, OC-SVM, and Naïve Bayes | -Anomaly and signature-based Ransomware detection | -Real time | -Not lightweight | -OpenICE | Self-created real | |
| Deep-Q-Network (LDQN) | -Signature based malware detection | -High detection rate | -FPR, Memory usage are not considered | NS2 simulator | Simulated data | |
| Different ML techniques | -Privacy attack detection | -Improved performance | -Still low accuracy | Not given | rsEEG data |
Note:
Each row represents a paper under category intrusion and malware detection, and the columns show the characteristics that are used for evaluating them.
Figure 7Papers distribution by the direction and problem-solving domain.
The pie chart shows the direction of studies. The percentage of the papers for each direction of study is given in the chart.
Figure 8The type of data used by the researchers to conduct their research.
The pie chart shows the percentage of the papers in terms of the type of the data used for their analysis.
Figure 9Software and tools used by the studies.
The pie chart shows the percentage of different tools and software which were used by the reviewed studies.
Figure 10Devices and hardware tools used in the studies.
The bar chart shows the number of hardware tools used by the analyzed studies.
Figure 11Analysis of the studies in terms of (A) complexity and (B) real time analysis.
The pie chart (A) shows the percentage of the papers in terms of complexity {lightweight, heavy, low complex} The pie chart (B) shows the percentage of the analyzed papers based on their real time feature {real time, not real time (heavy), low time complex}.
Figure 12Details of the studies in terms of placement.
The chart shows the percentage of the papers based on their placement.