| Literature DB >> 33782121 |
Jason A Okonofua1, Kimia Saadatian2, Joseph Ocampo2, Michael Ruiz2, Perfecta Delgado Oxholm3.
Abstract
Incarceration is a pervasive issue in the United States that is enormously costly to families, communities, and society at large. The path from prison back to prison may depend on the relationship a person has with their probation or parole officer (PPO). If the relationship lacks appropriate care and trust, violations and recidivism (return to jail or prison) may be more likely to occur. Here, we test whether an "empathic supervision" intervention with PPOs-that aims to reduce collective blame against and promote empathy for the perspectives of adults on probation or parole (APPs)-can reduce rates of violations and recidivism. The intervention highlights the unreasonable expectation that all APPs will reoffend (collective blame) and the benefits of empathy-valuing APPs' perspectives. Using both within-subject (monthly official records for 10 mo) and between-subject (treatment versus control) comparisons in a longitudinal study with PPOs in a large US city (N PPOs = 216; N APPs =∼20,478), we find that the empathic supervision intervention reduced collective blame against APPs 10 mo postintervention and reduced between-subject violations and recidivism, a 13% reduction that would translate to less taxpayer costs if scaled. Together, these findings illustrate that very low-cost psychological interventions that target empathy in relationships can be cost effective and combat important societal outcomes in a lasting manner.Entities:
Keywords: intervention; parole; probation; recidivism; relationships
Year: 2021 PMID: 33782121 PMCID: PMC8040791 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2018036118
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A ISSN: 0027-8424 Impact factor: 11.205
Growth curve models treated with random effects for subject intercepts and the linear and/or quadratic effect of time (subject level), as well as accounting for first-order autoregression predicting recidivism (Model 1) and violations (Model 2) while controlling for two baseline months
| Dependent variable | ||
| Recidivism (Model 1) | Violations (Model 2) | |
| Constant | 22.09*** | 11.61*** |
| (21.04, 23.15) | (10.66, 12.57) | |
| Officer condition | −0.57 | −1.77* |
| (−2.07, 0.93) | (−3.12, −0.41) | |
| Time (linear) | 0.48*** | 0.51* |
| (0.30, 0.67) | (0.05, 0.97) | |
| Time (quadratic) | 0.005 | |
| (−0.04, 0.05) | ||
| Baseline month 1 | 0.42*** | 0.42*** |
| (0.23, 0.61) | (0.24, 0.61) | |
| Baseline month 2 | 0.34*** | 0.48*** |
| (0.16, 0.52) | (0.29, 0.66) | |
| Condition × time (linear) | −0.32* | −0.14 |
| (−0.58, −0.05) | (−0.79, 0.51) | |
| Condition × time (quadratic) | 0.01 | |
| (−0.05, 0.07) | ||
| Subject intercept SD | 2.94 | 3.06 |
| Time (linear) SD | 0.52 | 1.33 |
| Time (quadratic) SD | 0.07 | |
| Correlation(intercept, time [L]) | 0.94 | 0.29 |
| Correlation(intercept, time [Q]) | −0.53 | |
| Correlation(time [L], time [Q]) | −0.78 | |
| First-order autoregressive Φ | 0.58 | 0.28 |
| Observations | 1,921 | 2,114 |
| Log likelihood | −5,688.55 | −6,410.12 |
| Akaike information criterion | 11,399.10 | 12,852.24 |
| Bayesian information criterion | 11,460.27 | 12,942.74 |
The outcomes are based on a proportion calculated for each officer, because the department only records proportions for officers, not records for individual people under their supervision. Estimate of regression β coefficients (not in parentheses) and 95% confidence intervals (in parentheses) are reported for each outcome.
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, and ***P < 0.001.
Fig. 1.Plot of treatment effects data from a linear mixed-growth model treated with random effects for subject intercepts and the linear effect of time (subject level), as well as accounting for first-order autoregression on the proportion of APPs under PPOs’ supervision who are in custody (“Recidivism”) and a quadratic mixed-growth model treated with random effects for subject intercepts and the quadratic effect of time (subject-level), as well as accounting for first-order autoregression on the proportion of APPs under PPOs with potential direct violations to the terms of probation or parole (“Violations”), while controlling for respective data for two baseline months. On the x-axis, “0” through “9” are the 10 mo following the treatment period, such that “0” is the first postintervention month and “9” is the 10th postintervention month.
Fig. 2.Plot of treatment effects on collective blame against adults on probation or parole 10 mo postintervention. The scale is 0 to 100. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.