Christoffer Bjerre Haase1,2, Margaret Bearman2, John Brodersen1,3, Klaus Hoeyer1, Torsten Risor1,4. 1. Department of Public Health, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. 2. Centre for Research in Assessment and Digital Learning (CRADLE), Deakin University, Australia. 3. Primary Health Care Research Unit, Region Zealand, Denmark. 4. Department of Community Medicine, UiT The Arctic University of Norway, Norway.
Abstract
AIMS: In three days at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Copenhagen Emergency Medical Services developed a digital diagnostic device. The purpose was to assess and triage potential COVID-19 symptoms and to reduce the number of calls to public health-care helplines. The device was used almost 150,000 times in a few weeks and was described by politicians and administrators as a solution and success. However, high usage cannot serve as the sole criterion of success. What might be adequate criteria? And should digital triage for citizens by default be considered low risk? METHODS: This paper reflects on the uncertain aspects of the performance, risks and issues of accountability pertaining to the digital diagnostic device in order to draw lessons for future improvements. The analysis is based on the principles of evidence-based medicine (EBM), the EU and US regulations of medical devices and the taxonomy of uncertainty in health care by Han et al. RESULTS: Lessons for future digital devices are (a) the need for clear criteria of success, (b) the importance of awareness of other severe diseases when triaging, (c) the priority of designing the device to collect data for evaluation and (d) clear allocation of responsibilities. CONCLUSIONS: A device meant to substitute triage for citizens according to its own criteria of success should not by default be considered as low risk. In a pandemic age dependent on digitalisation, it is therefore important not to abandon the ethos of EBM, but instead to prepare the ground for new ways of building evidence of effect.
AIMS: In three days at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Copenhagen Emergency Medical Services developed a digital diagnostic device. The purpose was to assess and triage potential COVID-19 symptoms and to reduce the number of calls to public health-care helplines. The device was used almost 150,000 times in a few weeks and was described by politicians and administrators as a solution and success. However, high usage cannot serve as the sole criterion of success. What might be adequate criteria? And should digital triage for citizens by default be considered low risk? METHODS: This paper reflects on the uncertain aspects of the performance, risks and issues of accountability pertaining to the digital diagnostic device in order to draw lessons for future improvements. The analysis is based on the principles of evidence-based medicine (EBM), the EU and US regulations of medical devices and the taxonomy of uncertainty in health care by Han et al. RESULTS: Lessons for future digital devices are (a) the need for clear criteria of success, (b) the importance of awareness of other severe diseases when triaging, (c) the priority of designing the device to collect data for evaluation and (d) clear allocation of responsibilities. CONCLUSIONS: A device meant to substitute triage for citizens according to its own criteria of success should not by default be considered as low risk. In a pandemic age dependent on digitalisation, it is therefore important not to abandon the ethos of EBM, but instead to prepare the ground for new ways of building evidence of effect.
Entities:
Keywords:
COVID-19; Chatbot; acute primary health care; diagnostics; digital diagnostic device; digitalisation; evidence-based medicine; regulations; symptom checker; uncertainty
Right at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Copenhagen Emergency Medical
Services (CEMS) developed a digital diagnostic device to assess symptoms of
infection [1]. In just
three days, this device was launched in the Capital Region of Denmark. A week later,
the device was implemented nationwide in Denmark and was used more than 90,000 times
in its first week and almost 150,000 times in the second week. The purpose of the
device was presented as twofold [1-4]: (a) to help individual citizens in
assessing whether symptoms they experienced were potentially COVID-19 related and to
advise them when and where to seek further medical assistance; and (b) to reduce the
number of calls to public health-care helplines. Immediately, politicians and
administrators described this digital diagnostic device in press releases as ‘a new
digital solution from the Regions’, which ‘has been a great success’ [4,5]. However, frequent use of the device may
not equal alleviation of pressure on the helplines; ‘see a doctor’ is indeed likely
advice provided by the device. If high usage is not an adequate criterion of
success, what would be? And should such a device by default be considered low
risk?With a rapid turn to digital solutions in a pandemic age, there is a need to move
beyond the hype [6-8] and base application of possibilities on
clear criteria for evidence of effect. This paper reflects on the uncertain aspects
of the performance, safety risks and accountability of the digital diagnostic device
in order to draw such lessons for the future.
Digital devices in health care and the absence of evidence
CEMS initiated the development of the device on 12 March 2020, and policy support and
research grants have allowed for an ongoing upgrade of the device [9]. Therefore, its concrete
content elements have changed over time. With support of their software provider –
Microsoft – CEMS designed the device as a simple decision tree (Figure 1) inspired by the decision trees
normally used in their telephone assessments of symptoms [1]. The helplines are the entry point into
the primary and secondary health-care services in Denmark outside of regular GP
office hours.
Figure 1.
The decision tree of the Danish COVID-19 ‘chatbot’, by the Copenhagen
Emergency Medical Services (CEMS). The figure is based on the first version
of the launched device and the decision tree published by CEMS elsewhere
[1].
The decision tree of the Danish COVID-19 ‘chatbot’, by the Copenhagen
Emergency Medical Services (CEMS). The figure is based on the first version
of the launched device and the decision tree published by CEMS elsewhere
[1].The initiative represents a digital response to the challenges of diagnostics and
triage. When patients facing serious illness decide which action to take, it can
have the gravest implications. They must make the right choice. However, for digital
devices, clinical standards as known from evidence-based medicine (EBM) are not in
place [10]. Unlike drugs,
software must continuously be developed and prove its efficiency through use. In
response to our inquiries, we have been informed that this particular device was not
subject to EU regulations of medical devices, as it was declared not to be ‘intended
by its manufacturer to be used specifically for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes’
[11]. The Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) responded that they would categorise the device as ‘lower
risk’ for which the FDA does not intend to enforce requirements under the FDA&C
Act at the moment [12].The device was also presented as a ‘chatbot’, although it does not conduct an actual
written or oral conversation with the user, which usually defines chatbots [13,14]. The device is more accurately
classified as a computerised diagnostic decision support, widely known as a symptom
checker [15]. These are
typically available online or as apps [16]. Symptom checkers have been used in
other countries to manage COVID-19 [17]. So far, however, uncertainty prevails
about their effects [16,18]. A
systematic review found variation between symptoms checkers but relatively strong
evidence that they are inferior in triage compared to health professionals [18]. They are mostly more
cautious, which should work against the goal of minimising pressure on helplines.
The review found little evidence of cost-effectiveness and patient compliance [18].
Lessons for future digital devices
With little evidence and high levels of urgency, it is important to help developers
to be better prepared for digital responses to pandemic threats. Since diagnostic
uncertainty is at the heart of triage function, we draw on the taxonomy of
uncertainty in health care by Han et al. [19] and combine it with the principles of
EBM and the EU and US regulations of medical devices.Based on the available information also graciously offered by the developers about
the purposes, design and success of the device, the following elements contain
lessons for the future:(1) Clear criteria of successThe stated criterion of success is ‘frequent use’, but this is insufficient
when a device intervenes in the diagnostic process. Criteria should be based
on assessments of risks and benefits that includes long-term consequences –
also for other affected actors. In this case, the appropriateness of
recommendations should be a criterion of success.(2) What if the users don’t have COVID-19 but some other serious
condition?The scope of the device is limited to detection of COVID-19 (Figure 1).
Nonetheless, users may be experiencing symptoms of other potentially acute,
fatal and relatively easily treatable diseases, such as meningitis or acute
coronary syndrome, which are not appropriately assessed in the device.
During a pandemic, it is important not to expose users to the risk of
overlooking symptoms from severe diseases not related to COVID-19. Thus,
interventions such as this device should not by default be considered low
risk.(3) Lack of possibility to evaluate the impact of the
deviceThe device collects minimum feedback from users in a form of comments and
answers about their demographic. Since software should prove its effect
through use, it is important to design it with a plan for appropriate data
collection to document achievement of the stated criteria of success. This
device did not collect sufficient data to evaluate its effect. Therefore,
the impact of the device should not be considered low risk.(4) No accountability for consequences of use of the deviceClear allocation of responsibilities could stimulate additional critical
thoughts during the development phase and provide users with appropriate
contact points in case of concerns or challenges. Accountability may prompt
politicians, administrators and health-care workers to ensure the quality
control of unregulated medical devices. Finally, accountability has a
symbolic value with respect to maintaining public trust in pandemic
situations (and clinical matters in general).Despite these concerns, it is remarkable how quickly the device was developed and
implemented, especially at the beginning of the outbreak in Denmark, when every
institution and workplace were in a state of emergency. Further, CEMS cannot be
accountable for the many uncertain aspects of a new disease, including symptoms,
prognosis and treatment. Finally, if CEMS is forced to take action on overloaded
helplines, they cannot be required to meet the same demands that commercial devices
do or guidelines that takes years to produce and formulate. The device should be
seen in this specific context, which was – and is – extraordinary.However, based on the mentioned lessons, a device meant to substitute triage for
citizens should not by default be considered low risk. In a pandemic age dependent
on digitalisation, developers, initiators and health authorities could take
advantage of the overall principles of EBM and medical device regulations (Table I). The suggested
step-wise approach does not require many resources. Sometimes you have to build the
boat while sailing [20,21], but
it only sustains the need for gathering evidence along the way too, while taking
into account how privacy concerns and user agreements may significantly hinder or
bias the collection of the aimed evidence in practice. We therefore need to update
existing scientific and regulatory principles and facilitate their easy use in order
to ensure that future devices have the intended performance and safety.
Table I.
Suggested approach before implementation of a non-regulated digital
diagnostic device.
(1) Information: Be transparent and explicit by
providing easily understandable and easily accessible
information to the users and other relevant actors about aspects
of the device in following order:(2) Aim:
State all aims of the device, including clearly defined criteria
of achieving those aims.(3) Safety risks and
implications for others: State any individual or
societal safety risks of using the device, as well as
consequences for any actors who may be directly or indirectly
affected by the device.(4) Before
implementation: Describe how aims, safety risks and
implications for others have been investigated and evaluated
before implementation. Make it clear if any aspects of aims,
safety or implications for others have not been investigated and
evaluated.(5) Monitoring and
re-evaluation: Describe the plan of how to
measure/monitor and re-evaluate each of the stated aspects of
aims, safety and implications for others. Make it clear if an
aspect is planned not to be measured/monitored and
re-evaluated.(6) Contact: Provide
contact information for further questions and suggestions for
improvements.(7) Accountability:
Clarify which institution/company/organisation is responsible
for steps 1–6.
The information provided by the approach outlined above should be
publically accessible along with the device to inform users and other
affected actors. The approach is based on principles of evidence-based
medicine, the EU and US regulations of medical devices and the taxonomy
of uncertainty in health care by Han et al. [10,12,19].
Suggested approach before implementation of a non-regulated digital
diagnostic device.The information provided by the approach outlined above should be
publically accessible along with the device to inform users and other
affected actors. The approach is based on principles of evidence-based
medicine, the EU and US regulations of medical devices and the taxonomy
of uncertainty in health care by Han et al. [10,12,19].
Authors: Gordon H Guyatt; Andrew D Oxman; Holger J Schünemann; Peter Tugwell; Andre Knottnerus Journal: J Clin Epidemiol Date: 2010-12-24 Impact factor: 6.437
Authors: Duncan Chambers; Anna J Cantrell; Maxine Johnson; Louise Preston; Susan K Baxter; Andrew Booth; Janette Turner Journal: BMJ Open Date: 2019-08-01 Impact factor: 2.692
Authors: Anna Essén; Ariel D Stern; Christoffer Bjerre Haase; Josip Car; Felix Greaves; Dragana Paparova; Steven Vandeput; Rik Wehrens; David W Bates Journal: NPJ Digit Med Date: 2022-03-18