| Literature DB >> 32714949 |
Jean-Loup Rault1, Sara Hintze2, Irene Camerlink1, Jason Richard Yee1.
Abstract
Positive welfare and related terms such as good welfare, happiness, and a good life are increasingly used in the animal welfare science literature. Overall, they highlight the welfare benefits of providing animals opportunities for positive experiences, beyond the alleviation of suffering. However, the various terms remain loosely defined and are sometimes used interchangeably, resulting in discrepancy. In this perspective article, we lay out the terms and concepts used in the literature. We identify two distinct views: "hedonic positive welfare," arising from likes and wants and their positive outcomes on welfare; and "positive welfare balance," as an overall positive welfare state based on positive experiences outweighing negative ones. Eudaimonia, satisfaction with one's life, may emerge as a third view. We propose a framework that is applicable across the different views. The "Vienna Framework" outlines different facets: frequency, duration, arousal, context, previous experience, individual differences, sense of agency, and long-term benefit. The framework aims to encourage researchers to consider the relevance of these facets for their own research, to indicate how the facets are affected by different interventions (e.g., greater sense of agency in enriched compared to non-enriched animals), or to compare different topics with respect to the different facets (e.g., high arousal of play behavior and low arousal of social affiliation). We encourage researchers to carefully consider and clearly state how their work falls along these views and facets, conceptually, and operationally. This should prevent dilution of the meaning of positive welfare and thereby preserve its potential to improve the welfare of animals.Entities:
Keywords: animal welfare; good life; happiness; life worth living; quality of life; reward; well-being
Year: 2020 PMID: 32714949 PMCID: PMC7343720 DOI: 10.3389/fvets.2020.00370
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Front Vet Sci ISSN: 2297-1769
Examples of terms and concepts related to positive welfare.
| Positive emotions | “Emotions associated with positively reinforcing situations” ( | “Autonomic emotional responses do not define welfare in themselves […]. They are only useful in the assessment of an animal's emotional state if they can be shown to be reliably linked to situations that animals find negatively [or positively] reinforcing.” ( |
| Positive affective states | “States that are experienced as pleasant” ( | Linking (on a two-dimensional scale) negative affect to survival situations (what the animal needs) and positive affect to opportunity situations (what the animal wants/likes) ( |
| Animal pleasure | Indirectly stated: | Observable by (rewarding) behavior, like playing, eating, mating and touching ( |
| Happiness | “How animals feel most of the time, i.e., | “Happiness is a long-term, typically stable state, which reflects how one feels most of the time, that is, the typical level of affect.” It is measurable by behavior, vocalizations and physiological correlates ( |
| Good welfare | “An animal experiences good welfare if the animal is healthy, comfortable, well-nourished, safe, is not suffering from unpleasant states such as pain, fear and distress, and is able to express behaviors that are important for its physical and mental state” ( | “Good animal welfare requires disease prevention and appropriate veterinary care, shelter, management and nutrition, a stimulating and safe environment, humane handling and humane slaughter or killing” ( |
| Positive welfare | What the animal likes (positive affective state) and what the animal wants (positive motivation to obtain a resource) ( | Positive welfare should be evaluated on the basis of input (physical resources that are required or valued by an animal) as well as output (positive outcomes such as behavioral responses, cognitive processes and physiological markers) ( |
| Quality of life (QoL) | “Quality of life is a multidimensional, experiential continuum. It comprises an array of affective states, broadly classifiable as comfort-discomfort and pleasure states. […] Quality of life is a uniquely individual experience and should be measured from the perspective of the individual” ( | QoL includes subjective experience, affect, and nature of the individual experiences. Concepts: (dis)comfort, needs, control, social relationships, health, and stress. McMillan proposes that in animals QoL is solely based on affect, and |
| A life worth living | “A life worth living is a statement about an animal's quality of life” […]. “A socially acceptable quality of life” ( | All vital needs, most mental needs and some wants are met. |
| A good life | The concept of “a good life” recognizes the distinction that an animal's quality of life is over and beyond that of a life worth living. Also defined as ‘welfare clearly beyond minimum [UK] legal standards' ( | All vital needs, all mental needs and most wants are met. Good substantially |
Definitions and approaches were retrieved from a structured literature search based on the first use of the term or the most clearly described term, in order to provide a concise selection that illustrates the heterogeneous, and sometimes overlapping, terminology and concepts used to date. Underlined words or phrases gave rise to the two views: “hedonic positive welfare” and “positive welfare balance”.
Figure 1The “Vienna Framework.” The framework contains various parameters (facets) that are adjustable to represent a topic. Researchers are encouraged to utilize the discriminatory power of the facets by considering the importance of each facet to their research. Doing so may reveal tacit assumptions that may not be of primary interest but may nonetheless influence their research. Facets should be utilized as a heuristic tool by deciding the extent to which the facet matters, as conceptualized by a particular researcher. However, researchers are cautioned against using the surface area as a direct indicator of welfare output because facet values are not referenced to any validated metric, and because a high value means a facet matters more for the topic but does not necessarily mean greater welfare (e.g., for Context-specificity or Individual differences). Each of the three framework representations shows a different topic – (A) giving treats, (B) social play, and (C) free-range - to provide an example of how to employ the facets. For example, Frequency may matter more for the topic of Treats given the number of treats may vary widely; whereas Duration may matter less given the duration of eating each treat varies minimally. Arousal is typically high in Social play as it includes behaviors such as chasing, but typically low for Social huddling as it includes behaviors such as sleeping. Context-specificity may matter more for Social play and Free-range, as the resultant outcome on welfare depends on the social context in Social play and the broader environmental context in Free-range; in contrast, Treats probably result in a comparable welfare outcome regardless of the context. Previous experience may matter more for Social play if animals in the study have a rich history of group living, but may matter less if animals have a standardized or uniform social history; and may matter less for Treats and Free-range as these provisions are thought to improve welfare regardless of their history with them. Individual differences may matter more to Social play as animals may vary on sociability, ranging from shy to gregarious, and similarly for Free-range; but may matter less to Treats as animals tend to respond to these provisions more uniformly. A Sense of agency is encouraged in Free-range as the animal engages with its environment, discouraged in offering Treats as the animal passively receives Treats, or conditional in Social play as it partly depends upon the potential play partner. Long-term benefit should be utilized by determining whether the topic has the potential to provide adaptive advantages, as play behavior has been suggested as “training for the unexpected” (37), but the provision of Treats may not lead to adaptive advantages.