| Literature DB >> 32578915 |
Peter Jones1, Sally Roberts2, Cheri Hotu3, Sinan Kamona4.
Abstract
OBJECTIVE: Concerns have been raised by healthcare organisations in New Zealand that routine mask use by healthcare workers (HCW) may increase the risk of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 through increased face touching. Routine mask use by frontline HCW was not recommended when seeing 'low risk' patients. The aim of this review was to determine the carriage of respiratory viruses on facemasks used by HCW.Entities:
Keywords: contamination; healthcare workers; mask; review, systematic; virus
Mesh:
Year: 2020 PMID: 32578915 PMCID: PMC7361325 DOI: 10.1111/1742-6723.13581
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Emerg Med Australas ISSN: 1742-6723 Impact factor: 2.279
Figure 1Study selection.
Studies reporting virus detection on the facemasks of HCW
| Study, | Sampling and detection method | Virus detected | Proportion of masks with detectable virus | CRI | Risk of bias |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Chughtai 2019 Main study China, Respiratory, internal medicine and paediatric wards |
Prospective observational study Standard medical mask used continuously 99/148 used same mask >6 h 49/148 used mask ≤6 h Laboratory experiments to identify position on mask more likely to have virus Masks collected in zip lock bags and frozen until tested. Outer layer of mask removed and placed in phosphate buffered saline to elute viral particle. Centrifuged and filtrate used for PCR. Viral DNA/RNA extracted using Kingfisher Flex 96 viral purification kit. rtPCR to amplify 15 target genes including Influenza A/B; Rhinovirus, RSV, Corona virus, Metapneumovirus |
Adenovirus 7 Bocavirus 2 Metapneumovirus 1 Influenza B and Parainfluenza 1 Influenza B and H1N1 1 RSV 2 Parainfluenza 1 |
10 excluded for multiple samples, 148 analysed 15/148 (10.1%, 95% CI 6–16%) positive >6 h 14/99 (14%, 95% CI 8–22%) ≤6 h 1/49 (2%, 95% CI 0–15%) Adjusted analysis found independent associations with Continuous mask use: more than 6 h OR 7.9 (95% CI 1.01–62) and Seeing more than 25 patients a shift OR 5 (95% CI 1.35–18.6) | Not reported |
Low for sampling Unclear for detection (no mention of limit of detection) Low for reporting |
|
Chughtai 2019 Pilot study |
Prospective observational study Standard medical mask for at least 30 min Laboratory experiments to identify mask sites likely to have virus. Masks divided into six sections, samples from the upper 3 sections x 12 masks ( Viral extraction as above Total nucleic acid extracted on Kingfisher Flex using MagNA Pure total Nucleic Acid Isolation Kit. Respiratory virus detected using the Seegene Allplex Respiratory Panel Assay | Enterovirus |
3/36 samples positive (two from outer sections, one from middle section). Unclear if these were from the same or different masks, so virus detection per mask ranges from 1 to 3 of 12 1/12 (8.3%, 95% CI 0–38%) to 3/12 (25%, 95% CI 8–54%) | Not reported |
Unclear for sampling and detection (no mention of limit of detection) Low for reporting |
|
Phan 2019 USA, Inpatient wards caring for 52 CRI patients with Influenza A ( Influenza B ( Rhinovirus ( Parainfluenza ( Coronavirus ( RSV ( Adenovirus ( |
Prospective observational study Type of mask not stated Staff were swabbed with Copan swabs before and after doffing masks and other PPE, including a 2 cm area of the face where the mask edge had been Samples stored on ice. RNA extracted from swab. Preamplification and qPCR analysis, Ct = 40 was limit of detection |
Influenza 6/42 masks 2/21 faces Rhinovirus 1/19 masks 0/8 faces ‘Other’ 1/7 masks 0/1 faces |
59 staff with 70 care episodes 8/68 (12%, 95% CI 6–22%) positive, mean 25 viral copies/cm3 Post doffing: 2/30 6.6% (95% CI 1–22%) faces positive | Not reported |
Low for sampling and detection Low for reporting |
|
Rule 2018 USA, |
Prospective observational study Staff wore bioaerosol samplers Surgical Masks and FFR (N95), worn for 6 h Masked in zip‐lock bags stored frozen until analysed 25 mm coupon punched from mask, four coupons placed in 8 mL Hanks solution. Viral particles eluted overnight at 4°C MagMax‐96 viral isolation kit Final viral volume 32 μL, transcribed to cDNA for qPCR analysis, Limit of detection 10 viral copies per sample | Influenza A |
30 staff 12/128 FFR analysed (9.4%) 0/205 Surgical masks analysed (0%) 3/12 FFR 25% (95% CI 8–54%), mean 20 viral copies/cm2 ‘low’ | Not reported |
High for sampling and detection (only used masks with high risk of contamination) Low for reporting |
|
Ahrenholz 2018 USA, |
Prospective observational study Surgical masks Surgical mask worn at start of shift for 10 min as control Surgical mask worn after ILI patient stored frozen for analysis Surgical masks worn for <30 to >60 min on any day (much variation) 25 mm coupon punched from mask, four coupons placed in 8 mL Hanks solution. Viral particles eluted overnight at 4°C MagMax‐96 viral isolation kit Final viral volume 40 μL, transcribed to cDNA for qPCR analysis. Limit of detection 10 viral copies per sample | Influenza |
12 staff 295/381 surgical masks submitted for analysis 43/295 study surgical masks analysed (15%), including all 4 directly exposed to cough/sneeze 11/11 controls analysed (100%) 0/43 0% (95% CI 0–10%) study surgical masks positive 0/11 0% (95% CI 0–30%) control surgical masks positive | Not reported |
High for sampling and detection (only sampled 15% of available masks) Low for reporting |
CRI, clinical respiratory illness; FFR, filtering facepiece respirator; HCW, healthcare workers; OR, odds ratio; qPCR, quantitative polymerase chain reaction.
Figure 2Proportion of virus detection on facemasks worn by healthcare workers.