Literature DB >> 32165059

Evaluating for-profit public benefit corporations as an additional structure for antibiotic development and commercialization.

Kevin Outterson1, John H Rex2.   

Abstract

While antibiotics are a key infrastructure underpinning modern medicine, evolution will continue to undermine their effectiveness, requiring continuous investment to sustain antibiotic effectiveness. The antibiotic R&D ecosystem is in peril, moving towards collapse. Key stakeholders have identified pull incentives such as Market Entry Rewards or subscription models as the key long-term solution. If substantial Market Entry Rewards or other pull incentives become possible, there is every reason to expect that for-profit companies will return to the antibiotic field. However, the political and financial will to develop such Market Entry Rewards or other similar incentives may be difficult to muster in the timeframes needed to prevent further diminishment of antibiotic research and development, especially if large drug companies are seen as substantial beneficiaries of these taxpayer-funded pull incentives. Bridging solutions are required from private actors in the interim. This article explores potential solutions led by private actors, including (1) traditional for-profit companies; (2) non-profit enterprises; and (3) public benefit corporations with lower profit expectations, akin to a public utility. All face similar commercial struggles, but nonprofits and public benefit corporations can accept lower profit expectations and might be more politically attractive recipients of pull incentives.
Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Year:  2020        PMID: 32165059     DOI: 10.1016/j.trsl.2020.02.006

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Transl Res        ISSN: 1878-1810            Impact factor:   7.012


  4 in total

1.  Patient Access in 14 High-Income Countries to New Antibacterials Approved by the US Food and Drug Administration, European Medicines Agency, Japanese Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency, or Health Canada, 2010-2020.

Authors:  Kevin Outterson; Ebiowei S F Orubu; John Rex; Christine Årdal; Muhammad H Zaman
Journal:  Clin Infect Dis       Date:  2022-04-09       Impact factor: 20.999

2.  Optimal subscription models to pay for antibiotics.

Authors:  Euan Barlow; Alec Morton; Itamar Megiddo; Abigail Colson
Journal:  Soc Sci Med       Date:  2022-02-16       Impact factor: 4.634

3.  A Nonprofit Drug Development Model Is Part of the Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) Solution.

Authors:  Laura J V Piddock; Jean-Pierre Paccaud; Seamus O'Brien; Michelle Childs; Rohit Malpani; Manica Balasegaram
Journal:  Clin Infect Dis       Date:  2022-05-30       Impact factor: 20.999

4.  There is no market for new antibiotics: this allows an open approach to research and development.

Authors:  Dana M Klug; Fahima I M Idiris; Mark A T Blaskovich; Frank von Delft; Christopher G Dowson; Claas Kirchhelle; Adam P Roberts; Andrew C Singer; Matthew H Todd
Journal:  Wellcome Open Res       Date:  2021-06-11
  4 in total

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