Literature DB >> 30485292

Risk of poultry compartments for transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza.

T J Hagenaars1, G J Boender1, R H M Bergevoet2, H J W van Roermund1.   

Abstract

When outbreaks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) occur in OIE member countries with until then disease-free status, member countries can use 'compartmentalisation'. A compartment may be defined as a subset of farms under a common management system, complying with certain stringent surveillance, control and biosecurity measures, and based on that may receive a disease-free status. Based on this disease-free status the compartment is exempted from certain transport restrictions coming into force in case of outbreaks occurring in the country. For deciding whether a candidate compartment is granted official compartment status, it is relevant to assess the additional HPAI transmission risks that would arise due to the exemptions granted. These risks consist of both additional local transmission risks as well as the additional risk of a 'jump' of HPAI infection from one poultry area, via the compartment, to another area. Here such risk assessment is carried out using a spatial mathematical model for between-farm transmission in the Netherlands, yielding insight in the roles of compartment composition and contact structure and identify relevant evaluation criteria for granting HPAI compartment status. At the core of this model are transmission probabilities associated with indirect between-farm contacts, e.g. through feed delivery, egg collection and professional visitors. These probabilities were estimated from Dutch epidemic outbreak data in earlier work. The additional risk of a jump of HPAI from one area, via the compartment, to another area is calculated relative to the direct jump risk. The results show that additional transmission risks caused by a compartment to other farms are mainly dependent on the distance of densely populated poultry areas (DPPAs) to the nearest compartment farm. Apart from conditions on these distances, we also recommend specific routing requirements for transport and other movements within the compartment.

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Year:  2018        PMID: 30485292      PMCID: PMC6261543          DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0207076

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  PLoS One        ISSN: 1932-6203            Impact factor:   3.240


  10 in total

1.  Surveillance and compartmentalisation as a tool to control avian influenza.

Authors:  C Zepeda
Journal:  Dev Biol (Basel)       Date:  2006

Review 2.  The concept of compartmentalisation.

Authors:  A Scott; C Zepeda; L Garber; J Smith; D Swayne; A Rhorer; J Kellar; A Shimshony; H Batho; V Caporale; A Giovannini
Journal:  Rev Sci Tech       Date:  2006-12       Impact factor: 1.181

Review 3.  OIE standards and guidelines related to trade and poultry diseases.

Authors:  C Bruschke; B Vallat
Journal:  Rev Sci Tech       Date:  2008-12       Impact factor: 1.181

Review 4.  Compartmentalisation and zoning: the Dutch perspective.

Authors:  E A A C Gemmeke; H Batho; E Bonbon; P W de Leeuw; C Bruschke
Journal:  Rev Sci Tech       Date:  2008-12       Impact factor: 1.181

5.  Controlling highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks: An epidemiological and economic model analysis.

Authors:  J A Backer; H J W van Roermund; E A J Fischer; M A P M van Asseldonk; R H M Bergevoet
Journal:  Prev Vet Med       Date:  2015-06-06       Impact factor: 2.670

Review 6.  Zoning and compartmentalisation as risk mitigation measures: an example from poultry production.

Authors:  L Ratananakorn; D Wilson
Journal:  Rev Sci Tech       Date:  2011-04       Impact factor: 1.181

7.  Chicken faeces garden fertilizer: possible source of human avian influenza H5N1 infection.

Authors:  I N Kandun; G Samaan; S Harun; W H Purba; E Sariwati; C Septiawati; M Silitonga; N P I Dharmayanti; P M Kelly; T Wandra
Journal:  Zoonoses Public Health       Date:  2009-11-13       Impact factor: 2.702

8.  Estimating the per-contact probability of infection by highly pathogenic avian influenza (H7N7) virus during the 2003 epidemic in The Netherlands.

Authors:  Amos Ssematimba; Armin R W Elbers; Thomas J Hagenaars; Mart C M de Jong
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2012-07-13       Impact factor: 3.240

9.  Risk maps for the spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza in poultry.

Authors:  Gert Jan Boender; Thomas J Hagenaars; Annemarie Bouma; Gonnie Nodelijk; Armin R W Elbers; Mart C M de Jong; Michiel van Boven
Journal:  PLoS Comput Biol       Date:  2007-03-05       Impact factor: 4.475

10.  A metapopulation model for highly pathogenic avian influenza: implications for compartmentalization as a control measure.

Authors:  S Nickbakhsh; L Matthews; S W J Reid; R R Kao
Journal:  Epidemiol Infect       Date:  2013-12-05       Impact factor: 2.451

  10 in total
  2 in total

1.  Dynamics of inter-farm transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N6 integrating vehicle movements and phylogenetic information.

Authors:  Dae-Sung Yoo; Byung Chul Chun; Younjung Kim; Kwang-Nyeong Lee; Oun-Kyoung Moon
Journal:  Sci Rep       Date:  2021-12-17       Impact factor: 4.379

2.  Knowledge and remaining gaps on the role of animal and human movements in the poultry production and trade networks in the global spread of avian influenza viruses - A scoping review.

Authors:  Claire Hautefeuille; Gwenaëlle Dauphin; Marisa Peyre
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2020-03-20       Impact factor: 3.240

  2 in total

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