| Literature DB >> 30429320 |
Christian Hilbe1, Laura Schmid2, Josef Tkadlec2, Krishnendu Chatterjee2, Martin A Nowak3,4,5.
Abstract
Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation based on shared moral systems and individual reputations. It assumes that members of a community routinely observe and assess each other and that they use this information to decide who is good or bad, and who deserves cooperation. When information is transmitted publicly, such that all community members agree on each other's reputation, previous research has highlighted eight crucial moral systems. These "leading-eight" strategies can maintain cooperation and resist invasion by defectors. However, in real populations individuals often hold their own private views of others. Once two individuals disagree about their opinion of some third party, they may also see its subsequent actions in a different light. Their opinions may further diverge over time. Herein, we explore indirect reciprocity when information transmission is private and noisy. We find that in the presence of perception errors, most leading-eight strategies cease to be stable. Even if a leading-eight strategy evolves, cooperation rates may drop considerably when errors are common. Our research highlights the role of reliable information and synchronized reputations to maintain stable moral systems.Keywords: cooperation; evolutionary game theory; indirect reciprocity; social norms
Year: 2018 PMID: 30429320 PMCID: PMC6275544 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1810565115
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A ISSN: 0027-8424 Impact factor: 11.205