| Literature DB >> 30061454 |
Peter Fazekas1,2, Morten Overgaard2.
Abstract
The problem of perceptual consciousness-the question of how our subjective experiences (colours as we see them; sounds as we hear them; tastes, etc., as we feel them) could be accounted for in terms of brain processes-is often regarded as the greatest unsolved mystery of our times. In recent literature, one of the most pressing questions in this regard is whether the neural basis of perceptual consciousness is independent of the neural basis of cognitive access mechanisms that make reporting and reflecting on conscious experiences possible. The Theme Issue focuses on this central problem of consciousness research and aims to contribute to the field by critically discussing state-of-the-art empirical findings, identifying methodological problems and proposing novel approaches.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.Keywords: access consciousness; cognitive access; phenomenal consciousness
Mesh:
Year: 2018 PMID: 30061454 PMCID: PMC6074076 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0340
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci ISSN: 0962-8436 Impact factor: 6.237