| Literature DB >> 29542202 |
Jim McCambridge1, Melissa Mialon1, Ben Hawkins1,2.
Abstract
AIMS: To summarize the substantive findings of studies of alcohol industry involvement in national or supranational policymaking, and to produce a new synthesis of current evidence.Entities:
Keywords: Alcohol; alcohol industry; alcohol policy; corporate; framing; policy making; policy process
Year: 2018 PMID: 29542202 PMCID: PMC6100095 DOI: 10.1111/add.14216
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Addiction ISSN: 0965-2140 Impact factor: 6.526
Policy‐framing strategies.
| Object of framing | Strategy |
|---|---|
| Policy actors | Position themselves as key stakeholders in the policymaking process and partners in tackling alcohol harms |
| Position themselves as key economic actors; i.e. generators of tax revenue/employment | |
| Claim they are responsible actors, unfairly demonized by public health actors and policymakers | |
| • Emphasize that they are a legal industry | |
| • Differentiate themselves from the tobacco industry | |
| Present public health actors as extremists (or neo‐prohibitionists) driven by a moral agenda in order to undermine their credibility and policy influence | |
| The policy problem | Play down the scale of alcohol problems (and thus the need for policy interventions) |
| • frame the alcohol problem in terms of a small minority of problem drinkers versus the moderate majority who are already aware of the need to drink responsibly | |
| • emphasize positive effects of alcohol; e.g. social and health benefits of ‘moderate’ drinking | |
| • focus policy debates on narrow range of harms, issues and subpopulations; i.e. binge and youth drinking; drink driving; drinking in pregnancy; certain areas of the country | |
| Promote individualized accounts of the nature of alcohol problems | |
| • consumer behaviour (misuse), not the product, is the source of harm | |
| • it is unfair to penalize the majority for the actions of the few | |
| Present alcohol and ‘responsible’ drinking as socially acceptable, while alcohol misuse should be socially unacceptable | |
| Policy positions | Oppose the whole population approach and specific measures derived from it; argue they are ineffective ‘blunt instruments’ which fail to address the real policy problems and have unintended negative consequences |
| Oppose: | |
| • minimum unit pricing (UK); argued it is ineffective, illegal and counterproductive; and that it unfairly targets moderate and less wealthy drinkers | |
| • tax increases (except as a ‘less bad’ alternative to MUP) | |
| • advertising, marketing and sponsorship restrictions | |
| • mandatory product labelling regimes | |
| • reductions in blood alcohol levels in drink‐driving laws | |
| • increases in minimum purchase age | |
| Promote targeted interventions (as direct alternatives to whole population intervention), e.g. on parenting style | |
| Promote voluntary, co‐ and self‐regulatory initiatives and partnerships (as direct alternatives to mandatory regimes) | |
| • for public information and education including product labelling | |
| • for advertising and marketing codes | |
| Promote better enforcement of existing laws (i.e. underage sales and drink driving) as opposed to passing new laws | |
| Promote the ideal of evidence‐based policy, but use evidence selectively to support their policy preferences |
MUP = minimum unit pricing.
Policy‐influencing strategies.
| Strategy | |
|---|---|
| Adopt multiple organizational forms | Proceed unilaterally: individual companies lobby government and other policy actors directly; limited mainly to large companies with sufficient access and resources |
| Pursue traditional forms of collective action: form, and participate in, trade associations and develop other forms of collective interest representation | |
| Create novel forms of collective action: use social aspects organizations and ad‐hoc campaign groups to give the impression of independence and as additional channels of influence to | |
| • speak publicly and to government with industry framing | |
| • disseminate research and produce reports to promote industry‐favourable messages | |
| • deliver public information campaigns | |
| • implement self‐regulatory regimes (e.g. Portman Group on advertising) | |
| Use external agencies | |
| • media and public relations consultancies used to shape terms of policy debates | |
| • consultancies used to produce reports on policy issues | |
| • funding think‐tanks creates the perception of independent authority | |
| Engaging policy actors | Long‐term relationship building with key decision‐makers via regular formal and informal contacts including creating reciprocal obligations |
| • financial contributions to political parties/campaigns | |
| • personal contacts and informal networks between industry actors and other policy actors | |
| • providing government with ‘policy goods’; e.g. information, expertise, and policy delivery via self‐regulatory regimes (individually and via trade associations and social aspects organizations) | |
| Short‐term issue specific campaigns in response to events | |
| • adapt strategies pragmatically to the policy context | |
| • venue shifting (e.g. Edinburgh to Westminster) | |
| • legal challenges | |
| Fund or disseminate policy relevant research with supportive findings to create a separate, circumscribed and self‐referential literature using think‐tanks, academics, consultancies and similar policy actors | |
| Constituency building with influential policy actors |
Effects on policy outcomes.
| Study | Availability of data and content of findings |
|---|---|
| Giesbrecht | Examined a wide range of issues in US alcohol policy throughout the 1980s and 1990s, with most detailed data available on the effects on advertising and product labelling policy outcomes. Initial success by public health actors to enact legislation on health warning labels on alcohol products was gradually countered by industry efforts to include labelling content promoting the health benefits of alcohol. Broadcast and alcohol industry groups ran TV public‐awareness campaigns as voluntary alternatives to legislation as part of a package that led to proposals for mandatory regulations being withdrawn. A voluntary ban on spirits advertising was maintained, again avoiding legislative restrictions. The opposition of public health and industry actors make alcohol policy development widely recognized as challenging, with the consequence of inhibiting the development of new policies, apart from in windows of opportunity |
| Bond | No data as not part of study design |
| Bakke & Endal 2010 | An alcohol company was identified to be responsible for the creation of the original drafts of national alcohol policy documents in four African countries. The contents of the final policies in these countries were not studied to provide direct evidence of impacts on policy decision‐making |
| Miller | No data as not part of study design |
| Yoon & Lam 2012 | Despite strong support for economic liberalism and vigorous lobbying by alcohol industry actors, the Hong Kong government was initially resistant to calls to reduce alcohol tax as this was seen as an important source of revenue. Gradually, during the 8‐year period of study, continued industry lobbying, in the face of relatively weak public health advocacy, led to a change in policy with Hong Kong going from a relatively high tax rate to zero duties on wine and beer |
|
Holden | Extensive access to policymaking in the UK Government system, supported by framing activities to promote themselves as partners in alcohol policy, has led to a situation in which industry actors are widely accepted as legitimate actors in the policy process, well positioned to obtain favourable policy outcomes. Following devolution within the UK, the election of a new party of government disrupted the equilibrium previously pertaining to alcohol policy in Scotland. This led to legislation on alcohol minimum unit pricing, despite extensive industry opposition. Public health actors were better able to gain access to policymaking in Scotland than they had been at the UK level, where the privileged access possessed by industry actors was maintained |
| Jiang & Ling 2013 | Coalitions of tobacco and alcohol industry actors, particularly where shaped by instances of shared ownership, have had a number of successes in influencing tobacco control policy in the US. No data are provided on alcohol policies. |
| McCambridge | The alcohol industry submissions to a public consultation on alcohol policy examined in this study constituted one strand of industry strategies to influence alcohol policy in Scotland that were ultimately unsuccessful, as described elsewhere in this table |
| Hawkins & McCambridge 2014 | This study examined the contribution of a global alcohol producer's partnership with a think tank to the reversal of a policy decision on alcohol minimum unit pricing in England. While not designed to draw strong conclusions, the study provides circumstantial evidence of industry influence on decision‐making. |
| Katikireddi | Framing by public health actors in support of alcohol minimum unit pricing was more successful than that used by industry actors in opposing the policy in Scotland (also see above) |
| Kypri | No data as not part of study design |
| Sornpaisarn & Kaewmungkun 2014 | This study principally examines competition between three companies in influencing policy in an oligopolistic alcohol industry. The largest company was favoured by the taxation regime and largely succeeded in preventing the policy changes sought by the other two companies |
| Avery | A parliamentary enquiry recommended the inclusion of mandatory warning labels on all alcohol products against the preferences of industry actors. This did not translate into government policy, which continued instead with the existing voluntary labelling regime among other industry‐favoured measures on fetal alcohol spectrum disorders. |
| Zatonski | The public debate on alcohol policy in Poland was dominated by the views of the alcohol industry and other opponents of a spirits tax increase. Despite this, the tax was implemented, although the Government conceded that the spirits excise tax would not be increased again within the next 2 years |
| Savell | No data as not part of study design |
Figure 1Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta‐Analyses (PRISMA) flow‐chart [Colour figure can be viewed at http://wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Characteristics of included studies.
| Study aims and review‐level observations on strengths of findings | Review‐level summary of data collection and analysis details | Review‐level observations on study limitations | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Greenfield | This interview study draws on documentary data to investigate the US policy process and the handling of specific policy issues. There are important findings on industry arguments, political organization and influencing tactics (e.g. financial donations and lobbying) subsequently replicated, and also key data on policy processes; for example, the dynamics of the US federal policy system, that have not yet been studied further | Uses a rigorous two‐stage sampling approach to recruit multiple actor types involved in policymaking and obtains an impressive response rate in a large sample ( | Few details of how interviews were conducted in included reports. The difficulty of getting industry respondents to talk about policy dynamics is noted. Use made of documentary/archival data in the analysis somewhat unclear in included reports |
|
Bond | This study of internal tobacco company documents takes advantage of Phillip Morris ownership of Miller Brewing Company to provide ‘smoking gun’ data on a range of key issues. It clearly identifies common policy concerns across tobacco and alcohol sectors. Policy issues are identified as key business risks globally, leading to an intention ‘to fight aggressively, with all available resources’ by ‘working behind the scenes’ through ‘a joint defence strategy’ with other alcohol industry actors and external lobbyists | Uses searching guidance for tobacco documents, identifying first 22 then increasing to 29 documents in the later paper on alcohol industry issues. Data unquestionably very strong. Thematic and content analyses are undertaken, although few details provided | Difficult to assess whether there may be other documents that have been missed. It may be possible to question external (i.e. generalizability to other actors) rather than internal validity. Later inclusion and coverage of Reynolds is somewhat unclear |
| Bakke & Endal 2010 | This study uses documentary data along with external data in the manner of a case study. Resulted from the chance discovery of software confirming industry authorship of draft national alcohol policy documents in four African countries. Safer drinking for the entire population was emphasized despite 3/4 being non‐drinkers, and industry‐preferred policies proposed. The industry actor also sought to institutionalize their participation in the processes of monitoring and reviewing resulting policies. This is another ‘smoking gun’ study | Detailed textual comparisons of policy documents used. No methodological details provided for workshop and other data. | It is unclear what impacts industry involvement in drafting these documents had on the subsequent final policies, or if conduct of this study impacted on policy decision‐making. The nature of the unpublished observational, interview and e‐mail correspondence data used, and their analysis, are also unclear |
| Miller | This is a documentary study of alcohol industry actor submissions to an Australian public consultation on prevention and health and the extent to which they promoted Drinkwise, a social aspects organization, to demonstrate corporate social responsibility. Promotion of Drinkwise in all industry submissions is identified | The data set comprises nine industry submissions of a total of 33 relevant to alcohol. Thematic analyses were undertaken. The data set is modest and the reported findings stick appropriately close to it | There are few details provided of the conduct of the analyses. The study focus is somewhat narrow and the resulting data set small |
| Yoon & Lam 2012 | This documentary study examines the policy debate over a zero beer and wine tax in Hong Kong. During an 8‐year period, industry actors came to coherently organize lobbying efforts to connect with key politicians. The importance of ideas in the evolution of the debates and the weak nature of public health advocacy in so doing are also emphasized | Alcohol and related industry material, media reports and government data sources are examined; 97 documents were analysed thematically. First author conducted the analyses | Examples of key search terms only are given, and similarly, indicative types of documents provided. It is thus unclear whether informative documents that would change study findings may have been missed. Few details of analytical methods are provided |
| Holden | This interview study is reported in a series of papers which collectively offer an extensive and coherent account of industry wide organization, policy framing, political strategy and engagement with policy makers in relation to alcohol pricing in the UK during a period of policy controversy. Comparative analysis of Scotland and England was incorporated into the study design | Stakeholder analysis to identify interviewees via purposive and subsequent snowball sampling. High level of access to industry actors. Triangulation between interview respondents (industry and non‐industry actors) as well as with documents/external data sources. Two authors involved in theoretically based analyses. Data saturation considered | Low levels of participation by governmental actors. Possible limitations in novel use of interview alongside documentary data for undertaking framing analyses. Variability in depth of insights across objects of study |
| Jiang & Ling 2013 | This study of internal tobacco company documents aimed to study alliances between tobacco and alcohol industries in the US in 1980s and 1990s. It specifies three main policy areas of collaboration (tax, air pollution and advertising), the industry actors involved and the organizational vehicles created or used for this purpose. It identifies the importance of co‐ownership in the identification of common interests, strategies and coalition building | Examples of the search terms used are given. Extensive use is made of memos in analysing the documents, although it is not clear how documents have been selected. The numbers of documents examined are reported by issue rather than overall | It is unclear which actors have been investigated and thus what may have been missed. The scope of this study, including examination of effects, is more focused on tobacco control than alcohol policy |
| McCambridge | This documentary study examines the use of evidence in alcohol industry actor submissions to a Scottish public consultation on population‐level policy measures that were strongly opposed by industry actors. Misrepresentations of the international scientific evidence on alcohol policies are identified along with other tactics in evidence use | The study uses extensive direct quotation and provides access to 27 submission documents by industry actors. Analyses involved comparisons with the international scientific evidence base and gave weight to the frequency and prominence of evidential claims | The data set is large and it is not clear whether additional findings may have been missed. There is limited detail provided of the conduct of the analyses |
| Hawkins & McCambridge 2014 | This case study examined how a global producer funded a respected think tank to produce reports at crucial stages in the development of the UK government's alcohol strategy. The tactics used to promote industry interests were similar to those used by transnational tobacco corporations, particularly using other, apparently independent, actors to articulate industry arguments | A range of data sources and data collection activities are described including those which capture political events. The design and composition of the case study provides some conceptual framework for the data analysis | Other data sources may have enhanced the findings of the case study. The reports were heavily promoted and a key policy decision was controversially reversed, although the study is not able to directly link the two. The industry actor studied is part‐owned by a tobacco company and may be untypical of other actors |
| Katikireddi | This case study investigated the development of pricing policy in Scotland and identifies two contrasting framings of the nature of the alcohol‐related problems to be addressed, which dominate the underlying policy debate: ‘social disorder’ (promoted by some but not all industry actors) versus ‘health’. This study thus emphasizes the importance of framing in policy debates | Combines both interview and documentary data including textual and oral evidence to a parliamentary committee. Offers a sophisticated, theoretically based approach to data analysis with details provided of the process | The study provides key data on industry actors although the scope is broader, so that there are limitations in the reporting of industry actor specific findings. Nonetheless, the study identifies a key difference in framing between industry actors supporting and opposing the policy measure |
| Kypri | This is a documentary study of submissions to a New Zealand parliamentary committee on a proposed bill to increase the minimum purchase age for alcohol. Industry submissions were highly unified in their opposition to the bill in comparison to those from other sources. Industry actors sought to increase the numbers of submissions opposing the bill | A large data set of 178 submissions, mainly from the public, industry and NGOs was included. Template/thematic analysis was used with doubled coding of data and detailed presentation of findings based on coding | The bulk of the alcohol industry data is presented quantitatively rather than qualitatively. The scope of this study is concerned largely with comparisons between submissions from different types of actors rather than on the industry |
| Sornpaisarn & Kaewmungkun 2014 | This case study examines taxation by beverage category in Thailand during a 20‐year period and efforts by the three dominant alcohol companies to influence decision‐making in line with their interests. The tax regime favoured the largest company and the other two used donations and access to prominent politicians, including the Prime Minister, to lobby for policy change. Conflicts between sectoral interests are emphasized | Multiple data sources used include quantitative analyses of taxation data, participant observations, media reports and parliamentary documents. Two specific events in the policy process are described. Content analyses performed with triangulation between data sources is described | There are few qualitative data originating from the content analyses presented, and it is not clear how data from different sources were used in reaching conclusions. The quantitative data do not include imports. It is not clear how informative events, other than the two described, may be |
| Avery | This documentary study of alcohol industry submissions to an Australian parliamentary inquiry into fetal alcohol spectrum disorders sought to investigate how industry actors contribute to policy development. As in other studies, it found promotion of vested interests including advocacy of ineffective policies, problem minimization and attacks on opponents | This study examines a small data set of five submissions made by four national and one state‐level (Western Australia) trade association covering the main sectors of alcohol production. Thematic analytical methods are used, although not described in detail | There appears little depth to the data available from industry actors. Generalizability to other issues, actors and cultures could be limited, although the findings are similar to those of other studies |
| Zatonski | This documentary study examined framing of the policy debate around an increase in spirits tax in Poland. Industry actors successfully promoted an economic framing of the policy debate in opposition to a health frame, especially in newspapers | This study adds to the literature on the importance of framing, and discursive strategies more broadly, in alcohol policy debates. Identifies precisely all dates and data sources (print media, spirits industry websites, governmental records and parliamentary debates) and 155 documents on the spirits tax were included. Theoretically informed analyses of framing, content analysis and thematic analysis, with origins and outcomes of codes presented. First author conducted analyses | Does not present search terms or strategy. Included data somewhat lacking in depth. Limited coverage of included data sources, e.g. no online media |
| Savell | This study sought to review alcohol industry attempts systematically to influence alcohol policies on marketing. Key arguments synthesized among 17 reports emphasized industry self‐regulation and individual drinker responsibility. Strong commonalities between tobacco and alcohol industry political activities were identified, with variations due most probably to policy context. This first evidence synthesis provides a major milestone in the development of the literature on alcohol industry policy influencing strategies | The 17 reports involve different forms of evidence and only two of 17 reports are included within the present study due to differing foci and study designs (for example, grey literature is excluded here). A rigorous narrative synthesis of included reports is described, with findings also reported in detail. This included involvement of all three authors in analysis, and double coding of all data. A careful comparison of findings with those from a parallel review on the tobacco industry was also undertaken | The report is not reported according to PRISMA guidelines and required content is lacking. Potentially eligible reports may have been missed. The evidential strengths and limitations of individual reports, and the literature as a whole, have not been discussed explicitly |
Other reports from these studies did not fulfil eligibility criteria for this review for lack of sufficient industry actor study focus or data. NGO = non‐governmental; PRISMA = Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta‐Analyses.