| Literature DB >> 29513766 |
Benjamin Grant Purzycki1, Cody T Ross1, Coren Apicella2, Quentin D Atkinson3,4, Emma Cohen5, Rita Anne McNamara6, Aiyana K Willard5, Dimitris Xygalatas7, Ara Norenzayan8, Joseph Henrich9.
Abstract
Researchers have recently proposed that "moralistic" religions-those with moral doctrines, moralistic supernatural punishment, and lower emphasis on ritual-emerged as an effect of greater wealth and material security. One interpretation appeals to life history theory, predicting that individuals with "slow life history" strategies will be more attracted to moralistic traditions as a means to judge those with "fast life history" strategies. As we had reservations about the validity of this application of life history theory, we tested these predictions with a data set consisting of 592 individuals from eight diverse societies. Our sample includes individuals from a wide range of traditions, including world religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism and Christianity, but also local traditions rooted in beliefs in animism, ancestor worship, and worship of spirits associated with nature. We first test for the presence of associations between material security, years of formal education, and reproductive success. Consistent with popular life history predictions, we find evidence that material security and education are associated with reduced reproduction. Building on this, we then test whether or not these demographic factors predict the moral concern, punitiveness, attributed knowledge-breadth, and frequency of ritual devotions towards two deities in each society. Here, we find no reliable evidence of a relationship between number of children, material security, or formal education and the individual-level religious beliefs and behaviors. We conclude with a discussion of why life-history theory is an inadequate interpretation for the emergence of factors typifying the moralistic traditions.Entities:
Mesh:
Year: 2018 PMID: 29513766 PMCID: PMC5841807 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0193856
Source DB: PubMed Journal: PLoS One ISSN: 1932-6203 Impact factor: 3.240
Descriptive statistics of each field site.
| Site/Sample | World Religion | Economy | Children | Years Educ. | Food Sec. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coastal Tanna | Christianity | Horticulture/Market | 44 | 2.52 (1.86) | 8.18 (3.55) | 0.82 (0.39) |
| Hadza | None | Foraging | 68 | 4.28 (2.61) | 1.38 (2.68) | 0.15 (0.36) |
| Inland Tanna | None | Horticulture | 76 | 3.67 (3.53) | 0.63 (2.08) | 0.72 (0.45) |
| Lovu, Fiji | Hinduism | Market | 76 | 2.24 (1.59) | 8.77 (3.78) | 0.14 (0.35) |
| Mauritians | Hinduism | Market | 95 | 1.40 (1.58) | 8.14 (2.98) | 0.65 (0.48) |
| Marajó Brazilians | Christianity | Market | 77 | 2.18 (2.56) | 8.00 (3.53) | 0.10 (0.31) |
| Tyva Republic | Buddhism | Herding/Market | 81 | 1.70 (1.43) | 15.44 (2.29) | 0.72 (0.45) |
| Yasawa, Fiji | Christianity | Horticulture/Market | 75 | 2.00 (2.07) | 9.66 (2.42) | 0.41 (0.50) |
| Grand M (SD) | — | — | 74.00 (14.36) | 2.45 (2.43) | 7.63 (5.37) | 0.46 (0.50) |
Values are means and (standard deviations) for number of children, years of formal education, and food security. See Tables A-B in S1 Supporting Information for additional summary statistics.
Cross-population mean estimates of achieved fertility with 90% credibility intervals.
| Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Food Security | -0.14 | -0.13 | — |
| (-0.30, 0.01) | (-0.27, 0.01) | ||
| Education | -0.03 | — | -0.03 |
| (-0.05, -0.01) | (-0.05, 0.00) | ||
| Age (Elasticity) | 1.02 | 1.07 | 1.01 |
| (0.86, 1.20) | (0.90, 1.24) | (0.83, 1.18) | |
| Male | -0.17 | -0.19 | -0.18 |
| (-0.30, -0.05) | (-0.31, -0.08) | (-0.30, -0.06) | |
| Intercept | -1.94 | -2.31 | -2.01 |
| (-2.55, -1.31) | (-2.88, -1.73) | (-2.64, -1.36) |
Model 1 is the full model, and Models 2 and 3 drop education and food security outcomes, respectively. Across populations, we see proportionality between exposure time to risk of reproduction and number of children, as indicated by the elasticity estimate on age being centered on the value of 1. Males show reduced age-specific production of offspring relative to females. We note reliably negative average effects of education and wealth security on achieved fertility.
*Denotes credibility intervals that do not cross zero.
Fig 190% credibility intervals of mean estimates for factors predicting achieved fertility (Model 1 in Table 2).
Effects to the right of zero are positive and effects to the left of zero are negative.
Fig 2Group-level moralization of local deities appears to increase as a function of group-level material security.
Note that the Hadza are missing due to difficulty with scale items and the Lovu are missing due to a lack of local deity data. This figure illustrates how aggregate, group-level patterns can be misleading for individual-level inferences. Compare this to the null effects in the Local Deity block in Fig 2 and Table D in S1 Supporting Information.
Fig 3Mean estimates and 90% credibility intervals for the levels of moral concern, knowledge breadth, punishment, and self-reported devotional ritual frequency attributed to moralistic (a) and local (b) deities as a function of food security, years of formal education and number of children.
These results hold participant sex and age constant. All values are from the results tables taken from the full models in Tables D-G in S1 Supporting Information. The end points of histograms are mean estimates. We include them for easier visual comparison of relative direction and distance from zero. Narrower error bars indicate more precise estimates. Effects to the right of zero are positive and effects to the left of zero are negative. Error bar symmetry around zero indicates no reliable effect; we found no evidence supporting any of the target predictions about religion.