Literature DB >> 29337264

Indirect reciprocity with negative assortment and limited information can promote cooperation.

Eleanor Brush1, Åke Brännström2, Ulf Dieckmann3.   

Abstract

Cooperation is ubiquitous in biological and social systems, even though cooperative behavior is often costly and at risk of exploitation by non-cooperators. Several studies have demonstrated that indirect reciprocity, whereby some members of a group observe the behaviors of their peers and use this information to discriminate against previously uncooperative agents in the future, can promote prosocial behavior. Some studies have shown that differential propensities of interacting among and between different types of agents (interaction assortment) can increase the effectiveness of indirect reciprocity. No previous studies have, however, considered differential propensities of observing the behaviors of different types of agents (information assortment). Furthermore, most previous studies have assumed that discriminators possess perfect information about others and incur no costs for gathering and storing this information. Here, we (1) consider both interaction assortment and information assortment, (2) assume discriminators have limited information about others, and (3) introduce a cost for information gathering and storage, in order to understand how the ability of discriminators to stabilize cooperation is affected by these steps toward increased realism. We report the following findings. First, cooperation can persist when agents preferentially interact with agents of other types or when discriminators preferentially observe other discriminators, even when they have limited information. Second, contrary to intuition, increasing the amount of information available to discriminators can exacerbate defection. Third, introducing costs of gathering and storing information makes it more difficult for discriminators to stabilize cooperation. Our study is one of only a few studies to date that show how negative interaction assortment can promote cooperation and broadens the set of circumstances in which it is know that cooperation can be maintained.
Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Entities:  

Keywords:  Evolution; Game theory; Knowledge; Replicator dynamics; Reputation

Mesh:

Year:  2018        PMID: 29337264      PMCID: PMC5853132          DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.01.005

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  J Theor Biol        ISSN: 0022-5193            Impact factor:   2.691


  39 in total

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Journal:  Science       Date:  2006-12-08       Impact factor: 47.728

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Journal:  Evolution       Date:  2009-02-13       Impact factor: 3.694

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6.  The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity.

Authors:  Satoshi Uchida; Karl Sigmund
Journal:  J Theor Biol       Date:  2009-12-03       Impact factor: 2.691

7.  The dynamics of indirect reciprocity.

Authors:  M A Nowak; K Sigmund
Journal:  J Theor Biol       Date:  1998-10-21       Impact factor: 2.691

8.  The evolution of cooperation.

Authors:  R Axelrod; W D Hamilton
Journal:  Science       Date:  1981-03-27       Impact factor: 47.728

9.  How should we define goodness?--reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity.

Authors:  Hisashi Ohtsuki; Yoh Iwasa
Journal:  J Theor Biol       Date:  2004-11-07       Impact factor: 2.691

10.  Partner Choice Drives the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect Reciprocity.

Authors:  Gilbert Roberts
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2015-06-09       Impact factor: 3.240

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  2 in total

1.  Reputation structure in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment.

Authors:  Yuma Fujimoto; Hisashi Ohtsuki
Journal:  Sci Rep       Date:  2022-06-22       Impact factor: 4.996

2.  Multi-strategy evolutionary games: A Markov chain approach.

Authors:  Mahdi Hajihashemi; Keivan Aghababaei Samani
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2022-02-17       Impact factor: 3.240

  2 in total

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